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Abstract 
It is argued that the realisation of ecopolitical values, interests and 
demands is inevitably constrained by material interests within advanced 
industrial societies. The policy environment in the state of Tasmania is 
examined, and both a traditional affirmation and accommodation of the 
goals of industrial development, and a resistance to the more recent 
ecopolitical challenge to established state interests is found. However, a 
review of four key environmental disputes finds that the politics of 
ecology ('ecopolitics'), despite routine constraint by material interests, 
continues to defy predictions of its inevitable demise as a 'single issue', 
and continues to gain ground as an ideological force in Tasmania. 
In reviewing the capacity of environmentalists to realise their aims 
(i) the nature and significance of the ecopolitical challenge is considered; 
(ii) ideological contention as a constraint in the realisation of ecopolitical 
interests is examined; (iii) the limits of state response to ecopolitical 
demands are reviewed; (iv) the political expression of conflicting values 
over two decades of Tasmanian ecopolitical conflict are examined; and (v) 
the Tasmanian tradition of underwriting industrial development is 
found to have acted as a 'policy paradigm' confining state action on 
environmental issues. A policy based framework of analysis is adopted 
that acknowledges ideological, political and institutional constraints, and 
is informed by (i) ecopolitical theory, given the deficiencies of traditional 
policy analysis in capturing the nature of the ecopolitical challenge, and 
(ii) power analysis in addressing policy constraint. -This framework 
recognises ecopolitics as a struggle between value contenders, and 
ecopolitical demands as potentially limited by the constraining influence 
of dominant values and industrial interests. 
This framework is applied to analysis of the Lake Pedder, Franklin 
River, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes. 
These disputes are detailed in Chapter Four, then reviewed in Chapter 
Five in terms of the nature of the environmental values at stake, the 
accommodation or frustration of these values, and the actions of the state 
in resolving the disputes. Whilst the ecopolitical challenge is not found 
to have been contained in Tasmania, environmental demands are 
nevertheless found to have been constrained by material values, the 
accommodation of industrial interests, and the institutionalisation of the 
traditional pursuits of development and resource exploitation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Greening of Tasmania? 
On 23rd March 1972, history was in the making in the Hobart Town Hall. 
Tasmanian conservationists had formed the world's first green party, the 
United Tasmania Group (UTG), with two goals in mind. First was its 
goal of campaigning in the upcoming state election against the threat of 
the hydro-industrial inundation of Lake Pedder. Pedder was a natural 
whisky-coloured lake, exquisitely bounded by rugged mountains, glacial 
dunes, pink quartzite beaches and vast button grass plains high up in 
Tasmania's remote southwestern wilderness. Secondly, the UTG aimed 
to exploit Tasmania's unique Hare-Clark electoral system. 1 hoping for 
the election of at least one of their candidates, and, ambitiously, to 
capture the balance of political power in the House of Assembly (Johnson 
1972:86; Rainbow 1992:327). Agreement between the Labor Government 
and Liberal Opposition to freeze the redder issue out of the 1972 election 
campaign had prompted the establishment of the UTG. Its formation 
was both in protest against the bi-partisan political neglect of ecological 
concerns, and in realisation that only 'a new political culture and a new 
movement' would ever achieve its ecological goals (Flanagan 1989:37). 
In the impossibly short three weeks before the 1972 election, the UTG 
successfully raised national and international awareness of the Pedder 
issue, whilst extending its own political platform to embrace alternate 
ecological, industrial, economic and educational directions for Tasmania 
(Johnson 1972). Its principal opponent in both the election and the threat 
to Lake Pedder was the formidable Hydro Electric Commission (HEC). 
1 'The Hare-Clark method is a variety of proportional representation, and uses a single 
transferable vote'. The state is divided into five electoral divisions, each returning seven 
candidates, and allotting seats once a quota of the votes is achieved in each division. The 
system was designed in 1896, not for party purposes, but 'to give representation to small 
sections of public opinion' (Townsley 1976:20). 
1 
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The HEC's notorious independence as a statutory authority was apparent 
in its hegemonic control over hydro-industrial development policy,' and 
its blatantly political, publicly funded, electoral campaign against the 
UTG (Tighe 1992:124; see also 4.2.2, fn 6). 3 Although the UTG failed to 
achieve either of its immediate goals, these few weeks launched a 
political environmentalism in Tasmania that has changed forever its 
typically conservative, ideologically moribund, small island politics. 
The tragic loss of Lake Pedder to hydro-industrial inundation4 is widely 
credited with shocking Tasmanian conservationists into radical activism. 
Every one of the half dozen state elections since has been coloured to 
some extent by an environmental issue. The thwarting by the federal 
government of the proposed Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp mill, 
after bitter and unresolved state disputes, has focused world attention on 
the revolutionary practice of the 'new' politics of ecology in Tasmania. 
As Hay (1993:7) suggests, the state's conservation movement has grown 
increasingly effective, injecting ideological stakes back into its politics, 
and achieving a 'sophistication not matched anywhere else in the 
world'. In 1976, the establishment of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society 
marked a tactical shift by conservationists away from green political 
aspirations and towards activism aimed at securing the southwestern 
wilderness against exploitation (Walker Pam 1989:167). Whilst this goal 
was achieved by the 1984 World Heritage Area declaration, twenty years 
of green activism ironically realised the UTG's political ambitions as 
well, leading directly to control of the state parliament that delivered the 
effective doubling of the world heritage area (refer to Locality Maps 1). 
2 The powers of the HEC are introduced in 1.3.3, and discussed throughout Chapters 
Four & Five. Davis (1993:120) saw the HEC's hegemony as sustained by Premiers with 
infinite faith in hydro-policy, despite its failure to 'deliver' from at least the late 1960s. 
3 (Note -fit - throughout refers to 'footnote number'). 
4 Pedder was drowned by Stage 1 of the 250 sq km Gordon Scheme impoundment in 1974.   
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Locality Maps 1.1 - South West to World Heritage' 
(Sources: Thompson 1981: 55 & DIIVS:1-11990 S z 
Whereas the Lake Pedder dispute spawned the world's first green party, 
each of the Franklin dam, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale 
pulp mill disputes returned at least one environmental activist to state 
parliament' (refer Locality Maps 1.2). In 1989, the signing of the Labor-
Green Parliamentary Accord marked the historic realisation of the UTG's 
early parliamentary ambitions. A record five green independent 
parliamentarians, elected following the Wesley Vale dispute, entered 
into partnership with a Labor minority government, thereby gaining 
qualified balance of political power in Tasmania's House of Assembly 
5 The first three maps from Thompson (1981:55) are intended to only diagramatically 
illustrate the impact of the Gordon Schemes on the southwestern wilderness region. The 
World Heritage maps, however, show actual boundaries. The 1984 WHA area essentially 
comprised, from north to south, the Cradle Mountain-Lake St Clair, Wild Rivers and 
South West Tasmania National Parks. National parks are not otherwise indicated. 
6 Respectively, Dr Bob Brown (Franklin), Dr Gerry Bates (Electrona), Christine Milne, 
Di Hollister and Lance Armstrong (Wesley Vale). Peg Putt, another active campaigner 
and Director of the Tasmanian Conservation Trust, recently replaced a retiring Dr Brown. 
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Wesley Vale Launceston 
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(Larmour 1990). The Accord was shortlived, however, and eventually 
foundered upon the irreconcilable clash of green principles with 
traditional development imperatives. The independents withdrew their 
support for Labor following one too many displays, in Westcombe's 
(1990:193) terms, of its dedication 'to a program of ecologically destructive 
economic expansionism', i.e. its attempt to legislate the hand over of 
Tasmania's native forests as a secure resource to its predominantly 
woodchip and pulpwood forestry industry (Hay & Eckersley 1993). 
Locality Maps 1.2 - Ecopolitical Dispute Locations 
(Source: Base Map Dept. of Environment & Land Management). 
Despite the impressive achievements of over twenty years, I argue in 
this thesis that Tasmania's greening has actually seen bi-partisan 
antipathy to ecological interests entrenched in the state, and that the 
persistent clash between dominant industrial and alternate ecological 
values continues to constrain the efficacy of future environmental 
4 
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demands. This clash of values lies not only at the heart of the Accord's 
failure (McCall 1993), but at the heart of routine and divisive disputes in 
which conservationists, environmentalists and development opponents 
are vilified as 'rat-bag greenie anti-Tasmanians', whilst development 
proponents are lauded as 'good corporate citizens' and 'pro-Tasmanian' 
(Crowley 1989:53). In a small island state of less than four hundred 
thousand people, with limited employment options, and an economy 
reliant upon resource exploitation, 'growthist-greenie' conflict, in 
Kirkpatrick's (1986:2-4) terms, has intruded deeply into Tasmanian life. 
The 'greenie anti-Tasmanian' label was fashioned when state rights 
emotions were running high after the Franklin dam had been thwarted 
by federal government intervention that was upheld by the High Court. 
It affords rhetorical advantage to development proponents, and shapes 
not only environmental and land use disputes, but planning and urban 
conflicts, out of all context to the issues at hand (Crowley . 1989:53). The 
danger of this sort of ritualised conflict, as Hay (1987:7) argues, is that it 
reinforces adherence to dominant ideology, heightening the stakes of 
conflict and operating against all but total victory. Liberal governments 
have used this ritual labelling since the dam dispute to vilify concerned 
citizens and green activists opposed to their development schemes, and 
also to stymie the Labor Opposition. Having lost much of its trade union 
constituency to the Liberals during the Franklin dispute for its own poor 
handling of the issue when in office, Labor will do nothing to antagonise 
the state's development clique. 7 So the 'greenie anti-Tasmanian' 
7 The state's development clique is described by conservationists as comprising the 
Hydro-Electric Commission, corporate consumers of bulk hydro-electric power, trade 
unions and the bi-partisan political backers of hydro-industrialisation (Crowley 1989:48). 
5 
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rhetoric also captures bi-partisan political resentment at the green 
challenge to established politics, and betrays the bonding of old political 
adversaries into resisting the further greening of Tasmania. 
This thesis questions the efficacy of ecological demands in a state that has 
traditionally affirmed industrial development imperatives and natural 
resource exploitation with bi-partisan political backing. It is divided into 
three key areas of inquiry, with Chapter Two theoretically considering 
the nature and significance of the ecopolitical challenge, Chapter Three 
discussing ideological contention as an obstacle to the realisation of 
ecopolitical demands, and Chapter Four reviewing four environmental 
disputes in Tasmania, to consider the role of values, power and the state 
in their resolution. Chapter Four details the disputes in these terms, 
whilst Chapter Five links analysis of these specific circumstances with 
the broader question of the routine accommodation of dominant values 
that is discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Whilst there is ample 
evidence in each of the case studies that Tasmania's greening has been 
constrained by dominant industrial imperatives, it is also paradoxically 
clear that environmentalism has thrived in protest at the circumstances 
of policy constraint. 
1.2 Research Aims, Content and Limitations 
1.2.1 Argument and Aims 
The argument of this thesis is briefly that the realisation of ecopolitical 
values, interests and demands, i.e. those inspired by the 'new' politics of 
ecology, is inevitably constrained by material interests within advanced 
industrial societies. 8 It examines the policy environment in the state of 
8 For the purposes of this thesis, 'ecopolitics' is considered to be interchangeable with 
'environmental politics'. Ecopolitics, or environmental politics, is considered to be a 
politics inspired by ecological concerns. Conservation is not considered interchangeable 
6 
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Tasmania, finding both a traditional affirmation and accommodation of 
the goals of industrial development, and a resistance to the more recent 
ecopolitical challenge to established political interests. Despite evidence 
of Tasmania's 'greening' discussed above, a review in Chapter Four of 
the outcomes of four environmental disputes reveals evidence of the 
routine ability of industry to evoke state support to thwart ecopolitical 
demands. Without federal intervention to halt the Franklin dam and 
the Wesley Vale pulp mill, the outcomes of the ecopolitical disputes 
considered would have invariably seen environmental losses dictated by 
dominant development imperatives. Faced with the bi-partisan political 
priority of natural resource exploitation and hydro-industrialisation that 
was incrementally encroaching upon the south western wilderness, and 
encouraged by the Hare-Clark system of proportional representation, it 
was inevitable that Tasmanian environmentalists would seek not only 
federal intervention, but their own parliamentary representation. 
The argument that environmental demands are subject to the routine 
constraint of prevailing materialism relies upon the conception of these 
demands as ideologically contentious, not as single issues struggling in a 
pluralistic way for attention in the policy arena. It is quite unhelpful to 
consider ecopolitical disputation in Tasmania as 'single issue' politics, 
not least because linking the disputes reviewed in this thesis is the 
common assertion of ecocentric values against exploitative hydro-
industrial and industrial imperatives. The framework of analysis 
required for a review of the efficacy of ecopolitical demands in Tasmania 
is one that recognises the boundaries of ideological constraint upon a 
contending set of values. It is also quite unhelpful to adopt a narrow 
with these terms, since conservationists have been reluctant to become involved in the 
political process in Tasmania, as we shall see in 4.2.2. For the purposes of this thesis, 
green politics is considered to embrace a broader agenda than environmental politics, being 
inspired by ecological concerns to advocate environmental, social, political and economic 
agendas as an alternate political party. 
7 
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policy focus excluding factors such as the constraining effect of dominant 
material values, the routine accommodation of industrial interests, and 
the institutionalisation of the traditional development pursuits. The 
policy based framework of analysis adopted by this thesis, then, is one 
that recognises ideological, political and institutional constraint. It is 
informed both by ecopolitical theory, given the deficiencies of traditional 
policy analysis in capturing the nature of the ecopolitical challenge, and 
power analysis in addressing policy constraint. This framework of 
analysis recognises ecopolitics as a struggle between value contenders, 
and ecopolitical demands, therefore, as potentially limited by the 
constraining influence of dominant values and industrial interests. 
This thesis has a number of interrelated aims: 
(i) Chapter Two draws upon ecopolitical theory to argue that ecopolitical 
demands are ideologically contentious, and therefore both constrained by 
dominant material interests, and requiring a radical distancing of the 
state from traditional growth imperatives before they can be realised; 
(ii) Chapter Three examines environmental policy approaches capable of 
explaining the efficacy of ecopolitical demands in circumstances of policy 
constraint, and argues that analysis must account for the role of values, 
power and the state in environmental policy formation; 
(iii) Chapter Four makes a co-ordinated presentation of four ecopolitical 
disputes in Tasmania, opening with the policy context and circumstances 
of policy constraint, before moving on to the detail of decision making, 
the role of the state and the aftermath of dispute; 
(iv) Chapter Five reviews the disputes in a broader ideological, political 
and institutional sense, after Downey (1987:34), to explain the forces that 
have shaped policy, limited the efficacy of environmental demands, and 
influenced the state in its determination of policy outcomes; and 
8 
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(v) Chapter Six finds that the achievement of key ecopolitical victories 
does not necessarily lead to the legitimation of environmental values, 
and that, until there is a paradigmatic shift sufficient to legitimise 
ecological concerns, analysis should acknowledge that the efficacy of 
ecopolitical demands is limited by the dominance of industrialism. 
1.2.2 Thesis Structure and Content 
The greater detail of the thesis chapters is as follows. Chapter One opens 
with an initial discussion of Tasmania's 'greening', and then discusses 
the thesis aims, content and limitations. The Chapter concludes with a 
brief descriptive account of the Tasmanian ecopolitical setting as the 
starting point for a consideration of environmental policy formation. 
Chapter One explains the thesis, introduces its argument, and establishes 
the Tasmanian context for later discussion. The Chapter introduces the 
argument that the capacity of environmentalists to realise their demands 
is routinely constrained by material interests in advanced industrial 
societies, and suggests that the thesis will provide empirical evidence to 
show that twenty years of ecopolitical struggle in Tasmania has failed to 
subvert a policy environment affirming dominant industrial interests 
over alternate ecological interests despite evidence of the 'greening' of 
other policy areas. 
Chapter Two explains the ideological challenge of environmentalism, its 
efficacy in policy terms, and the limited response of the state to its 
demands. The chapter opens with an ecopolitical literature review, 
specifically literature addressing the ideological distinction between 
dominant (technocentrist) and alternate green (ecocentrist) positions - 
described by Cotgrove (1982:27; see Table 2.1) as counter paradigms. The 
Chapter examines the ways in which environmentalism is considered to 
challenge the established political order and argues that, despite the 
9 
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persistence of the ecopolitical challenge and the achievements of the 
environmental movement, it is this challenge to established order that 
sees environmental demands constrained within industrial society. The 
Chapter turns to a discussion of environmental capacity and constraint 
in policy terms. It reviews environmental efforts and achievements that 
confirm the capacity, even of ideological contenders, to impact within 
pressure group processes of modern capitalist societies. Despite such 
capacity, however, the Chapter establishes the fundamental opposition 
of environmentalism to dominant perceptions of ecology, polity, society, 
nature and knowledge, and finds industrial society therefore a significant 
obstacle to the realisation of environmental policy goals. 
Chapter Three considers the environment as a problem in policy terms. 
The aim of Chapter Three is to establish a framework of policy analysis 
capable of explaining opposing values, causality and the role of power in 
environmental policy making. The Chapter argues that to discuss the 
efficacy of environmental demands, analysis must explain ideological 
constraint as a policy variable and must, therefore, adequately address 
restrictive policy contexts. The Chapter considers the nature of the 
environmental policy problem, reviews frameworks of policy analysis, 
and finds, after Downey (1987), that analysis must indeed acknowledge 
the influence of broad determining factors upon the specifics of the 
policy making process. The Chapter examines the role of causality in 
policy analysis, and introduces power theory into policy analysis to 
explain capacity, constraint and bias mobilisation toward orthodoxy. The 
approach adopted for the purposes of this thesis is a synthesised policy 
model that explains the efficacy of demands in terms of prevailing 
ideology, structures of power and institutional constraint. 
10 
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Chapter Four presents the empirical heart of the thesis, describing each 
of the Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley 
Vale pulp mill disputes - spanning a twenty year period in Tasmania 
that begins with the rise of contemporary environmentalism in the late 
1960s in the state, and concludes with the historic, if shortlived, 
achievement of a Labor-Green Accord government in 1989. The Chapter 
aims to capture the political expression of conflicting value imperatives, 
and to review the efficacy of demands from an environment movement 
that is acclaimed one of the world's most successful (Hay 1993:7). The 
Chapter argues that each dispute involved ideological conflict over 
traditional development practices in a political context constrained by 
hydro-industrial policy imperatives, or by the industrial legacy of 'hydro-
imperatives' after the South West wilderness was secured against 
further hydro-industrialisation. The Chapter finds that without federal 
intervention, each dispute would have been resolved by a state policy 
apparatus demonstrated to routinely favour entrenched development 
interests, whilst constraining or excluding alternate ecological interests. 
Chapter Five undertakes analysis of the Tasmanian material presented 
in Chapter Four. It argues that the routine ability of industrial interests, 
in the disputes examined, to evoke bi-partisan political support confirms 
the limited efficacy of environmental demands within the state policy 
arena. The Chapter considers the dispute outcomes in terms of value 
clash, the power of prevailing interests to mobilise against challenge, and 
the politics of underwriting development. The Chapter examines the 
utility of values, power and the state in explaining environmental policy 
and the routine accommodation of industrial interests in Tasmania. 
The Chapter opens with the historical background behind later 
ecopolitical conflict from Pedder to Wesley Vale. It establishes the 
political tactics used by the Hydro-Electric Commission with bi-partisan 
11 
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political backing to achieve its policy goals and to suppress emergent 
ecological concern. Chapter Five finds that these suppression tactics 
were also used in the 'post hydro-industrial' Electrona and Wesley Vale 
disputes, and that hydro-industrialisation has defined a 'policy 
paradigm' in Tasmania within which mainstream state political and 
economic action has been confined for almost a century. 
Chapter Six concludes by reviewing the thesis of routine constraint upon 
ecopolitical demands in view of the Tasmanian empirical evidence. It 
finds that a broad framework of analysis is required to contend with the 
environmental policy challenge to dominant industrialism, and indeed 
with the mobilisation of bias in Tasmania against ecopolitical demands 
in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes. 
Environmental concern is found routinely constrained in these disputes 
by ideological antipathy between ecopolitical and conservative Tasmania 
- despite victory in the Franklin and Wesley Vale disputes, the demise of 
hydro-industrialisation, the achievement of World Heritage status for 
the South West wilderness, the greening of state parliament, and other 
significant achievements by the conservation and environmental 
movements. Analysis of the Tasmanian disputes finds that constraint is 
inevitable where ideological, political and historical factors favour 
development imperatives over ecological concerns. Only by strategically 
exploiting the overt democratic political arena, interweaving ecological 
values within the mainstream dialogue and politics of their opponents, 
have environmentalists ever prevailed over industrial interests in 
ecopolitical disputes in Tasmania. 
1.2.3 Sources, Scope and Limitations 
The sources for this thesis are both theoretical (ecopolitical, power and 
policy theory) and empirical (Tasmanian environmental and political 
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history and disputes). This thesis was inspired by the author's work on 
the otherwise undocumented Electrona silicon smelter dispute (Crowley 
1989). This study established the inability of silicon smelter opponents to 
prevail in the formal policy arena to halt the project, despite its adverse 
environmental impact. It was also established that the broader policy 
context required examination in order to understand this constraint of 
environmental concerns. The contribution of this thesis to ecopolitical 
theory is its examination of the notion of the mobilisation of bias against 
environmental demands. Its contribution to environmental policy 
analysis is to adopt a 'multi-layered' explanation of the capacity of 
environmentalists to realise their policy demands (in 3.4). Its 
contribution to Tasmanian environmental political analysis is to link 
the detail of the Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona silicon smelter 
and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes as no body of work currently does. 
This study is the first to capture, compare and contrast these disputes 
collectively, and to place them, in terms of policy analysis, within their 
broader ideological, political and institutional context. It presents, in 
Rainbow's (1993:323) terms, 'proper consideration' of the concrete issues 
'that catalyse and motivate' green politics in Tasmania. - 
Several bodies of work were both relied upon and inspiration to this 
thesis. Initially, most inspirational were Crenson (1971), Blowers (1984) 
and Sandbach (1980) for their studies respectively of restricted decision 
making in pollution control, the decisive role of corporate power in 
environmental disputes, and the limitations on environmental policy 
and action imposed by power structures and dominant economic groups. 
In exploring ideological contention in environmental disputes, a range 
of authors were particularly helpful for defining the contrasting pattern 
of values at stake (Berman 1981; Cotgrove 1976, 1982; Eckersley 1992; Fox 
1990; Hay 1988; Paehlke 1989; Porritt 1984; Satterfield 1983; Skolimowski 
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1981; Solesbury 1976; Walker K. J., 1985, 1988, & 1989). In determining a 
framework of analysis, a number of works were encouraging in adopting 
a synthesised values, politics and power approach (Cox et al 1985; Davis 
et al 1988; Downey 1987; Ham & Hill 1984; Simeon 1976). 
In piecing together twenty years of ecopolitical dispute in Tasmania, and 
the historical legacy of resource exploitation and hydro-industrialisation, 
the sources relied upon were extraordinarily diverse and included: Bates 
1983; Burton 1983, 1986; Chapman et al 1986, 1992; Davis 1974, 1975, 1980, 
1981, 1984, & 1993; Economou 1990; 1992; Gee & Fenton 1978; Green 1981; 
Hay 1986b, 1987, & 1992; Herr 1984; Herr & Davis 1982; Johnson 1972; 
Kiernan 1990; Lowe 1984; McEachern 1990; Pybus & Flanagan 1990; 
Southwell 1983; Tighe 1989; & 1992; Thompson 1981 & 1982; USER? 1988 
& Westcombe 1990. Primary sources uses to detail the Electrona silicon 
smelter dispute included Bates 1986, 1991; Burton 1983, 1985, 1986 & 1989; 
Gillies 1984; Stokes 1896; Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates; Walker P. A. 
1988; the Advocate, Examiner, Mercury, Sunday Tasmanian, regional 
newspapers, and various press releases. 
Hall (1984:87-90) appears to have undertaken the only other 'power 
analysis' of a Tasmanian environmental dispute with his discussion of 
the Hydro-Electric Commission's 'non-decision making' in the design 
and implementation of hydro-industrialisation in the context of the 
Franklin dispute. The considerable work of Davis (1974, 1975, 1980, 1981 
& 1993) in reviewing hydro-industrialisation, project evaluation, energy 
politics and political economy in Tasmania provided invaluable analysis 
and political detail. Finally, for insight into the 'ideologically moribund' 
nature of Tasmania pre-environmental politics, Tasmania's apparent 
greening, the character of Tasmanian environmentalism and land use 
politics, and a grasp of ecopolitical theory, I am fortunate to have enjoyed 
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many discussions with Peter Hay, and a close reading of his work (i.e. 
1994, 1993, 1992, 1989, 1987, 198713 & 1986b). 
The scope of the case studies reviewed in this thesis is historically broad 
in covering twenty years of ecopolitical dispute in Tasmania. However, 
it nevertheless addresses four key disputes in specific terms that seek to 
establish the capacity of environmentalists to realise their demands in 
circumstances of demonstrated policy constraint. Whilst these disputes 
provide a reasonably representative picture of ecopolitics in the state, a 
limitation of the scope of this study is the range of other disputes beyond 
those considered in this analysis. The plethora of forestry disputes over 
the last twenty years in Tasmania, for example, is only briefly referred to 
in discussion of the Wesley Vale pulp mill proposal. The utility of the 
disputes reviewed, however, is their representativeness of the 'hydro-
industrial era', (with the Pedder and Franklin conflicts), and the 'post 
hydro-industrial era', (with the Electrona and Wesley Vale conflicts). 
The comparative case study approach adopted furthermore overcomes 
the common limitation levelled at sole case studies. In defence of sole 
studies, as Blowers notes, is their assistance in 'sifting out and defining 
issues for comparative survey' and in the identification of universal 
factors (Blowers 1984:9-10; discussed also in 3.2.1). 
1.3 The Tasmanian Ecopolitical Context 
1.3.1 'South of the Smallest Continents 9 
As an introduction to Tasmanian environmental politics, it is important 
to understand the isolation of the island state, its economic 
vulnerability, its political parochialism, and its natural magnificence. So 
small is the small island state of Tasmania that only 'the Mountain', as 
9 As Bob Brown described Tasmania during the Franklin dispute (Bell & Sanders 1980). 
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locals call the sheltering Wellington Range, separates its capital city, 
Hobart, from the southwestern wilderness. So isolated is Tasmania, 
with its small and stagnant population, its limited domestic market, its 
high transportation costs, and absentee industrial landlords, that its 
economic vulnerability (Callaghan 1977:94-99) and, incredibly, the 
'politics of crossing Bass Strait', have endured since settlement. Indeed, 
so 'endearingly provincial' is Tasmanian politics, that the failure of a 
candidate to identify with his own political party has routinely paid 
electoral dividends. 10 So uncertain of Tasmania's natural identity are 
these parochial old style politicians in Hay's 'Lilliput at the end of the 
Earth' (Hay 1992:87), that they applaud as 'novel tourism' the idea that 
everything possible should be done to make tourists think they are not 
in Tasmania but somewhere else. 11 Policeman should wear English 
'bobby helmets', state forests should be planted with oaks, elm and other 
deciduous trees to create an 'English image', period costume should be 
worn in the hospitality and retail industry, and red 'London' double 
decker buses should roam mainland states promoting a 'distinctly 
different' Tasmania (Legislative Council 1993). 
So 'well and truly forgotten' was this Tasmania by its own country before 
the Franklin Dam dispute, that it was often left off the map of Australia 
altogether (Thompson 1982:10). Yet it is no accident, Pybus declares, that 
10 For his twenty years in Tasmanian politics, Liberal MP Bruce Goodluck enjoyed a 
record approval rating on his very working class image of 'little Aussie Battler'. This was 
untarnished at election time by any conspicuous Liberal imagery (Thompson 1982:10). 
11 A Legislative Council Select Committee inquiring into 'Tourism in Tasmania' 
endorsed this idea, included in the Novel Ideas section of its findings, as 'worthy of 
implementation where practicable'. The 'different image idea' strongly accorded' with 
the Committee's own view that everything should be done to make tourists feel they are 
in a different environment when visiting the state. 
Further novel ideas were for cable cars to travel up Mt Wellington as they do in Banff, 
for example, and for a stone wall, complete with a finger sized hole, to be built across a 
small river in the state's north-west coastal town of Penguin. Visitors would then be 
drawn to recreate the Dutch hole-in-the-dyke-plugging that prevented Holland's 
flooding, just as they are drawn to kiss the Blarney Stone in Ireland (Legislative Council 
1993). 
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from this periphery has come the inevitable challenge to the industrial 
state, a challenge moreover that is a proven paradigm for international 
political change (Pybus 1990:11). The island of Tasmania is remote, 
ecologically distinctive not for its long isolation from the Australian 
mainland, but rather, Kirkpatrick (nd) explains, for its proximity to 
Antarctica. It is a relatively unexploited island, scattered still with the 
artefacts of Aboriginal ancestry and European settlement, and bestowed 
by its, southwestern wilderness with one of the few remaining sub-
antarctic and mountain landscapes in the world (Kirkpatrick nd; Davis 
1980:155). Early explorers were struck with awe at Tasmania's wild 
magnificence, unable to call its jagged mountains, brash cataracts and the 
dense rain forests of the south west 'beautiful', perpetrating instead the 
myth of a 'terrible waste land' (Flanagan 1985:63-70). A century later, the 
defence of Tasmania's wilderness changed forever its moribund politics, 
spawning the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group, a 
forerunner to the Tasmanian, (and subsequently the Australian), Greens. 
From this small island state has come the practice of revolution in 
political vision 'that human material needs do not have pre-eminence 
in the world' (Pybus & Flanagan 1990:11). 
1.3.2 Hydro-industrial Dreaming 
Faced with its own isolation, and with an enduring, fatal dependency 
upon external economies - dubbed by a federal inquiry 'the Tasmanian 
problem' (Callaghan 1977) - the poorest state in Australia turned early to 
hydro-industrialisation in a bid to offer cheap hydro-power as part of a 
package designed to attract industry to the state. The Electrolytic Zinc 
works at Risdon, Cadbury's chocolate works at Claremont, and the 
carbide works at Electrona were each established during the first world 
war on the basis of cheap hydro-power, after which Tasmania's economy 
again stagnated with its most vigorous export for the next thirty years 
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being its youth. Following the 1930 establishment of the Hydro-Electric 
Commission (HEC), 12 post-depression reconstruction championed by the 
Ogilvie Labor Government, saw cement, paper, newsprint, aluminium, 
ferro-manganese and pellet ore industries each enticed by cheap power to 
establish in Tasmania (Townsley 1976:3-4). In terms of state industrial 
development, hydro-industry attraction was Tasmania's sole strategy, 
upheld by successive state governments, and coupled, particularly from 
the 1960s and 1970s, to the exploitation of the state's natural resources. 
Tasmania's 'hydro-response' to its enduring economic problems swiftly 
developed into an hegemonic ideology, with the advocacy and cross 
party support of pragmatic politicians and entrenched administrators 
(Crowley 1989:48). 
In its role as powerful de facto state planner (Herr & Davis 1982), the HEC 
regulated the pace and nature of industrial development in a manner 
critical to Tasmania's political economy (Thompson 1982:23). As one of 
the state's first 'hydro-industries', the Electrona carbide works 
established in North West Bay, Southern Tasmania, ironically only ever 
enjoyed 'success' as a state subsidised bulk user of power, lurching as it 
did from difficulty to difficulty until it was pronounced the state's worst 
corporate disaster on its final collapse in 1981 (Crowley 1989:46). It was in 
the nature of 'hydro-policy', however, that related industrial 
development escaped detailed empirical investigation until the late 
1960s when hydro-industrialisation first threatened Lake Pedder, the 
exquisite 'jewel' of the southwestern wilderness that eventually 
succumbed to HEC inundation. Although the 'hydro-dream' of rapid 
economic growth for Tasmania has long encountered practical 
difficulties, it has always been, Davis (1981:53) notes, 'anti-Tasmanian' to 
12 Initially the Hydro-Electric Department, established in 1914 (Sandercock 1983:16). 
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comment on uncomfortable realities. Dissent has invariably met with a 
terse state response (refer also to Appendix 1). 
1.3.3 The Politics of Power 
Before the advent of environmental conflict in Tasmania, politics in the 
conservative small island state notably lacked intellectual and 
ideological underpinnings, its population, Townsley (1976:41) observes, 
having 'no set views on any particular issue' (Chapman et al 1986:117; 
Hay 1993:1 & 1987:5). As the most decentralised Australian state, region 
and personality had long combined in Tasmania to inspire a 'politics of 
brokerage', that has served to eclipse doctrinal cleavages, leaving the 
policy differences between the State Labor and State Liberal parties 'all 
but indistinguishable' (Sharman 1977:22). In the absence of political 
doctrine, it was the 'deep-rooted ideology' of hydro-industrialisation, 
Hay (1987:4) argues, that went unchallenged for decades 'as the central 
unquestionable plank in what passed in Tasmania for political thought'. 
Meanwhile the practice of hydro-industrial development acted not only 
as a key policy and planning principle, but was fundamental to the 
domination by the Tasmanian Labor Party of the island's state politics. 
Under successive Labor governments, a status quo arrangement evolved 
between government, industry and administration, further strengthened 
by the support of industrially quiescent trade unions, legitimating 
Labor's economic and industrial policy - the parameters of which were 
firmly fixed by the development imperatives of the Hydro-Electric 
Commission (HEC) (Crowley 1989:50). For as long as this arrangement 
remained in place (and under the control of an autocratic Premier) the 
Labor Party's political power had been unassailable. Although a state 
government instrumentality, the HEC was unaccountable - beyond 
ministerial control and the powers of parliamentary investigation, it 
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routinely escaped empirical analysis (Herr & Davis 1982; Davis 1981:5). 
Indeed until public discontent over the handling of the Pedder dispute 
saw Premier Reece lose office as the state's first 'ecopolitical casualty', 
hydro-industrialisation had delivered Labor unbroken rule from 1934 to 
1969 (Crowley 1989:50-51; Crowley 1993; refer to Appendix 2). On the 
basis of Labor's experience, the electoral success of hydro-industrial 
proponents was believed to be guaranteed (Hay 1987:4). 
1.4 Conclusion - Power & Environmental Policy Analysis 
The 'greening' of Tasmania has been a complex achievement given the 
extraordinary circumstances of hydro-industrial policy constraint upon 
the realisation of environmental demands. Against the realisation of 
ecological demands has been unified political support for hydro-policy; 
entrenched bureaucrats and the administrators within the Hydro-Electric 
Commission; Tasmania's trade unionists - particularly those employed 
by hydro-schemes; and, the cultural myth that hydro-development was 
the key to the state's economic prosperity. The early conservationists 
ended up founding a radically new ecopolitical tradition in frustration at 
their routine inability to impact upon industrial policy. As the world's 
first green party, the United Tasmanian Group offered a political agenda 
so radical that it still remains threatening to industrial interests today. 
The policy approach to the explanation of the efficacy of environmental 
demands in Tasmania is in three parts, as explained above. Chapter Two 
considers the nature and significance of the ecopolitical challenge, 
Chapter Three discusses ideological contention as an obstacle to the 
realisation of ecopolitical demands, and Chapter Four reviews the four 
Tasmanian disputes. The role of values, power and the state in the 
resolution of the disputes is considered in further analysis in Chapter 
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Five, before Chapter Six reflects back upon the ideological nature of the 
ecopolitical challenge in Tasmania as an explanation of policy constraint. 
By tracing ecopolitical events from the Lake Pedder to the Wesley Vale 
dispute, this thesis reveals the fundamental realignment of politics in 
Tasmania that has been inspired by environmental imperatives, and 
finds that beneath Tasmania's apparent greening is an antipathy between 
'new' and 'old' style politics so bitter and entrenched that it continues to 
threaten the efficacy of future ecopolitical demands. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
2.1 Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two comprises three main sections: (2.2) Environmentalism and 
its Political Imperatives; (2.3) The Boundaries of Ideological Constraint; 
and (2.4) Ecological Integrity & the Role of the State. The Chapter 
discusses the ideological distinction between dominant growth based and 
environmental values in order to establish the boundaries of ideological 
constraint set by dominant values in the policy process, and to consider 
the distancing of the state from traditional growth imperatives required 
to respond to environmental demands. The Chapter examines the 
ecological challenge to the established political order, the 'mobilisation of 
bias ' 1 against environmentalism as an ideological contender, and the 
growth based political priorities of the state. It argues that, despite the 
achievements of environmentalism, studies of environmental policy 
have identified a plethora of constraints upon the realisation of 
environmental values and demands. These paint a grim picture of 
democratic pluralist society, and lend credence to the mobilisation of bias 
theory whereby issues are organised into (or out of) politics according to 
the extent to which they conform or conflict with inherently capitalist 
values (Schrecker 1990:179). 
The Chapter opens with a review of ecopolitical literature that specifically 
addresses the ideological distinction between dominant growth based and 
the alternate environmental values - described by Cotgrove (1982:27) as 
counter paradigms, or ways of viewing the world. The purpose of this 
review is to counter the notion of environmentalism as 'single issue' 
1 Schattschneider ,(1960) coined the term 'mobilisation of bias' to describe how the 
crucial political problem - the management of conflict - is dealt with. Barach and Baratz 
(1970) used the notion to demonstrate the restricted scope of the pluralist political process, 
and the indirect exertion of influence (See 2.3.4 & 3.3.5 for discussion). 
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politics, replacing it with an appreciation of the ideological significance 
and persistence of ecological concern. The Chapter then identifies the 
constraining influence of industrial policy priorities upon the realisation 
of ecological imperatives, and finds constraint manifest as policy placebo, 
bias mobilisation and symbolic policy making. It reviews the role of the 
state in policy making, and finds the state response to the quest for 
ecological rationality in the policy process limited by its preoccupation 
with economic growth and industrial imperatives. The fundamental 
ecopolitical challenge to dominant perceptions of ecology, polity, society, 
nature, knowledge, and industrial society, it is concluded, remains a 
significant obstacle to the realisation of environmental policy goals. 
2.2 Environmentalism and its Political Imperatives 
2.2.1 Dominant & Environmental Values 
Environmental conflict has been the subject of much analysis - political, 
sociological and philosophical. Though varied, most critiques subscribe 
to the notion of environmental opposition to a dominant paradigm, or 
worldview. 2 The dominant paradigm, Drengson (1980:221-5) suggests, is 
philosophically technocratic, conceptualises nature as a resource, and is 
essentially 'global, transpolitical, transideological', and 'closely connected 
with modern industrial technology and its specialised disciplines'. Not 
only does this worldview operate as a scheme for understanding and 
explaining certain aspects of reality, that is as a social paradigm (Boer 
1984:235), but also as 'the collection of values, beliefs, habits, and norms 
which forms the frame of reference for a collectivity of people such as a 
nation' (Devall & Sessions 1985:42). As an ideological reference point, 
2 See Boer (1984), Catton W. & Dunlap R., (1978); Cotgrove (1976; 1982), Drengson (1980; 
1989), Dunlap R.E. & Van Liere K.D. (1978), Dunlap R.E. (1980), Henderson (1991); 
Jagtenberg (1985), Milbraith (1989:119); Miller (1985), O'Riordan (1981:85), Paehlke 
(1989:143-177), Papadakis (1993:20-24), Rodman (1980), and Routley (1983). 
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the dominant paradigm legitimates and justifies dominant institutions 
and processes (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:345). 
Dominant Paradigm 	Alternate Environmental 
Paradigm 
Core values 	Material (economic 
growth) 
Natural environment 
valued as a resource 
Domination over nature 
Economy 	Market forces 
Risk and reward 
Rewards for achievement 
Differentials 
Individual self-help 
Polity 	Authoritative structures: 
(experts influential) 
Hierarchical 
Law and Order 
Society 	Centralised 
Large-scale 
Associational 
Ordered 
Nature 	Ample reserves 
Nature hostile/neutral 
Environment 
controllable 
Knowledge 	Confidence in science and 
technology 
Rationality of means 
Separation of fact/value, 
thought/feeling 
Non-material (self 
actualisation) 
Natural environment 
intrinsically valued 
Harmony with nature 
Public interest 
Safety 
Incomes related to need 
Egalitarian 
Collective/social provision 
Participative structures: 
(citizen/worker 
involvement) 
Non-hierarchical 
Liberation 
Decentralised 
Small scale 
Communal 
Flexible 
Earth's resources limited 
Nature benign 
Nature delicately balanced 
Limits to science 
Rationality of ends 
Integration of fact/value, 
thought/feelin 
Table 2.1 Counter Paradigms3 
Source: (Cotgrove 1982:27). 
3 Conflict between the opposing paradigms represents what is described as the 'raiding' 
by each of their own respective cultural repertoire of beliefs and values, with which each 
attempts to authorise and provide acceptable reasons for their actions, and by which each 
attempts to gain support for their respective interests. Belief inevitably fuels acrimonious 
debate, explaining emotive attacks upon environmentalists (Cotgrove 1982:88). 
24 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
Countering the dominant 4 worldview, or paradigm, with an entirely 
opposing 'way of seeing' the world is the alternate ecological paradigm. 
The ecological critique is characterised by a strongly negative evaluation 
of many of the central features of industrial society, with the essence of 
conflict between the dominant and ecological paradigm then being the 
creation of national wealth (Cotgrove 1982:27; Table 2.1). In all respects 
the ecological paradigm conflicts with the idea of progress currently 
dominating human society (Satterfield 1983:138;149). Whilst the 
dominant paradigm is characterised by objective procedure, rationality 
and science, the ecological paradigm emphasises subjectivity and natural 
order. As an emerging paradigm, environmentalism brings with it not 
only attitudes and goals, but a philosophical base with which to justify 
and direct patterns of behaviour (Cotgrove 1982:27). Ecological values 
prescribe behaviour which preserves and enhances the eco-system, 
whilst, Jagtenberg argues, inspiring a focus on issues of planetary 
survival, ways of life in harmony with nature, democracy and an 
individual freedom which does not depend on the exploitation of the 
i natural and social environment (Skoliminowski 1981; Jagtenberg 1985). 	1 
1 
The conceptual transformation of values into structured paradigms for 1 
1 the purposes of analysis is a convenient one. Nevertheless, it is fraught 	i 
with problems and contradictions, though the intent here is not to 
pursue these. Briefly, paradigms are abstracted distinctions, describing, 
for convenience's sake, over simplified 'ideal types', and presenting 'a 
false picture of tidy and consistent positions' (Cotgrove 1982:10; Miller 
1985:22). In reality, the boundaries are much more blurred and difficult 
to sustain (Papadakis 1993:22). Certainly difficulties arise whilst holding 
4 Cotgrove qualifies the term 'dominant' as 'not dominant in the statistical sense of 
being held by most people, but in the sense that it is the paradigm held by dominant 
groups in industrial societies, and in the sense that it serves to legitimate and justify 
institutions and practices of market economy' (Cotgrove 1982:27). 
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ecological values in a material world (Paehlke 1989:155; Cotgrove 
1982:50), with implications for inconsistencies between belief and actions. 
A further difficulty of paradigmatic analysis, is its suggestion that values 
are contained within boundaries, 5 betraying positivist assumptions 
whereby reality is capable of being so ordered. It is rather more likely that 
values permeate and define, eventually to such an extent that one 
position emerges as distinct from another. Discussion here will focus on 
factors which may constrain the emergence of an ecological position, 
rather than wholly concentrating upon distinctions between the 
opposing paradigms. In considering power, environmental policy 
analysis, and the realisation of ecopolitical goals, the notion of opposing 
paradigms is nevertheless a useful one in identifying the fundamental 
conflict of values at stake. 
2.2.2 Difficult Shades of Green 
The contemporary Green movement is widely regarded as one of the 
most tactically advanced of the new political forces (Hay 1989:20). Based 
on the pillars of ecology, social responsibility, grass roots democracy and 
non-violence, Eckersley sees the ecological paradigm lending itself 'to a 
powerful critique of the status quo as well as providing a constructive 
vision of an alternative future' (Eckersley 1988:54-5). In political terms, 
the Green movement describes its own manifesto as - 'neither left nor 
right, but out in front', 'where a strong emphasis on conservation and 
spiritual values may be found nestling up to a commitment to 
redistribute wealth not merely between classes but between continents 
and between generations' (Parkin 1989:17; Cotgrove & Duff 1980:347). The 
political impact of new social movements 6 of which, Offe argues, 
5 Drengson suggests viewing paradigms as 'artforrns' to then better appreciate the need 
to avoid conceptual rigidity (Drengson 1980:225). 
6 To Offe these are represented by feminist, human rights, peace, environment, and 
alternative or 'dual' economy movements (1985:860). 
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'environmental protection' is one, has been to disrupt the linear model 
of the political universe. 7 In terms of parliamentary politics, neither 'left 
nor right' is neither liberal nor conservative but 'alternate', the linear 
model then becoming a triangle with new politics its apex (Offe 1985:857- 
860; Cotgrove & Duff 1980:347). 
However, just as there are problems in idealising an ecological paradigm, 
so are there problems in defining 'environment protection' as the basis 
of a new social movement akin to the others described above by Offe. 
Firstly, as Porritt reminds us, it is quite wrong to assume that all 
environmentalists are green for there are 'almost as many shades of 
opinion within the environment movement as there are within politics 
itself' (Porritt 1984:4-5). Porritt illustrates this diversity argument with 
Cotgrove's (1982) three categories of environmentalists: (i) the 
conservationist traditionalists who do not oppose industrialism but hope 
to rescue or conserve remnant natural areas from the worst excesses of 
industrialism, and as such tend not to be green; (ii) the reformists who, as 
centrists support the dominant paradigm, do not oppose industrialism, 
are nervous about fundamental change, and would resent being called 
green despite their deep concern for a whole range of environmental 
issues; and (iii) the radical libertarian environmentalists who reject 
industrialism, bureaucracy, hierarchy and technological fixes to 
environmental crises, who advocate self-sufficiency and personal 
autonomy, and who are usually green (Porritt 1984:4-5). 
Secondly, as Eckersley (1992b:160) has argued, 'theorists who apply new 
social movement typologies to the Green movement are more likely to 
locate the Green movement within the humanist tradition and thereby 
lose sight of its radical ecocentric component or at least mistake it for 
7 See also (Eckersley 1992:151) and inglehart Sr Rabier (1986:473-9). 
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something else'. She suggests that the normative disagreement over the 
identity of the Green movement 'may be analyzed in terms of the 
different interpretations given to the status and meaning of the principle 
of ecology in Green politics' (Eckersley 1992b:158). Eckersley's analysis of 
green identity establishes: (i) the rainbow interpretation of being green 
held by some movement participants, including ecosocialists, who see 
the Green movement pragmatically as part of an alliance of new 
movements in which ecological concern is anthropocentric or human 
centred, and therefore not privileged vis-a-vis the concerns of other new 
social movements; and (ii) the alternate, ecology first interpretation held 
by participants and theorists that the Green movement 'ought to be 
deemed a new social movement in its own right' with an ecological 
perspective then providing 'the framework within which all social 
problems should be integrated and resolved'. The ecology first 
interpretation is itself further split by an 'anthropocentric' and 
'ecocentric' cleavage, i.e. between arguments for environmental 
protection on 'purely human centred grounds' or on ecocentric grounds 
where wilderness and threatened species are protected 'for their own 
sake' (Eckersley 1992b:158-159). 
The philosophical foundations informing the ecological paradigm have 
been as contested as its political and social characterisation. Eckersley 
(1992b:26) notes that 'the anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage follows the 
ecophilosophical cleavage that is central to the relatively new but rapidly 
expanding field of environmental philosophy'. Ecophilosophical 
thoughts ranges from the 'shallow', reformist ecological position, which 
8 Skoliminowski distinguishes ecophilosophy from mainstream philosophy by 
describing it as 'life-oriented' rather than 'language oriented', committed to human 
values, to nature and to life itself rather than committed to 'objectivity, to detachment, to 
facts', as 'spiritually alive' rather than dead, as 'comprehensive and global' rather than 
'piecemeal and analytic', as 'concerned with wisdom' rather than the 'acquisition of 
information', as 'environmentally and ecologically conscious' rather than oblivious, as 
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focuses upon reforming dominant attitudes, to the 'deep' ecological self 
identification with nature and the equal valuing of all entities (Fox 
1985:26). For ecophilosopher Warwick Fox, the study of deep ecological 
principles as propounded by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1973) 
has resulted in Fox's own rejection of the term 'deep' in favour of 
'transpersonal' ecology (Fox 1990:197). With this term Fox describes the 
expansion of the self beyond ego to the rest of nature, the consequence of 
which is necessarily ecologically ethical behaviour (Fox 1992:11). Within 
ecophilosophical circles, both the deep ecological principle of non-
anthropocentric identification, and the more profound transpersonal 
ecological identification, will no doubt continue to be contested, to 
evolve, to inform debate over the characterisation of Green political 
identity, and to play a key role in the analysis of ecopolitical conflict (Fox 
1989 and 1990; Nash 1989; Norton 1984; Sylvan & Bennett 1986). 
2.2.3 Transforming Industrialism? 
Since its political emergence, environmentalism has been characterised 
by a diversity of ideologies and utopias as Cotgrove suggests 'just beneath 
the surface of arguments about pollution, limits to growth, or the 
population explosion', and offering equally diverse solutions to 
ecological problems from anarcho-socialist communes to technocratic 
world government (Cotgrove 1976:23). Even the briefest overview of 
environmentalism suggests that the green project of transforming 
industrial society is in fact a green reformist or anthropocentric ecology 
first project rather than a radical libertarian or ecocentrist project. The 
ecocentrist project on the other hand is emancipatory, seeking not to 
transform but to liberate both human and non-human species from the 
domination of industrialism, relocating the 'human emancipatory 
aligned rather than unaligned with 'the economics of the quality of life', and as 
'politically aware' (Skoliminowski 1981:28-52). 	
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struggle' within an ecocentric context rather than remaining 'wedded to 
the long standing tradition of anthropocentrism - a tradition that is partly 
responsible for our present environmental problems' (Eckersley 
1992b:159). 
Inspired by ecocentrism, emancipatory theorists9 (Eckersley 1992:21-6), see 
capitalism and communism similarly dedicated to growth, expansion, 
the materialist ethic and the domination of nature, uniting these 
opposing ideologies in an all-embracing super-ideology of industrialism 
(Porritt 1984:43). 10 Industrialism, Goldsmith argues, asserts humanism 
above naturalism, individualism above communitarianism, materialism 
as 'the opiate of the people', scientism above culturalism, technologism 
over natural systems, institutionalism over self regulation, and 
economism over ecologism (Goldsmith 1988:205). 11 In terms of planetary 
exploitation, emancipatory theorists see the ideological divide between 
liberalism and Marxism as overwhelmed by industrialism. 12 The 
modern ecological crisis is then 'the quintessential crisis of industrialism 
rather than just Western capitalism' (Eckersley 1992:22). Still dividing 
9 Eckersley (1990:769) describes Mlle most widely recognised ecocentric emancipatory 
currents in Green political thought' as: deep/transpersonal ecology; bioregionalism; social 
ecology; and eco-feminism. Despite their differences, she says these schools share 'an 
ecological orientation and are critical of philosophical dualism (particularly 
human/nature dualism), the domination of nature, and instrumentalist approaches to 
social and ecological problem solving'. 
10 Environmentalists, Porritt stresses, reject the 'staggeringly foolish' trade offs at the 
heart of industrialism - of the environment against material progress, and of the future 
against the present - trade offs which he claims fundamentally threaten our very 
survival. Furthermore only environmentalism, he claims, genuinely opposes the dominant 
world order (Porritt 1984:20;216). 
11 Rudig and Lowe (1986:271) suggest that Goldsmith's 'counter idea of an ecological 
society' is sophisticated, complex and problematic - for leading to 'a number of proposals 
rejecting women's emancipation and the integration of foreigners, strengthening law and 
order, and courting the idea of authoritarian government'. 
12 Nevertheless, Tucker (1992:201) argues, 'liberalism has better ecological credentials 
than Marxism precisely because the democratic processes it recommends provide the only 
feasible mechanism for environmental protection'. Walker notes that late most widely-
accepted political philosophies, Marxism and Liberalism, assume abundance, and their 
internal logic is incompatible with conservationist, "steady-state", or "stewardship" 
approaches to environmental management' (Walker 1985:10). 
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theorists however, as Eckersley observes, is the way toward" 'an 
ecologically benign, conserver society' and toward the post-liberal social 
and political theory best addressing 'the interrelated social and 
environmental problems of the modern world', be it 'neo- or post-
Marxism, democratic socialism, utopian socialism, anarchism, feminism 
or some revised combination thereof' (Eckersley 1992:25; also Cotgrove 
1976:31 on the lack of consensus amongst utopian environmentalists 
about alternatives to industrialism). 
Most opposed to the notion of ecocentrism and the ideological novelty of 
environmentalism are anthropocentric eco-socialists 14 and eco-Marxists 
to whom the environment movement offers no end in itself, but is 
merely 'a stage in the larger struggle' against capital. Environmental 
problems to these theorists are therefore 'epiphenomena of capitalism', 
rather than important in their own right (Walker 1979:29). Ryle's eco-
socialist line against the ideological novelty of environmentalism 
suggests that 'the values of the Greens, their commitment to justice and 
liberty, cannot be adequately anchored in "ecology" but derive from a 
long tradition of progressive thought and struggle - liberal, libertarian 
and socialist' (Ryle 1988:12-13). More recently, Pepper reasserts the time 
honoured claim of elitism against ecocentrics, i.e. that their affinity is 
with the middle class whilst their suspicion remains of both capital and 
labour" - hence the ecocentric penchant for welfare liberalist, and 
13 In fact this is a serious problem underlined by Frankel's (1989:25) comments that the 
environmental critique lacks 'detailed images of how to organise economic and social 
institutions which will not result in tyranny, mass unemployment, poor welfare services 
and so forth'. Unless combined with the insights of other movements, he warns, the green 
goal of planetary survival will do nothing to distinguish us from the stone age. 
14 Pepper (1993:58) argues that the 'red critique of ecologism is an attempt to pull it 
towards a more modernist outlook, involving: (i) a form of anthropocentrism; (ii) a 
Marxist-informed (materialist and structuralist) analysis of what causes ecological crisis; 
(iii) a conflictual and collective approach to social change; (iv) socialist prescriptions for, 
and visions of, a green society'. 
15 Whilst opposing material wealth, for example, environmentalists have been 
described as a 'bourgeois movement', predominantly middle class and therefore well 
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democratic socialist, policy prescriptions (Pepper 1993:46). Pepper's 
ideological taxonomy of political philosophy and environmentalism, 16 by 
his own admission, tends to blur the distinction between ecocentric and 
anthropocentric green politics. His claim is that whilst ecocentrists 
consider themselves a 'deep' radical' and 'bioethical' green, all greens 
make social policy prescriptions and there is, in his view, no evidence 'to 
distinguish ecocentrics from the rest, since there are, of course, traditional 
political philosophies which are equally as radical as ecologism, if not 
more so' (Pepper 1993:47-8). 
Emancipatory theorists generally counter anthropocentric criticism by 
arguing that whereas eco-socialism and eco-Marxism would change and 
control the direction of ecologically destructive modern science and 
technology, only ecocentrism rejects the core values of industrial society 
responsible for ecologically destructive outcomes (Cotgrove 1976:25). 
Ecocentrists would furthermore assert Fox's five arguments against 
anthropocentrism: 
that it is empirically bankrupt, theoretically disastrous, practically 
disastrous, logically inconsistent, morally objectionable, and 
incongruent with a genuinely open experience (Fox 1990:18-19). 
However, Cotgrove does not suggest that threat of ecological degradation 
or catastrophe acts to promote any particular alternative society. 'The 
same danger' he says, 'may be (and is) used as a lever to promote 
different remedies' (Cotgrove 1976:34). As an emancipatory theorist who 
entrenched growthists with the ability to literally pay for the consequences of 
environmental policies (Beresford 1977:104; Cotgrove & Duff 1980; Eckersley 19896; Lowe 
& Goyder 1983:10; Morrison & Dunlap 1986). 
16 Pepper's typology ranges from anti-industrial, radical, traditional and conservative 
greens to mainstream greens whose aims are radical but whose methods are reformist, and 
to green anarchists and eco-feminists, whom he claims share radical aims and methods. 
Mainstream, anarchistic and eco-feminist greens start from an ecological imperative but 
straddle liberalism and socialism. From the perspective of this typology, and for the 
purposes of 'settling social issues', Pepper sees the 'red-green debate' as divided into the 
two camps of modernism (red) and postmodernism (green) (Pepper 1993:46-7). 
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asserts environmentalism as ideologically distinctive, Satterfield (1983) 
argues, not for catastrophe as a lever for the collapse of industrialism, but 
for the inevitable decline of the 'progress ideology' given its weakness as 
a belief system, and structural dissimilarity to historically dominant 
ideologies. Whilst 'progress' merely rests upon the twin supporting 
pillars of growth and abundance (Satterfield 1983:136), 
environmentalism, he argues, addresses the four historical, existential, 
destinational and ethical questions of philosophy which an ideology will 
inevitably seek to answer, i.e.: 
(1) where did I and my society come from? (historical); (2) who am I 
and what is my society? (existential); (3) where are I and my society 
heading? (destinational); and (4) what is right and wrong? (ethical) 
(Satterfield 1983:138). 
By contrast, the 'idea of progress', although successful in having moved 
humanity away from the world of primitive societies, attempts only to 
achieve higher and more complex systems, and to rise above natural 
constraints - the extent of the triumph over nature thereby acting as 'the 
yardstick of modernity'. Satterfield's argument is firstly that there are 
structural similarities between environmentalism, Marxism and 
Christianity, and secondly that the structural differences between these 
ideologies and the 'idea' of progress point to the increasing efficacy of 
environmentalism, and the abating of progress in the Western world 
(Satterfield 1983:136). 
2.2.4 The Limitations of 'Issue Attention' 
To summarise debate over environmentalism thus far, it would seem 
that ecopolitical analysts essentially agree on the emergence of an 
ecological belief system or paradigm in opposition to the dominant 
paradigm of industrialism.. Theorists nevertheless readily identify many 
contested 'shades' of green political thought within this so-called new 
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ecological paradigm - from the 'light' green anthropocentric reformists to 
the 'dark' green ecocentric emancipists. Indeed healthy debate within the 
green political 'community' continues to rage on a number of issues 
from its own philosophical and historical underpinnings, through a 
plethora of alternate community visions, to differing prescriptions for 
green political action. Within such debate, the 
anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage is emerging to preoccupy theorists as 
they respondu to Eckersley's charge that this cleavage has been largely 
overlooked in particular by social movement theorists. Such theorists 
have then either missed or underplayed, she argues, 'the significance of 
the contribution of the radical ecocentric stream within the environment 
movement', and have thereby failed to identify the 'most novel and 
distinctive current' feeding into the Green political movement (Eckersley 
1992b:160). As Hay (1988:27) observes: 
It might be concluded that environmentalism is nothing more than 
a diffuse set of precepts that can be put to the service of all strands of 
contemporary political thought. Such a conclusion is erroneous. 
There is a set of core values to environmentalism - the values of the 
ecological paradigm which cluster around the key value of 
ecocentrism. Ideological interpretations of environmentalism that 
do not acknowledge this view of the [hu]man-nature relationship 
fail to identify the essential tenet of environmentalism. 
Despite the significance of this emergent and divisive theoretical debate, 
the ecological worldview is widely heralded as ideologically distinctive - 
indeed by Paehlke 'as coherent as any of the three classical ideologies of 
17 For recent response see: Weale (1993:342) who argues that Eckersley is caught in a 
contradiction, (when she seeks to spell out the programatic implications of her position), 
that 'democratic and environmental aspirations', in her preferred model of social 
organisation, 'may fall apart if the demos fails to be as committed to ecocentrism as she 
supposes'; Wells (1993) who argues for an anthropocentric environmental position on the 
grounds that humans cannot logically hold an ecocentric position and that this in any case 
promotes an ethos 'without clear guidelines for human action'; and Pepper (1993:246) who 
argues for the privileging of humans to achieve ecocentric material and spiritual outcomes 
whilst avoiding the 'slippery slope' ecocentrism threatens to misanthropy. 
See also Fox (1990:19-20) for his critique of authors such as Pepper whom he argues 
commit the fallacy of misplaced misanthropy in equating the ecocentric critique of human-
centredness with a critique of humans per se. 
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liberalism, conservatism and socialism', and with 'the potential to 
become the first original ideological perspective since the middle of the 
nineteenth century' 18 (Paehlke 1989:3). Historical, philosophical, political 
and scientific attention to environmentalism belies predictions made 
over twenty years ago that 'ecology' was a single issue that would, as 
Schrecker reminds us, succumb to the vagaries of Downs's 'issue 
attention cycle' (Downs 1972:43; Schrecker 1990:165). Despite 'pernicious 
and persistent' convention, it is then wrong, Hay argues, to describe 
'environment' as 'mere issue', or indeed 'a single issue' that will fit 
within a broader issue-context (1993:8). 19 Indeed, even as Downs 
relegated environmental issues to the ranks of domestic issues that 
would, after initial alarmed discovery and the realisation of the cost of 
solution, gradually lose the public's attention, the 1973 Ninth World 
Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) had 
determined otherwise. 28 
Twenty years ago, the 1973 IPSA Congress addressed the environment as 
a political problem with long term effects and catalysing properties that 
had in policy terms already begun to influence and threaten institutional 
structure and behaviour (Milbraith & Inscho 1975). 'Environment' was 
identified, not as a conventional domestic issue, but as (i) novel in public 
affairs and therefore slowly assimilated into the normal processes of 
politics particularly given its threat to 'cherished assumptions and 
18 See Hay (1988:27) who argues that 'environmentalism is probably most 
appropriately seen as a new and separate ideological stream, in competition with the 
older contenders, and stemming from radically different base principles'. 
19 It is rather a comprehensive system of interlocking and mutually reinforcing values, 
a fully-fledged tool (that is) for interpreting social existence - a competitor not with other 
issues, but with the other great ideological systems; socialism, liberalism, conservatism 
(Hay 1993:8). See Warhurst (1983) for a discussion of the impact of conservation on 
'single-issue politics.' 
20 See L. W. Milbraith and F. R. Inscho - Chapter Two "The Environmental Problem as 
a Political Problem", and L. Caldwell - Chapter Six "Environmental Policy as a Catalyst 
of Institutional Change" in Milbraith and Inscho (1975) which compiles a selection of 
papers presented to the Congress. 
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personal economic interests'; (ii) general in that 'environment represents 
qualities accessible to entire populations and is not easily reduced to 
specific, individual, personal interests'; (iii) expansive with ultimate 
boundaries that remain obscure in advance of experience and with policy 
therefore directed at 'moving targets', and; (iv) incompatible with 'the 
specialised institutional hierarchies and professionalism that 
characterises modern industrial society', given the 'interdisciplinary or 
holistic approach of ecology' (Caldwell 1975:98-100). 
The limitation of Downs's (1972:39-41) issue cycle, on the other hand, is 
that it is narrowly focused upon the stages of public attention to discrete 
environmental issues without any reference to greater contextual debate 
over the character of the ecopolitical challenge or the emergence of a 
global environmental movement. Instead, Downs describes: (1) the pre-
problem stage: where a problem exists, is recognised by experts and 
groups in the field, and is usually far worse than when it finally receives 
public recognition; (2) alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm: 
where the general public is alerted to an issue and there is enthusiasm for 
dealing with it; (3) realising the significant cost of progress: people realise 
that the cost of actually solving the problem is likely to be very high; (4) 
gradual decline of public interest: new issues drive out the old, which in 
any case has suffered from the 'hurdle' of cost realisation, and; (5) post 
problem stage: where the issue loses its primary position on the agenda, 
receives only spasmodic attention, and is just ahead of (1). 
Rarely quotedn by supporters or detractors, however, is Downs's (1972:43) 
concession that unlike many other social issues, environmental issues 
may well endure despite the vagaries of his issue attention cycle. Indeed 
Downs expected concern about the environment to linger rather than to 
21 Sandbach (1980:33) appears to be a rare exception in his critique of Downs. 
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expeditiously complete the attention cycle. Certain features, he conceded, 
protect 'environment' from 'the rapid decline in public interest typical of 
many other recent issues', - such as the broad nature of environmental 
problems, and the potential for broad public concern over such problems 
to overcome political divisiveness. He also concedes that the hurdle of 
cost realisation may be overcome where blame for a problem, pollution 
for example, can be easily attributed to industry, and where the cost to 
industry of resolving the problem can be defrayed by higher prices to the 
consumer. Indeed, by his own analysis, ecology fails the test of Downs's 
issue attention thesis, particularly with his projection of the growth of an 
environmental protection industry and the institutionalisation of related 
bureaucratic programs. Downs concludes with an unconvincing and, in 
hindsight, a flawed qualification that, despite signs of issue sustainability, 
the American public's capacity for easy boredom will hasten the demise 
of ecology as a public concern (Downs 1972:46-50). 
2.2.5 Legitimation and the Clash of Values 
Sandbach argues that the apparent decline in environmental concern in 
the early 1970s could never be accounted for by Downs's pluralist view of 
issue attention. Inflation and unemployment had brought about a swift 
end, at this time, to a period of unparalleled economic expansion and 
social change. In this climate, Sandbach argues, there was more than a 
shift of public concern away from environmental issues. Anti-growth 
and limits to growth concerns were dismissed, he suggests, for their clash 
with dominant economic imperatives (Sandbach 1980:33-34). To 
comprehend this, a materialist understanding is required stressing 'the 
importance of the economic and social base for concern', and the 
processes by which conflict and conflicting interests are accommodated 
through debate, institutional change and legislation. Sandbach's (1980:35- 
36) conflict-accommodation model describes: (1) a pre-issue stage; (2) 
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political agitation and proposals; (3) a clash with capital interests; (4) an 
accommodation of differing interests with the development of new 
institutions, legislative compromise, explanation and apparent solutions; 
and (5) subsequent issue decline as the process of accommodation reduces 
the threat of the social problem, either comprehensively or in an 
ineffective, piecemeal fashion. 
In 1980, when Sandbach was reviewing Downs's model, there appeared 
to be declining environmental concern, and indeed a shift of attention to 
other issues. It was not then apparent that environmentalism would 
persist as a social issue and intensify as a political force, although not for 
the reasons outlined by Downs in the qualifications to his attention cycle, 
as will be discussed shortly. Downs offers a superficial analysis of issue 
politics from a mainstream pluralist perspective that his supporters 
embrace uncritically, for example in 'writing environment off' as having 
declined into the post-problem period (Richardson & Jordan 1985:90). In 
Eckersley's terms, these supporters 'miss or underplay' environmental 
politics which they describe as a 'loosely arranged bundle 22 of causes and 
controversies' commanding cyclical attention that existing institutional 
structures then adequately accommodate by processes of adaption (Kellow 
& Moon 1993:245, 252-253). This analysis misses what Leiss (1979:258) 
describes as the dual 'demand-perspective' significance of environmental 
issues, where explicit demands may be made for governments to resolve 
single issues, however motivated by a broad ecological critique of society. 
In Sandbach's terms, there are critical problems with Downs's pluralist 
attention cycle. Firstly, it ignores the fundamental conflict of interest 
between environment and capital underlying issue emergence, (which, 
as we have seen, contributes to the distinctive characterisation of the 
22 From Downs' (1972:50) 'bundle of issues' called improving the environment. 
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Green movement); secondly it fails to identify pressure from capital to 
'confine issues to safe areas of debate' in accommodating concern; and, 
ultimately, it fails to account for the support by economic interests of 
ideologies ('comprising beliefs, theories and ideas') that 'serve their own 
interests'. Issue analysis consequently fails to identify the dominance of 
ideas that marginalise environmental concerns whilst appearing to 
resolve them (Sandbach 1980:36-38). An alternate critique would, as 
Cotgrove and Duff's does, emphasise the essence of conflict between the 
dominant industrial and the alternate environmental paradigms, and 
the consequences of this in terms of the realisation of opposing value 
imperatives, emphasise that is: (i) the fundamental difference in belief 
about nature, economy, politics and society; (ii) the hegemony of 
dominant ideology which 'legitimates the institutions and politics of 
industrial capitalism'; and (iii) because of its 'taken for granted character', 
the ability of the dominant social paradigm to 'systematically repress the 
articulation of alternate viewpoints' (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:345-347). 
The hurdle that environmentalism faces, in the light of a broad critique 
that acknowledges environmental opposition to industrialism and the 
hegemony of economic imperatives, is the hurdle of issue legitimisation. 
The struggle for legitimisation is a struggle to revise the power relations 
between prevailing economic and contending environmental values. 
An issue achieves legitimacy, Solesbury argues, where it is generalised 
beyond a particular instance, attracts party political support, prompts a 
government policy response, becomes associated with wider values, and, 
in the process of gaining legitimacy, stimulates the evolution of new 
values. Environmental demands face particular ideological difficulties in 
seeking legitimacy, however, given the preoccupation of political parties 
with economic growth and exploitative ideology, and their shying away 
from environmental ideology and its anti-growth imperatives (Solesbury 
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1976:388). Giddens argues that, within advanced capitalist societies, it is 
prevailing ideology that sets the boundaries within which decisions will 
be made, influencing the kinds of issues that may develop, and limiting 
the possible policy options for consideration (Giddens 1981:200). In these 
terms, groups in tune with dominant values will have a significantly 
greater chance of gaining attention, influencing policy and achieving 
legitimacy than environmentalists, who are antagonists of dominant 
economic goals, and relative political outsiders in the policy process 
(Cotgrove & Duff 1980:341). 
2.2.6 The Persistence of Eco politics 
It may not have been apparent twenty years ago that environmentalism 
would transcend single issue politics, persist as an ideological force, and, 
in Fox's terms, 'unfold' 23 in a plethora of directions - historic, scientific, 
ethical, social, political and global. 'Single issue' or 'issue attention 
analysis' explains neither the persistence of ecopolitics nor indeed the 
enduring inspiration and complex policy demands of ecocentrism. In 
search of a simple solution to a difficult political phenomenon, issue 
analysis simply fails to engage with the turbulent debates within 
contemporary green political theory and so totally misses the significance 
of the ecological struggle for legitimacy in a material world. It misses as 
well the transition of environmental concern from reform to radical 
change driven by the enormous difference that Porritt (1984:14) describes 
between ecological and industrial values, and the powerful opposition to 
any real change that Cotgrove and Duff (1980:335) argue has led 
environmentalists to challenge the central values and ideology of 
23 Fox advocates a cosomological, 'transpersonal' basis for the identification of all 
identities as autonomous modes of a 'single unfolding process' i.e. as leaves on the 'tree of 
life'. The realisation of such a sense of commonality then leads to identification more 
with the tree than with the individual 'leaf of our own 'self', and a recognition therefore 
of the freedom that each entity should enjoy to unfold in its own way (Fox 1992:13). In this 
sense, environmental history, science, ethics, politics, societal and global imperatives are 
each unfolding facets of the evolving tree of environmentalism. 
40 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
industrial society. Kellow and Moon (1993:227), nevertheless, dismiss 
environmental issues as 'relating to mundane human wants', and 
return them to the 'linear' politics of redistribution alongside 
mainstream policy areas such as health and education. In doing so, they 
misrepresent the character of environmental issues, and the capacity of 
mainstream systems to accommodate them. 
Behind the persistence of ecopolitics is the persistent failure of policy 
processes to satisfactorily resolve ecological concerns. Ecology remains 
novel and problematic in policy terms for its recognition of 'the 
ecological interrelation of so many environmental elements hitherto 
regarded separately' (Solesbury 1976:380). With such recognition of the 
principles of wholism, interconnectedness, ecological integrity and 
quality of life, Leiss explains, emerges a 'new way of seeing connections 
among different concerns' that is fundamentally incompatible with 
established interests: 
Neither our market economy nor our methods of public decision-
making were "designed" with environmental concerns in mind 
(Leiss 1979:259-260). 
Historically, the terms of ecological analysis are not seen by its critics as 
new, but are argued to have roots in, for example, Malthus's warnings 
about population, in the romantic critique of 'mechanistic reason 
characteristic of the Enlightenment', and even, for its apocalyptic tone, in 
'countless messianic movements' (Dobson 1990:35). To such critics, 
ecology will eventually be submerged as its antecedents have been 'by 
their dominant and opposed counterparts', by governments, that is, that 
have managed to reconcile such demands before (Dobson 1990:35; Kellow 
and Moon 1993:238). Dobson, however, argues that the 'ecologism' born 
of the early 1970s is indeed novel, not for its terms of analysis, but for its 
historical specificity - i.e. for 'being posited here and now' and for paying 
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ecological attention to the 'potentially terminal state' to which the 
'slavish usage' of mechanical reason has led us (Dobson 1990:35). Hay 
explains that l[t]hough conservation and preservation movements have 
long been with us, the modern environment movement is a historical 
discontinuity', ... 'born to action, inspired by science and led by scientists' 
(Hay 1988:27). 
Leiss argues that many divergent sources came together in the 1960s to 
turn environmental problems into social issues, and that it was both 
inevitable and necessary that our political economy would respond by 
seeking to contain the emergence of ecological concern within its own 
limits, a process captured by Sandbach as the accommodation phase of his 
'conflict-accommodation' cycle, with those limits being: 
the capacity of existing institutions to manage problems in such a 
way that the general alignment of established social interests - such 
as the distribution of wealth and power - is not unduly threatened 
(Leiss 1976:259). 
That environmentalism has failed to be contained 24 is testimony to its 
'unfolding', and to the evolution of the politics of ecology from its early 
'limits-to-growth' and 'doomsday' origins (see further discussion in 
2.4.1). Hay observes that this shift was one from 'scientific doomsdayism' 
24 The proof that environmentalism is persisting is readily available. By the mid 
1980s, more than one million Australians had joined a total of 800 registered 
environmental organisations (Jagtenberg 1985), reflecting a growing community interest in 
political action - commensurate to a loss of faith in decision making by traditional 
politicians and governments as being in the best interests of citizens (Tighe & Taplin 1989). 
The combined membership of 1 in 10 Americans who belong to environmental groups is 
further more larger than any of the nation's political parties, and has equally created a 
social phenomenon of the discontent felt by citizens there against customary societal 
values (Lowe & Goyder 1983). In Britain, Lowe and Goyder estimate that nearly three 
million people belong to an environmental group, a larger number than the membership of 
any political party or trade union, with a 1983 poll establishing that 12 per cent of the 
population would vote for an ecology party if it were given the choice. A comprehensive 
survey of international green politics by Parkin finds that Greens have contested elections, 
with mixed success, in at least twenty countries, on political platforms which she sees as 
proposing the most radical redistribution of power and wealth ever contemplated - 
sharing it not merely between classes but between continents and with future generations 
(Parkin 1989:216). 
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to a contemporary focus on questions of ethics and political theory and 
practice, with the environment movement turning 'hard about' in the 
mid 1970s when its scientific spokespersons were superseded by 'a new 
breed of social theorist' (Hay 1988:22; 1989:20). The irony of this 'shift', 
Paehlke observes, is more recent environmental opposition to many of 
the institutional practices inspired by earlier generations of consensual, 
conservative ecologists as mechanisms for resolving their conservation 
concerns (Paehlke 1990:43). Cotgrove describes this as the environment 
movement being forced from a consensual to a conflictual framework, 
and from a concern with reform within a framework of consensual 
values, to a radical challenge of societal values and the very institutions 
and practices of the market economy (Cotgrove 1982:10,27). It is to a 
consideration of why the movement was 'forced' into this reorientation 
that we now turn. 
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2.3 The Boundaries of Ideological Constraint 
2.3.1 The Difficulty of Influencing Policy 
To understand the practice of ecopolitics, one must understand not only 
the diverse and problematic character of the ecological imperative, but 
also the policy constraint of dominant industrial ideology. As we have 
seen, ecological demands within advanced capitalist societies are made 
where the expression of dominant growth-based, rather than alternate, 
ecological goals have shaped the structures and processes of decision 
making, and indeed underpin the nature of the entire political system. 
As Drengson (1980:227) argues, the technocratic mindset of the dominant 
paradigm sees 'the systematic application of technology to all levels of 
human activity, including government and economic policies which 
have growth as their central aim'. Policy is then not the product of an 
objective system but of a process that 'assumes, expresses and helps create 
a whole system of human values' (Vickers 1972:29), in this case the 'web 
of decisions and actions' that favours industrial over ecological values 
(Ham & Hill 1984:11). 25 
The industrial system maintains its 'monopoly in social purpose' in the 
event of a dispute between opposing ideologies, Cotgrove suggests, 26 by 
routinely favouring the dominant ideology, and must be appreciated in 
environmental policy analysis. Having established, in 2.2, the complexity 
and persistence of ecopolitical demands, this section establishes the 
25 Chapter Three is dedicated to the problem of environmental policy analysis given 
the subversive nature of ecological demands. However, policy in Chapter Two is discussed 
as an end goal sought by environmentalists. 
26 Cotgrove (1982) cited in Miller (1985:25). The maintenance of a built-in bias toward 
orthodoxy in the political process represents 'norm holding', in Vickers's terms, or the 
keeping to the centre line and away from threatening boundaries or critical thresholds, 
beyond which norms suffer radical, self exciting and thereafter irreversible change. To 
experience such change would also be to witness, or partake in, the dissolution of the 
existing system, in this case industrialism. Norm holding acts as the necessary control in 
averting that eventuality (Vickers 1972:34-5). 
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difficulties that environmentalists face in seeking to influence policy. As 
value contenders in the policy process, environmentalists additionally 
face the challenge of weakening the growth-based paradigm, its political 
structures and its ideologically sustained legitimacy. Such a task would 
involve refocussing the vision of every day life and transforming the 
social world away from the interests of capitalism (Gouldner 1976:24). 
'Unsocialised outsiders' unwilling to respect the 'rules of the game' 
within the dominant paradigm, however, find little or no attention is 
paid to their arguments, and that legitimacy is achieved only by those 
groups whose demands accord with conventional procedure (Giddens 
1981:199-201; Gouldner 1976:249; see also 2.3.3). The dilemma for 
environmentalists is whether to resist the political mainstreaming of the 
'green vision', or to work within the bounds of conventional politics at 
the risk of reinforcing the societal status quo which is perceived to be the 
root cause of ecological concern. Whilst there is strength in resisting the 
mainstream and playing the ideological politics, as Gouldner (1976:249) 
suggests, of an outsider,27 there is equally an urgency to 'rescue the 
remnants of non-human nature' by political participation in 
environmental affairs (Livingston 1984:61-62). 
The response of environmentalists to the difficulties of realising their 
demands in a material world has scarcely been uniform. As Vincent 
(1993:248-251) argues, ecological political practice is indeed as complex and 
as resistant to type as ecological thought, even more so for failing to 
follow the ground rules of its own philosophy. 28 Vincent [1993:251; see 
27 'Ideological projection' may afford an outside interest its own unique base of power 
(Gouldner 1976: 24; 249) to which the evolution of green politics, for example, may well be 
testimony. 
28 Here Vincent is referring to Dobson's (1990:70) view that 'although political 
ecologists might publicly give human-instrumental reasons for care of the environment, 
they are likely to have been motivated to do so by considerations of the intrinsic value 
theory'. See also Eckersley (1993:124) where, in reviewing recent developments in 
environmental political theory, she argues that: 
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also Hay 1992(b) in Hay & Eckersleyi discusses a serious lack of contact 
between eco-philosophers and the practitioners of ecopolitics, explained 
by the former as 'professional rigour and academic 
compartmentalisation' and by the latter as 'fine words butter no 
parsnips'. His own typology attempts to address both the diversity of 
approaches within the ecological perspective and the relationship of 
ecophilosophy to ecopolitical practice. Both ecophilosophy and 
ecopolitics range, to add Eckersley's insight to Vincent's terms, from 
'light' green reformist to 'dark' green emancipist, with a 'middle 
position' that is described by Vincent as 'intermediate'. Light green 
reformist ecopolitics embraces conservation, preservation, single issues, 
and recreation. It may be 'divorced from the ecology perspective 
altogether', and it 'characteristically works within existing institutional 
frameworks and political processes' (Vincent 1993:263). The intermediate 
ecopolitical position embraces eco-capitalism, social ecology and eco-
socialism, and is essentially reformist, however with greater ideological 
and philosophical commitment than light green reformism. Vincent's 
final 'deep' ecopolitical position embraces the 'dark' green advocates of 
'total value change in society' - such as bioregionalists, eco-feminists, the 
'eco-right', eco-fascists and the Earth First! movement (Vincent 1993:264- 
265).29 
That there is no consensual ecopolitical response to the policy problem of 
'environment' is seen both as the environmental movement's strength 
and weakness, whilst highlighting the problem of ideological contention 
within mainstream policy processes. The strength in the environment 
While politics and ethics are clearly connected to, and informed by, particular 
ontologies, such connections are neither logical nor necessary ones. Both inclusive 
and dualistic conceptualisations of nature can be used to ground different 
environmental ethics carrying different social and political consequences. 
29 Vincent (1993:256) depicts ecophilosophy in 'light', 'intermediate' and 'ecocentric' 
terms, from anthropocentric to non-anthropocentric and deep ecological positions. 
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movement's diversity is apparent in Vincent's typology of ecopolitical 
forces for change operating from a range of 'light', 'intermediate' and 
'dark' green philosophical positions, with change then possible at a 
variety of levels. Whilst Goodin prefers a rather unlikely single moral 
vision, or green theory of value, 30 to 'the confluence of various different 
theoretical commitments and practical emphases' that is green politics, 
he notes that 'incoherence and inconsistency' is indeed seen by some as 
the virtue of green political programs (Goodin 1992:86-87). Hay explains, 
in his own plea for diversity 'at the level of theoretical input', that, 'in 
generating a green praxis, a respect for the dynamics of internal difference 
should be the touchstone - just as the preservation of biodiversity should 
be a prime external goal of political action'. That 'contradictory activist 
impulses have damaged the movement' is, in Hay's (1992b:227) view, no 
cause for a 'single theory' or a 'canon of approved orthodoxy' to inform 
it. 
Diversity is problematic, however, when recriminations and enmity 
erupt between ecopolitical groupings at times threatening to overwhelm 
ecopolitical opposition to industrialism: 
Social ecologists attack the deep ecologists for engaging in mystical 
claptrap. Deep ecologists, amongst others, attack the ecosocialists as 
still at root being tied to industrial growth, and therefore being part 
of the environmental problem. Reformists attack the social 
ecologists as redreaming the hopelessly nostalgic utopias of 
nineteenth century anarchism (Vincent 1993:263). 
30 Goodin (1992:15) argues that a green theory of value is '[alt the core of green political 
theory's public policy choice', providing unified moral vision by virtue of which 'the 
green agenda can legitimately be thought to form something akin to an all-or-nothing 
package'. To this he adds a 'green theory of agency' to advise how one is to go about 
pursuing those values identified by his 'theory of value'. 
Eckersley (1993:116-117) identifies a number of problems with Goodin's approach 
which briefly she calls 'a radical and distinctive environmental theory but an uncritical 
and conventional political response that takes the institutions and regulative ideals of 
liberal democracy as "givens". Of interest here is Eckersley's (1993:119) claim that InJo 
analysis of power or structural constraints is offered' by Goodin 'and no attempt is made to 
forge any theoretical links between social and ecological concerns'. 
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The potential for enmity exists between theoretical positions along any 
number of axes, principally along the ecocentric-anthropocentric axis - to 
which Vincent quite blithely makes no reference despite evidence, as we 
have seen, of its increasing significance. In terms of ecopolitical practice, 
the differences between his 'light', 'intermediate' and 'dark' greens, is 
complemented by historically distinctive greens, (from the early 
conservationists, through the single issue environmentalists, to green 
political activists), and problematic groupings of diverse interests 
endeavouring to thrive as green alternate political parties within 
mainstream political systems, with the most infamous tension being that 
between the 'fundis' and 'realos' of the West German Greens, or Die 
Grunen, before German reunification. 31 
2.3.2 The Power of Industrialism 
Equally as problematic as the diverse response of environmentalists to 
the difficulties of realising ecological demands in a material world, is the 
task of identifying and reviewing the mechanisms acting to constrain 
them. Ecological critiques of humanism, industrialism, materialism and 
capitalism, although suited to this purpose, are not necessarily suited to 
the greater task of prescribing ecologically sound future societies. The 
intention here, however, is to review ideological constraint and the 
power of prevailing ideas for subsequent empirical analysis, rather than 
to engage in debate over contested paths to eco-topia. Paradigmatic 
analysis is a useful starting point for identifying dominant industrial and 
alternate ecological worldviews and the mobilisation of bias toward 
'conforming' rather than 'contending' values. We may ask how, and 
31 'Fundis' or 'fundamentalists' oppose coalitions, consider green politics to be extra-
parliamentary and geared at undermining the existing order, and may be Marxist, 
socialist or spiritualist. 'Realos', 'realists' or 'radical reformers', however, favour 
pragmatic politics and coalitions (Porritt and Winner 1988:213). For an important update 
on the fate of the West German Greens since reunification, in particular the obstacle of the 
new national electoral system, the rise of material over post material values and the 
emergence of the Alliance 90/The Greens political successor to Die Grunen see Jahn (1993). 
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how well a political economy can respond to environmentalism, given 
its challenge, in Berman's (1981:49) terms, to the mental framework of a 
world defined by capital accumulation. Will the political economy then 
seek to contain environmental concerns, as Leiss suggests, with its 
institutions managing environmental problems only without detriment 
to material interests such as the established distribution of wealth and 
power? (Leiss 1979:267). Or are there perhaps exclusion rules and 
mechanisms, as Offe argues, built into the institutions and structures of 
capitalism which, contrary to democratic political theory, constrain 
political events and screen out non-capitalist demands? (Ham Sr Hill 
1984:74;177). 
Studies of environmental policy and conflict have certainly identified a 
plethora of constraints upon the realisation of environmental demands, 
lending weight to the mobilisation of bias argument, (discussed in 2.3.4) 
and illustrating how it might operate, for example by: consultative 
processes suppressing proper consideration of environmental concerns; 
administrative hostility to the environmental challenge to economic 
affairs (Cotgrove 1982); tendencies to define environmental problems as 
narrowly as possible (Leiss 1979:262); prevailing elite control of policy 
making that sustains industrial interests (Miller 1985); developers 
keeping their intentions secret to facilitate the success of their operations, 
whilst denying environmentalists access to information (Sandbach 
1980:107); corporate resistance to environmental hazard regulation; 
legislative controls of limited effectiveness (Schrecker 1985); 
manipulative participation processes; ineffectual environmental 
bureaucracies (Paehlke 1989); loss of crucial environmental information 
in the decision process (Socolow 1981:163); efforts to upgrade pollution 
control thwarted by a conspiracy of delaying tactics (O'Riordan 1981:246); 
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and legislation which lulls and contains environmental conflict rather 
than properly resolving it (Dempsey & Power 1973). 
Lindblom (1982:334) now relies upon bias mobilisation to assert the 
power of the market and to question the validity of liberal democratic 
theory, given the way that the market, through the power of business, can 
constrain policy options available to governments. 32 In a view close to 
determinist Marxism, he (1982:332) declares that 'no market society can 
achieve a fully developed democracy because the market imprisons the 
policy process'. The market is consequently treated not as a variable, but a 
fixed element around which policy (including our thinking on 
environmental protection) is fashioned. Lindblom argues for the need to 
identify mechanisms of constraint that imprison thought and vigorously 
frustrate social change (Lindblom 1982:333). He suggests that one such 
mechanism protecting market interests is an 'automatic punishing recoil' 
whereby reform, pollution control for example, is suppressed by market 
threats, such as industry threats to relocate to avoid compliance. The 
power of the market, Schrecker argues, is the power 'to shape the overall 
economic context and agenda of government policy into which 
environmental protection must fit'. To describe environmental policy 
and to fail to 'acknowledge the uniquely powerful position of business in 
political life' is then to describe Frankenstein 'with the monster left out' 
(Schrecker 1985:10). 
32 Once one of the leading proponents of pluralism, Lindblom (1983:384) recently 
conceded that his arguments on the privileged position of business and on 'circularity 
through indoctrination' are antagonistic to the pluralist concept 'that while many social 
groups are involved in political activity, this activity is constrained because the political 
agenda is biased in favour of corporate power' (Lindblom in Cox et al 1985:224-231). 
Galligan (1984:87) notes that Lindblom now argues that politics is pluralistic on 
secondary rather than primary issues, with even many secondary issues settled between 
business and government officials. 
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Perhaps the most influential study of agenda control, bias mobilisation, 
non-decision making and politically enforced neglect of environmental 
concern is Crenson's study of the 'unpolitics' of air pollution, (discussed 
below, also in 3.2.3). This demonstrates empirically the relative power of 
industrial interests in Gary and East Chicago, USA, to prevent air 
pollution from becoming a political issue (Crenson 1971). Crenson finds 
politically imposed limitations upon the scope of decision making, which 
is then channelled and restricted by the process of non-decision making, 
or enforced neglect. He identifies the power reputations of people and 
groups in the community as potentially deterring action on sensitive 
environmental or political issues. Power in these circumstances is then 
not only of the ability to influence existing political issues, but to define 
and control issue emergence, whilst stunting the political consciousness 
of the public by excluding certain issues such as pollution from the 
agenda, and, incidentally, by occasionally denying would-be leaders their 
opportunity to achieve prominence (Crenson 1971:21; see 3.2.3 for further 
discussion). Blowers (1983:407) finds similar evidence of suppression of 
the air pollution issue in his case study of the London Brick dispute 
discussed in 3.2.4, whilst Schrecker (1985:10) suggests corporate polluters 
are protecting their own privilege by resisting the 'opening-up of access to 
information and of participation in the regulatory process'. 
2.3.3 Communicative Distortion as Policy Privilege 
The ecological imperative is further impeded by a failure of discourse 
within industrial societies to appreciate and accommodate core ecological 
values, a failure that Cotgrove argues threatens the legitimacy of the 
political system. He explains that whilst communication problems have, 
in the last two decades, been couched in terms of the need for improved 
access and attention to more meaningful participation, the problem of 
understanding is in fact deep rooted between the opposing values of the 
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industrial and ecological paradigms - within which '[f]acts  are interpreted 
and acquire meaning': 
It is because protagonists to the debate approach issues from different 
cultural contexts, which generate different and conflicting implicit 
meanings, that there is mutual exasperation and charges and counter 
charges of irrationality and unreason. What is sensible from one 
point of view is nonsense from another. It is the implicit, self-
evident, taken-for-granted character of paradigms which clogs the 
channels of communication (Cotgrove 1982:82). 
Fundamentally at issue are competing values, with rationality a policy 
privilege of the dominant rather than the ecological paradigm. As Table 
2.1 shows, 'knowledge' in the dominant paradigm is characterised by 
confidence in science,33 the rationality of means, and the separation of 
fact/value and thought/feeling, whereas the ecological paradigm sees 
'knowledge' characterised by belief in the limits to science, the rationality 
of ends, and the integration of fact/value, and thought/feeling. 
The objections of environmentalists to natural resource exploitation, to 
the nuclear power industry, to the terms of public debate and inquiries, or 
to environmental decision making processes which fail to accommodate 
ecological concern, are typically seen as irrational from the perspective of 
the dominant paradigm, by which 'reason' is a technocratic, scientifically 
based concept. Science is then a privileged concept in debate about the 
environment, employed to 'get the facts right' and to find a technical 
solution, whilst values remain the preserve of 'eco-maniacs', 'eco-nuts' 
and the 'irrational'34 (Cotgrove 1982:81). Rational explanation of the 
persistence of ecological concern then points to the failure of technology, 
whilst deeper analysis points to a failure of discourse. In his analysis of 
33 Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion to pursue, it is worth noting the 
debate about the role of science in the domination of nature captured in Eckersley's 
(1992:104-106) discussion of the failed promise of critical theory from the perspective of 
ecocentrism. 
34 This is a classic tactic for weakening or ignoring a group's demands, i.e. by defining 
them as 'extremist', 'unpatriotic', 'Reds', or whatever, and heading off the legitimacy of 
their challenge, or even a basic demand for rights (Giddens 1981:200). 
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the controversy surrounding the proposed Tocks Island Dam, 35 Socolow 
(1981:152) explores these themes and concludes that: 
The failure of technical studies to assist in the resolution of 
environmental controversies is part of a larger pattern of failures of 
discourse in problems that put major societal values at stake. 
Discussions of goals, of visions of the future, are enormously 
inhibited...[P]ublic debate is clothed in a formality that largely 
excludes a large part of what people care most about. 
The dilemma for environmentalists mentioned above of whether to 
resist the mainstreaming of the 'green vision', or to work within the 
bounds of the societal status quo, thereby reinforcing the root cause of 
ecological concern, is heightened by the exclusion of ecological discourse 
from mainstream policy processes. To 'gain entry' into the dominant 
discourse, Socolow notes, environmentalists must assume self-
censorship and talk in the language of their avowed opponents. 36 
Dialogue then proceeds under false pretences, causing participants great 
bitterness and losing valuable ecological information in the decision 
process (Socolow 1981:163). In such terms, the environment movement 
was perceived to have 'come of age', Evernden argues, when it replaced 
its 'shrill emotionalism' of the late 1960s with 'hard nosed research' and 
35 Briefly, Socolow (1981:152-153) argues for a re-orientation of technology to one 
responsive to an environmental ethic. He expresses the dissatisfaction of 
environmentalists with the way in which discourse precludes the articulation of concerns 
that move them, and of the alternatives envisaged by them to exploitative land use. 
36 In discussing Naess's 'formal sense of deep ecology' (which will not be pursued here), 
Fox illustrates the difficulty of 'a minority group' communicating a radical challenge 
within 'a dominant tradition': 
The views of any group that offers a radical challenge to a dominant tradition 
appear distinctly odd, to say the least, from the perspective of the dominant 
tradition. The consequence of this is that if a minority group wants the views 
that they advocate to become dominant, then they are more or less forced to 
argue their case from the level of basic assumptions ... in order to demonstrate 
to members of the dominant tradition that the minority group's more specific 
views are actually quite sensible when viewed within this alternative (and, 
the minority group hopes, more appealing) context. In contrast, however, 
members of a dominant tradition are not forced to do this. The very fact that 
their tradition is the dominant one means that almost everyone in that society 
(whether supporters of this dominant tradition or not) will have at least a 
tacit understanding of the basic assumptions that underlie the more specific 
views that are expressed by members of that society's dominant tradition (Fox 
1990:132-133). 
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'careful planning'. This shift in tactics may have worked in terms of 
appearing 'more reasonable', but it also made it difficult to speak of value 
and meaning whilst balancing objective facts. Any decisions taken to 
preserve the environment on these grounds enslave nature to human 
use, and are inherently reversible 'for as soon as its worth is greater as tin 
cans than as scenery, the case for the mountain vanishes' (Evernden 
1985:11). Where environmentalists tacitly acknowledge the societal goals 
they had initially challenged, they fall neatly into Ehrenfeld's 
'humanist's trap' where utility to industrialised society is the sole 
justification for the existence of anything on the planet. To enter such 
discourse, Evernden concludes, is to pay a rental fee of 'a kind of 
emotional lobotomy' for the use of the 'tools of respectability', and so 
become 'that contradictory being, a dispassionate advocate' (Evernden 
1984:11-12). 
Communicative distortion, where status quo values skew ecological 
debate, and discourse failure, where ecological values are lost in decision 
making processes, represent the kind of evaluation permitted by our 
societal institutions as simply too narrow to accommodate the concerns 
of the environmentalists. 37 Socolow proposes a 'more playful discourse', 
fully expressing the diversity of preferences and emotional commitments 
of its participants, whilst Dryzek suggests, after Habermas, 'freely 
discursive institutions' and a new 'communicative rationality' in an 
autonomous public sphere if 'instrumental rationalisation' is to be 
undermined, and discourse is to be rescued from the state, capital and the 
market (Socolow 1981:169; Dryzek 1990:102-106). Dryzek furthermore 
argues that nature merits resurrection by 'the right kind of rationality' 
37 McCall (1993:27) presents an excellent case study of this point in arguing discourse 
failure as the reason for the collapse of the Tasmanian Labor/Green Accord Government in 
which the Green Parliamentary partners to the Accord found themselves saddled with 
'dubious' decision making mechanisms hostile to their own agenda. 
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rather than by any 'particular spirituality' such as deep ecology. He rejects 
the so-called 'spiritual' approach to rescuing ecological discourse on two 
grounds, firstly that it is incapable of addressing the complexity of 
ecological systems, and secondly, that it offers no effective 'theory of 
transition ... let alone any practical political program' (Dryzek 1990b: 199; 
201; see also discussion in 3.3.5). 
2.3.4 Rationality, Domination & Bias Mobilisation 
The difficulty facing Dryzek's project is that the ecological rationality he is 
seeking is logically inconsistent. This is because Dryzek appears to lose 
sight of Cotgrove's 'deep rooted' opposing industrial and ecological 
worldviews. He fails, that is, to capture the core motivating values of 
ecocentrism that he describes as neither rational nor 'enamoured by spirit 
and suspicious of any kind of reason' (Dryzek 1990b:198). Rationality 
lends no legitimacy to ecological values, and holds little promise of the 
'integration' rather than the 'separation', in Cotgrove's (1982:27) terms, 
of 'fact/value' and 'thought/feeling' in mainstream policy processes. 
Whilst ecocentrists seek the liberation of nature from human 
domination, their terms are such as would rescue ecological discourse 
from, rather than enmesh it in, the 'instrumental anthropocentric 
orientations' upon which Dryzek models his own ecological rationality 
• 
(Eckersley 1990:757). In this, Dryzek follows Habermas and his theoretical 
break, identified by Eckersley, from early Frankfurt School theorists 
whereby 'the rationalisation process set in train by the Enlightenment' is 
welcomed 'as a positive rather than a negative development'. Lost to 
both Dryzek's and Habermas' critiques, furthermore, are the 'utopian 
excesses' of the early Critical Theorists and their argument for healing 
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'the rift between humanity and nonhuman nature that has been brought 
about by the rationalisation process' (Eckersley 1992:100; 107). 38 
Dryzek's pursuit of communicative competence is, in Solesbury's terms 
discussed above (in 2.2.5), intended to generalise par excellence Mlle 
continuing integrity of the ecological systems on which human life 
depends' (Dryzek 1987b:675). In policy terms, however, he offers 
ecological concerns legitimacy within the mindset of the very rationality 
to which such concerns are attributable, albeit in 'freely discursive 
institutions'. Eckersley (1990b:757) argues that Dryzek undermines his 
own project by conceding that 'there is no guarantee that individuals in a 
communicatively rationalised society would necessarily agree to give any 
primacy to ecological values'. 39 His approach is equally flawed for 
retreating, after Habermas, from a consideration of the lack of ecological 
rationality within a constraining, dominant discourse, back into a 
rational anthropocentric framework, in which he abandons domination 
and conversely the liberation of nature, as a policy concern (Dryzek 
1990:101). Habermas's account of communicative distortion suggests that 
domination rests precisely upon the ability of anthropocentrism to co-opt 
ecocentric concern, mobilising bias toward orthodoxy with any consensus 
the product of systematically distorted communication within the context 
of unequal power distribution (Habermas 1970). Eckersley, on the other 
hand, argues for a grounding of ethics in recognition of 'the dignity of 
both human and nonhuman beings': 
38 Eckersley (1992:97-98) argues that the enduring contribution of the early Critical 
Theorists, notably Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, 'was to show that there are 
different levels and dimensions of domination and exploitation beyond the economic 
sphere and that the former are no less important than the latter'. They sought 'human' 
reconciliation with nature by its liberation from human mastery. 
39 Similarly, Eckersley notes that Throm an ecocentric perspective, there is clearly 
nothing in Habermas's communications ethics that would redeem the instrumental 
character of the technical interest in control vis-a-vis the nonhuman world' (Eckersley 
1990b:579). 
56 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
We need to revise and extend Habermas's communication ethics to 
a full-blown ecocentric ethics that is informed not only by the 
internal relatedness and reciprocity imbedded in human speech, but 
also by the internal relatedness and reciprocity imbedded in 
ecological relations in general, which, in a very literal sense, sustain 
us all (Eckersley 1992:111-112). 
The utility of the domination thesis for the purpose of this discussion is 
its recognition of ideological constraint upon ecological discourse. Its 
difficulty, Goodin (1992:75) argues,40 is that domination is perpetrated 'by 
very many different sorts of agents and forces' and indeed by very many 
different mechanisms, leaving the argument for the liberation of nature 
'parasitic on arguments against domination'. However the ecocentric 
perspective cuts a swath through the various eco-feminist, 41 eco-socialist 
and eco-anarchist conceptions of domination, and rests the argument for 
nature's liberation on the freedom of nature for its own sake, not for the 
sake of humankind. To liberate nature for its own sake, or in policy 
terms, to realise ecopolitical values, interests and demands, invariably is 
to encounter the agents, forces and mechanisms of domination such as 
raised above (in 2.3.2), and to experience the counterveiling mobilisation 
of pressure toward the preservation of the market system. The capacity of 
environmentalists to express their motivating concerns and to achieve 
40 His own understanding is, somewhat disparagingly, [and seemingly ignorant of 
Eckersley's (1992) thorough critique of emacipatory ecopolitical theory], that the 
'liberation of nature' is a phrase figuring 'more frequently as chapter headings than as the 
subject of sustained analysis' (Goodin 1992:75). 
41 Eco-feminism, in particular demonstrates important connections between the 
domination of women and the domination of nonhuman nature. Warren (1990:127-128) 
argues that an oppressive conceptual framework 'explains, justifies, and maintains 
relations of dominance and subordination'. When such a framework is patriarchal, she 
adds, 'it explains, justifies and maintains the subordination of women by men'. Plumwood 
(1986:120) suggests that whilst much of the literature 'lumped together' under the eco-
feminist label must be rejected, what can be salvaged is the valuable light that eco-
feminism sheds upon the conceptual structure of domination which represents an important 
contribution to the western philosophical tradition. 
See also Fox's discussion of the dominance of the anthropocentric frame of reference in 
his (1989b) rebuttal of the eco-feminist charge against the ecocentric, deep ecological 
critique for its focus on anthropocentrism (human-centredness) rather than androcentrism 
(male-centredness). Fox argues that deep ecology unmasks 'the ideology of 
anthropocentrism so that it can no longer be used as the "bottom line" legitimation for 
social domination and ecological destruction by any class of actors (Fox 1989b:25). 
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their policy goals in such circumstances is inevitably constrained, for 
example by their rejection of the ecological trade offs at the heart of 
industrialism. The setting of environmental standards, for example, 
Leiss argues, is traded off 'among a wide range of considerations' with the 
outcome usually 'a rough compromise among vested interests, balancing 
science, politics, and economy on the knife-edge of potential catastrophe' 
(Leiss 1979:264). Ecocentric sentiment holds that such trade offs are 
staggering lunacy that undermines our security, fundamentally impairs 
our quality of life, and threatens our very survival (Porritt 1984:20). 
2.3.5 Greening the Policy Margins? 
Dryzek recognises that his aspiration for ecological rationality to inform 
environmental policy-making from the centre rather than the margins, 
is unlikely to be realised. Even in the anthropocentric terms that he 
adopts, Dryzek (using Lindblom's punishment analogy) concedes that the 
market would automatically constrain policy making if 'environmental 
mediation' and 'regulatory negotiation' were, for example, to become 
centralised, lest these processes upset market confidence (Dryzek 
1990:105). In Schattscheider's terms, this is mobilisation of bias in action, 
as a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional 
procedures (i.e. the rules of the 'game') operates systematically and 
consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of 
others (Bachrach & Baratz 1970:43). For environmentalists who choose to 
work within the boundaries of conventional politics, (in the hope of 
greening policy - if only at the margins), the risk is heightened of their 
inadvertently reinforcing the societal status quo, and thus exacerbating 
the root cause of ecological concern discussed earlier (in 2.3.1). The threat 
to their essential concerns is made explicit in Amy's identification of an 
illusion of participation in explaining the treatment of 
environmentalists who participate in mainstream policy processes, most 
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particularly within recent environmental mediation and dispute 
resolution arrangements: 
Environmentalists and community activists will be seduced into 
becoming mere agents of the state and capital .... the very fact of 
sitting down on equal and reasonable terms with capitalists implies 
devaluation of moral concerns (for example, on behalf ecological 
integrity as a basic value) to the status of mere particular interests, fit 
for tradeoff against the profits of polluters and developers (Amy as 
discussed in Dryzek 1990:105). 
To illustrate that environmental mediation is the latest in a long list of 
'placatory and symbolic' resolution processes that have co-opted activists 
and devalued ecological concern, Amy (1990:59-80) reviews policy 
making techniques over the last decade, revealing that their use has not 
measured up to expectations in protecting the environment, 42 whilst 
often serving powerful political interests inside and outside the state. His 
critique is intended to address the analytic neglect of the politics of 
environmental decision making in a debate so far dominated, he 
suggests, by concern over the 'intellectual and scientific validity' of 
various approaches (Amy 1990:59). Amy argues that the environmental 
impact statement, an assessment approach that originated in the 1970s, 
emerged as the quickest way to silence critical 'eco-freaks' by allocating a 
small proportion of funds for the ecological study of proposed 
engineering projects (Amy 1990:63). Amy finds the original intention of 
making better ('i.e., more scientific and rational') environmental 
decisions ultimately thwarted, technically, through the adoption of a 
simplified scientific approach to complex subjects that obscured the 'real 
impacts and issues', and politically whereby a political decision was first 
42 Amy (1990:59) begins by noting that much of the responsibility for protecting the 
environment has been handed over to administrative agencies in the United States. These 
agencies then developed decision making techniques to 'enable government to manage and 
protect water quality, air quality, forests and wilderness in a rational and professional 
manner'. 
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taken and then the environmental impact statement shaped to justify it 
(Amy 1990:61-62).43 
Whilst impact analysis emerged initially to appease environmentalists, 
cost-benefit analysis emerged in the 1980s, Amy suggests, as part of the 
conservative Bush/Reagan deregulation agenda aimed at appeasing an 
increasingly powerful business lobby. 44 Cost-benefit analysis simply 
sought to transfer 'the economic rationality of the marketplace from the 
private to the public sector', reviewing 'all proposed new 
[environmental] regulations to ensure that their costs did not exceed 
their benefits' (Amy 1990:65). An immediate consequence of cost-benefit 
analysis was its use 'to argue against a wide variety of environmental 
regulations including the control of acid rain, the safe disposal of dioxins, 
the control of disease causing cotton dust in the workplace' and so forth 
(Amy 1990:65). Amy finds cost-benefit analysis to be an arbitrary decision 
making technique that routinely underestimates the benefits of 
environmental regulation, whilst discouraging public participation and 
appealing to the pro-growth administrative agenda. He finds it 
technically, politically, morally and philosophically flawed (Amy 1990:69). 
Of interest to this discussion is Amy's view that cost-benefit analysis 
attempts to rationally put a market price on social and environmental 
impacts for which there are no markets, whilst actually manipulatively 
serving political rather than environmental objectives (Amy 1990:66-67). 
43 One of the most useful functions of the EIS, Amy concedes (1990:63), is in revealing 
the often indirect and hidden social and environmental costs of development. Information 
revealed can serve to mobilise opposition, and the process itself has opened up an avenue 
of participation where none previously existed. 
44 See Vogel (1983:19-43) for a description of the negative impact of the rise of 
environmentalism in the 1970s upon the business lobby in the USA, and the subsequent 
resurgence in business control of the national environmental agenda in the 1980s through 
various factors including the adoption of environmentalist tactics, the impact of the 
worldwide recession and the shift toward political conservatism. 
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In Cotgrove and Duff's terms (1980:347; quoted in 2.2.5), the purported 
'rationality' and 'objectivity' of the environmental impact and cost-
benefit analysis techniques identified by Amy serves to systematically 
repress the articulation and realisation of ecological goals in favour of 
market imperatives, thereby confirming mainstream policy processes and 
power relations within dominant discourse. Environmental dispute 
resolution, the last of the decision techniques considered by Amy, is also 
found to legitimise corporate rather than environmental objectives, and 
indeed to bolster the 1990s corporate drive to in fact discredit 
environmental initiatives. 45 Despite the early access this technique offers 
environmentalists to the decision process, Amy argues that bargaining in 
dispute resolution is basically a search for middle ground that will 
neutralise environmental activism and not impede economic growth as 
ecopolitical disputes have in the past. Equally neutralised are ecological 
values, which, as a cost to environmentalists for participating in the 
bargaining arena, are seen as no more valid than the right to pollute. 
Indeed, the moral stigma of polluting or destroying irreplaceable 
ecosystems is automatically lifted on entering the dispute resolution 
process (Amy 1990:72-73). 
Amy (1990:76) concludes that the decision making techniques he reviews 
are 'flawed', 'biased', 'far from neutral', politically motivated and 'largely 
useless unless the distribution of power in society ensures that these 
techniques will be utilized properly in both the public and private 
45 Basically environmental dispute resolution, as considered by Amy, involves a neutral 
mediator bringing together the various parties to an environmental dispute and seeking an 
agreeable compromise. Regulatory negotiation occurs where a resolution process is 
formalised as part of the environmental regulation-setting process in United States 
federal bureaucracies. 
Regulations established by negotiation then follow normal administrative procedures 
of public comment and amendment before they are issued as law (Amy 1990:70). The 
difference between regulatory negotiation and both impact and cost-benefit analysis, Amy 
notes, is that lilts legitimacy rests not on claims to be scientifically or economically 
rational, but on claims to be procedurally neutral and democratic' (Amy 1990:70-71). 
61 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
spheres'. Symbolic, placatory political rhetoric about the environment 
appears matched by a routine favouring of market values and concerns 
from each of these techniques (for a discussion of symbolic policy 
making, see Edelman 1964). The ecological imperative then fails to 
survive these decision processes as environmentalists are drawn onto 
the anthropocentric turf of their ideological opponents, ironically on the 
basis of technocratic objective rationality that Amy finds in these 
instances to be the blatant tool of political manipulation. The 'symbolic 
legitimacy' sought by governments that establish such policy processes, 
O'Riordan notes, is evidence of their preference for keeping 
environmental issues off the public agenda and for non-decision making 
'delay tactics' to be adopted where they are forced by public interest 
groups to deal with them. OrRiordan's (1981:247) 46 own preference is for 
participatory decision making based upon the translation of community 
consensus into policy, Yet this approach can prove equally as 
manipulative, as McEachern argues, for example, where a participatory 
process promising to 'green' policy making generally, based upon 
principles of ecologically sustainable development, serves merely as a 
'symbol of political concern', indeed designed 'to allow as much 
economic development as possible within a strategy of resource 
conservation' rather than to solve essential ecological problems 
(McEachem 1993:24-25; 1993b:180; see also 2.4.6 for discussion). 
46 O'Riordan (1981:245-248) argues that environmental decision making is a far from 
rational process. He suggests that most decisions only take place in response to public 
concern, and identifies four typical government responses: non-decision making or the 
deliberate attempt to keep issues off the agenda, routine decisions or the shifting of the 
onus for resolving an issue onto an administrative agency in line with the limits of its 
legislative mandate, non-routine decisions where the identification of a previously 
unknown threat requires extensive studies, consultation and innovative decision making 
with an uncertainty of outcome, and participatory negotiation where policy represents the 
outcome of community views following participatory problem identification, goal setting, 
discussion of alternatives, and ideally, co-operatively made decisions. 
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2.3.6 Beyond Ecopolitical Constraint 
Whilst 2.2 of this discussion reviewed the environmental challenge to 
established political order and therefore the hurdle of issue legitimisation 
facing the ecopolitical project, 2.3 has sought to identify the manner in 
which the hegemony of dominant ideology may serve to legitimate, in 
Cotgrove and Duff's terms, 'industrial capitalism', whilst marginalising 
environmental concerns. The incompatibility of ecological integrity with 
economic interests established in 2.2,raised the question (addressed in 2.3) 
of the capacity of mainstream policy processes to accommodate the 
values, interests and demands of environmentalists. Obstacles discussed 
to the legitimation of the ecopolitical challenge began with the risk that 
the political mainstreaming of the 'green vision' may act to reinforce the 
status quo cause of ecological concern. The lack of ecopolitical consensus 
on political action, given this risk, not only highlights the ideological 
contentiousness of ecology within mainstream policy processes, but, as 
we have seen, is both the environmental movement's strength and 
weakness. In Gouldner's (1976:24;249) terms, ideological 'projection' has 
indeed afforded the movement great strength and a unique base of power 
that continues to 'unfold' historically, scientifically, ethically, socially, 
politically and globally, as discussed in 2.2. Ideological 'projection' by 
environmental activists wishing to transform industrial imperatives in 
the long term, however, may alienate activists who are prepared to accept 
ideological conformity and mainstream political participation on a short 
term, issue-by-issue, basis in order to meet the urgent need Livingston 
(1984:61-62) describes of rescuing the remnants of non-human nature. 
Nevertheless, radical ecocentrism remains 'the most novel and 
distinctive current' characterising Green politics (Eckersley 1992b:160; 
discussed in 2.2.4). Its critique of human-centredness, the legitimating 
ideology of anthropocentrism, the assertion by industrialism of 
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humanism over naturalism, and the domination of nature, indeed often 
motivates reformist environmentalists prepared to work within the 
mainstream and to adopt anthropocentric terms of reference in the 
pursuit of their goals. The danger of such action, as discussed, is not only 
in the communicative distortion that privileges dominant industrial 
interests, but in the suppression of core ecological values by a range of 
measures such as non-decision making, enforced neglect, the protection 
of corporate interests, the illusion of participation and placebo policy 
responses, i.e. where the state responds not as an impartial mediator, but 
in the defence of economic against ecological interests. That 
environmentalists have impacted upon policy processes regardless is 
argued by some as well documented, 47 and by others as unconvincing, the 
easiest wins, according to Dempsey and Power's 'hierarchy' of 
environmental issues, being those where ecological demands least 
threaten capital interests: 
[T]he wider the ecological significance of an environmental 
problem, the greater are the political difficulties entailed in tackling 
it. These difficulties are so daunting that governments are usually 
keen to keep the politics of the environment on as symbolic a plane 
for as long as possible (Dempsey & Power 1973:616). 
As Dempsey and Power infer, the greater the ecocentric challenge to the 
industrial imperative, the more constrained the realisation of ecological 
goals. 48 This analysis does not rule out the potential for gain by 
environmentalists, but acknowledges the mobilisation of bias toward the 
47 Richardson and Jordan (1979:11), for example, claim that previously powerful 
political and economic pressure groups in Britain have to an extent been displaced by 
environmental groups, and that these have subsequently impacted upon transport 
planning, urban renewal and redevelopment, and nuclear power. They are confident in the 
ability of pressure groups in modern democracies to force issues onto the public agenda, 
whether or not governments or established elites like it, and whether or not they are 
insider groups with insider status (Richardson & Jordan 1979:83-4). 
48 The greatest political difficulties for conservationists were seen by Dempsey and 
Power to be environmental problems with wide ecological significance - such as the 
protection of the planet's life support system from air, land and water pollution, the 
greatest source of which they cite as heavy industry, against which all governments are 
similarly reluctant to take vigorous action. 
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maintenance of the 'progress ideology' at the expense of the basically 
'subversive' ecological imperative. Inherent in such mobilisation, 
Sandbach (1980:135) suggests, is access to power and resources enhancing 
the capacity of the interest of capital to realise its own objectives and 
secure these against threat. The industrial imperative constraining the 
ability of environmentalists to achieve their goals may be explained as a 
structural power imbalance that limits their capacity to communicate or 
resolve their ecological concerns contrary to democratic principles. Such 
imbalance may operate where access to power is determined by orthodoxy 
constraining ecology as ideologically contentious; where political debate 
mobilises bias toward orthodoxy, defining legitimacy exclusively in terms 
of dominant growth based values; where contenders drawn into such 
debate experience a distortion of their core ecological values by dominant 
discourse; and, where the pursuit of pragmatic environmental politics 
may therefore be at the cost of ecocentrism. 
The boundaries of ideological constraint then follow the identification of 
ecocentrism as a 'contending' rather than a 'conforming' value position 
within the dominant industrial paradigm. The potential for bias toward 
orthodoxy to contain the ideological challenge of ecology, whilst 
frustrating the generalisation of ecological integrity as a policy concern 
within orthodox politics, does not necessarily negate the potential to 
achieve a broad range of other ecological goals. Having reviewed the 
ideological challenge of ecology (in 2.2), and concluded that ecopolitical 
demands are necessarily constrained by dominant values within the 
policy process (in 2.3), it remains to examine (in 2.4) the distancing of the 
state from traditional growth imperatives required to respond effectively 
to ecological concerns. 
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2.4 Ecological Integrity and the Role of the State 
2.4.1 The Logic of Ecological Integrity 
Whilst 2.3 finds environmental demands ideologically constrained to the 
extent of their conflict with established industrial goals, and indeed state49 
response to such demands often a defence of economic against ecological 
interests, environmentalists nevertheless rely implicitly upon the state to 
respond to their concerns. In practical terms, Victor (1979:48) claims, it is 
the state to which they turn to resolve disputes, albeit 'with varying 
degrees of scepticism' about its impartiality, and highlighting the 
dilemma, that Walker (1985:2) describes, between expectations that the 
state should 'create and maintain economic growth' on the one hand, 
and, on the other, that it should conserve the natural environment and 
'husband resources'. This section considers why it is that the response of 
the state may be constrained when faced with ecopolitical demands. 
As Neo-Marxists (O'Connor 1973; 1984, Offe 1985; Habermas 1975) have 
argued, the state is caught in contradictory roles of sustaining both capital 
accumulation through the creation of the conditions for private profit, 
and mass legitimacy through the satisfaction of human need, promoting 
'economic efficiency', that is, whilst protecting 'social equity' (Blake 
1986:5). To this tension, the logic of ecological integrity adds a further 
demand upon the state, the satisfaction of ecological expectations, and a 
further contradiction, an implied radical distancing of the state from 
capital interests. A brief, historical reflection upon the fate of competing 
economic and ecological imperatives since the early 1970s, however, 
49 The state may be defined in terms of its roles: i.e. developer, protector, regulator, 
arbitrator, and distributor, organiser, and producer; its bodies, i.e. legislative, executive and 
judicial; or its levels of government, i.e. national, regional and local. Davis et al ascribe no 
life, certainty or logic to the state but suggest it is a 'hydra-headed complex of organisations', 
and its actions are as much determined by, as indeed they are determinants of, public policy, 
which often merely reflects the disjointed and sectional problems that emerge from the 
structure of society itself (Davis et a/ 1988:22; 33-35; Ham & Hill 1984:22-26). 
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confirms that the ability of the state to adopt the logic of ecological 
integrity is constrained by the priority it accords both material interests 
and the growth imperative within capitalist societies. 
In the early 1970s, the state faced conflicting pressures. There was 
pressure from ecologists with the publication of The Limits to Growth 
(Meadows et al 1972) and Blueprint for Survival (Goldsmith et al 1972) to 
recognise the ecological limits of economic growth and adopt an anti-
growth 'equilibrium' steady state in order to avert certain eco-catastrophe 
as 'ecological limits' are reached. Ironically this debate coincided with 
both O'Connor's (1973) Neo-Marxist critique of the 'fiscal crisis' of the 
state, and the emergence of the conservative New Right" market 
liberalist critique of the 'overloaded' state and expansionary state policies 
(Head 1984:37,38; Emy & Hughes 1988:105). O'Connor predicted the fiscal 
crisis of the state would occur as the expansionary trend of spending on 
both capital support and social investment is no longer affordable, with 
state expenditure outstripping state revenue, and the state finding itself 
required to either cut spending or raise taxes. Either choice would lead to 
a crisis of legitimation or loss of faith in the actions of the state. Spending 
cuts would threaten social harmony by depriving society of state services 
on the one hand, and increased taxation would burden capital by adding 
to its operating costs and eroding its profit margins on the other. To this 
dilemma, market liberalists have added what has become the most 
constraining pressure on state activity by advocating the minimisation of 
state intervention in favour of market outcomes, risking legitimation 
crisis in order to avert a crisis of capital (Emy & Hughes 1988:105). 
50 Emy & Hughes explain that what is 'new' about the New Right is 'the attempt to 
resuscitate and combine conservative social values with the principles of classic liberal 
political economy, notably the faith in the market and economic individualism'. The dual 
goals of individual freedom and economic rationality are achieved by 'reducing the role of 
government while applying market principles to as many spheres of social life as possible' 
(Emy & Hughes 1988:105,106). 
67 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
In the twenty years to follow the emergence of the limits to growth 
debate, as state fiscal crises have intensified around the globe, the New 
Right market liberalist agenda has gained political ascendancy, 51 whilst 
ecological demands for a no-growth 'steady' state have either stalled 
completely and been abandoned by their advocates as unrealistic and 
utopian, or increasingly clashed with mainstream economic priorities 
and thus have made little ground into the recessionary 1990s. Ecological 
demands in this climate have succeeded only to the extent that they have 
posed no threat to the 'laws of motion of capital' by which, Emy and 
Hughes (1988:502) observe, capitalist society ensures its own smooth 
functioning, with its contradictory processes dovetailing so neatly that 
'the whole looks like a "natural" order' (Emy & Hughes 1988:502). 
Theoretically the state acts autonomously in responding to demands, its 
links to capital being to assume a steering role in the facilitation of 
private accumulation only to the extent that this does not threaten its 
own legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate (Frankel 1992:23). Given the 
structural constraints that Bell (1992:210) argues operate on ecological 
policy under capitalism, however, 'only limited reforms' compatible 
with capital accumulation, and conforming rather than conflicting with 
the dynamically balanced imperatives of capital accumulation and mass 
legitimacy, will ever be achieved. The adoption of a 'steady state' plainly 
requires major reform in the observation of physical, biological and 
moral first principles that would undermine economic growth if 
51 Australia in the 1980s has been particularly captive of the New Right push for lower 
taxes, deregulation and smaller government, as evidenced by the extent of government 
spending cuts, the prioritising of free market objectives, the integration of state interests with 
those of the market, and the shift of politics generally to the Right and away from non-
market priorities (Emy & Hughes 1988:105,136; Davis et al 1988:31-33). 
As Australia's recession has deepened, environmental initiatives have furthermore 
suffered from government attempts to 'get the economy moving'. The litany of broken federal 
promises includes: the failure to act on its 1992 Rio Earth Summit undertakings; the watering 
down of both endangered species legislation and targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions; and the stymieing of the sustainable development process (O'Reilly 1992:16). 
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observed, yet threaten ecological crisis, such as the potential collapse of 
life supporting ecosystems, if ignored (Daly 1977:108-110). 
2.4.2 Crisis and the Neo-Hobbesian Response 
The 1972 Limits to Growth study commissioned by the Club of Rome 
appeared ten years after the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, 
described by Fox (1990:4) as 'an indictment of our arrogant conception of 
our place in the larger scheme of things'. The 1972 study argued explicitly 
that: 
If present growth trends in world population, industrialization, 
pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue 
unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached 
sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable 
result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both 
population and industrial capacity (Meadows et al 1972:23) 
Although the sophisticated computer modelling upon which the Limits 
to Growth study relied was subject to criticism and subsequent revision, 52 
Leeson suggests the crucial point is that for the first time humankind was 
asked by its authors to restrain economic growth. But their message of 
ecology (i.e. interdependence, complexity and limitation), she concludes, 
runs contrary to liberalism and its belief 'that nature could and must be 
dominated', (in Fox's terms, contrary to 'human-centredness') and has 
not, therefore, been well received (Leeson 1979:309-310; Fox 1990:9). Two 
decades after its release, the Limits to Growth study has been reworked, 
and again argues 'that the exponential growth of human population and 
economic production threatens to go beyond the limits of nature', and 
that unless the 'social system' responds to limit growth, 53 then collapse in 
52 Beder (1993:17) explains that debate over the limits to growth was discredited and 
largely discarded, even by many environmentalists, due to: (i) its exaggerated pessimism; (ii) 
its focus on resource depletion that failed to manifest itself; and (iii) the debunking of 'limits' 
arguments by well financed think tanks such as the Hudson Institute. 
53 Specifically, response would require 'a series of measures' were put in place - 'effective 
birth control, increases in the efficiency of resource use, a decrease in pollution emissions per 
unit of output, control of land erosion and increasing food yields from land' (Meadows et al 
1992 discussed in Weale 1993:341). 
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the 21st century is inevitable (Meadows et al 1992 discussed in Weale 
1993:340-343). Weale's criticism is that this analysis 'degenerates into an 
ad hoc collection of institutional changes', fails 'to engage with the 
complexities and contradictions of democratic politics', and so offers an 
'indeterminate' politics of change (Weale 1993:341; 343). Weale is not 
alone in his criticism, not of the ecological crisis that the thesis predicts, 
but of its lack of attention to political and institutional details in 
proposing a solution, 54 This is despite the urgency, according to Meadow 
et al's own calculations, for political response. O'Riordan (1981:60) argues 
that whilst the authors were aware that the accelerating trends identified 
by their Limits model would raise issues that would inevitably go beyond 
the realm of science and enter the realm of the community debate at large 
(Meadows et al 1972:23), they nevertheless avoided any discussion of 
their proposed equilibrium state, and so avoided tackling the 
contradiction of having to draw appropriate solutions to avert ecological 
crisis (necessarily based upon human perception and choice) from their 
own deterministic scientific analysis (O'Riordan 1981:61-3). 
In the 1970s, the most influential responses to the crisis of ecology were 
those of the 'Neo-Hobbesians'55 - i.e. Garrett Hardin, Robert Heilbroner, 
and William Ophuls (Walker 1988:67). The Neo-Hobbesians, Orr and 
Hill (1978:458-60) note, 'agree that the combination of resource scarcity, 
overpopulation, and the lack of a long lead time for measured changes 
threaten to overwhelm the capacities of both physical and social systems'. 
In Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons', self-interest and naivety prevents 
54 See also Orr and Hill (1978:457), and Paehlke (1990:48) for similar criticism. 
55 In 1651, political philosopher Thomas Hobbes proposed absolute sovereign authority as 
the resolution to the problem of social order and indeed it is to Hobbesian State 
authoritarianism that the Neo-Hobbesians turned in the early 1970s as, in their view, the 
tragic yet necessary alternative to potential environmental 'oblivion'. Whilst Hobbes' 
inspiration for overarching sovereignty was the fear of chaos and disorder provoked by the 
religious intolerance and civil strife of his own era, the Neo-Hobbesians concluded that the 
solving of the environmental crisis required the unfortunate submission to a Leviathan State 
(Torgerson 1990:19). 
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the individual from recognising the physical limits of the commons, and 
only 'mutual coercion mutually agreed upon' can save it from over 
exploitation and collapse. Heilbroner advocates a Hobbesian state 'as the 
condition for peaceful survival' given the otherwise 'ultimate certitude' 
of environmental destruction and the unlikelihood of humankind 
adopting no-growth economics, limiting industrial and technological 
processes, and redistributing income to the extent required to preserve 
the environment. For Ophuls again the sustainable society requires a 
move along the spectrum from libertarianism toward authoritarianism if 
the requisite controls are to be successfully imposed upon population 
growth, land use and resource consumption. The only workable solution 
to impending ecological crisis seen by these authors, albeit regretfully, is 
'authoritarian government capable of imposing strict limitations' 56 
(Leeson 1979:311). For the most part, responses to the authoritarian 
prescriptions of the Neo-Hobbesians have been negative, earning its 
proponents a reputation not only for 'doomsdayism', pessimism, and a 
'lack of faith' in human response, but for anti-democratic elitism (Leeson 
1979:312-314; O'Riordan 1981:61; Paehlke 1990:37). 
Whilst Hobbesian authoritarianism drew a negative response for its 
depiction of 'self-centred man who is incapable of acting in the larger 
community interest and incapable of deciphering the complexities of 
ecological problems', it was equally criticised for prescribing the 'rather 
blunt instrument of the myopic, centralized, administrative state' to a 
'subtle, complex and long term' though inevitable ecological crisis (Orr & 
Hill 1978:462; 466). Torgerson argues that whilst in the seventeenth 
century it may have suited individuals to forsake their personal power to 
56 Orr and Hill (1978:459) note that Idlespite difference in emphasis all three agree that: 
(1) we are at the threshold of an unprecedented planetary ecological crisis; (2) reliance on 
individual good will, conscience, and/or education is not sufficient; and (3) democratic 
institutions are inadequate to meet the challenge'. 
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a single authority, in the twentieth century the sovereignty concept 
advocated by Neo-Hobbesians represents the Weberian 'iron cage' - 
imprisoning the autonomy of the individual out of all proportion to any 
threat to the prevailing order (Torgerson 1990:20-21). Such an approach, 
Paehlke (1990:49) and Lauber (1978:217) argue, undervalues the protection 
of democratic institutions and the purpose for which liberal democracy is 
designed. Additional criticism of the Neo-Hobbesians is made of their 
philosophical determinism, the 'reactionary and right wing ideological 
messages' it conceals (described as 'eco-facism' and 'new scientific 
racism'), the 'deterministic natural laws' it would prescribe for 
government, and indeed the confidence of the Neo-Hobbesian project in 
autocratic rationalism and the capacity of the authoritarian state to cope 
with the problem of ecology (Pepper 1985:13; Orr & Hill 1978:461). 
2.4.3 Beyond the Leviathan State 
Criticisms of authoritarian state solutions to the crisis of ecology, its 
'politically reactionary flavour', and the elitism of Neo-Malthusianism, 57 
championed by limits to growth ecologists in the 1960s and 1970s, has 
been swept aside by a more positive green image (Pepper 1985:11). 'No-
growth vanguardism' faded in the 1980s, Paehlke (1990:51) observes, not 
because the immediate threat of ecological crisis is thought to have 
receded, but in part because of difficult economic times, and in part due to 
the evolution of the environment movement's tactics in pursuit of 
ecological goals, for example, via democratic participation and the 
formation of green political parties. This is not to suggest, Walker argues, 
that the Neo-Hobbesian approach does not offer some powerful insights, 
57 Contemporary environmental solutions fashioned upon Malthusian determinism remain 
hampered by its implicit, reactionary elitism as well as its popularly denounced political 
fascism, for the Malthusian concept of limits was inspired not, as environmentalists had 
hoped, by an interest in steady state economics, but rather by the desire of Malthus as an 
apologist for the owners of property 'to protect the interests of the privileged minority in a 
world of shortage' (Pepper 1985:12-13; O'Riordan 1981:44). 
72 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
nor that the ecological perspective itself is invalid. 	Indeed, 
lelnvironmental limits do have implications for the problem of social 
order', and 'the impact of scarcity on human social behaviour is worthy 
of serious thought'. However, Walker concludes, '[t]he  problem of 
ecology and its political implications are far broader than the Neo-
Hobbesians recognise, and as a result has been dominated for over a 
decade by hasty prescriptions based on poor problem definitions and 
inadequate thought' (Walker 1988:80-81). Whilst notions of scarcity and 
ecological limits continue to preoccupy environmental critiques (Birch 
1993:110-158; Brown et al 1993:3-21; Milbrath 1989:9-38; Young 1991:1-22), 
Pepper (1985:14) suggests that the emphasis now is on progressive 
solutions rather than those dwelling, as the Neo-Hobbesians do, 'on the 
general hopelessness of man's plight'. 
Although criticised for its lack of attention to political detail, Goldsmith 
et al's (1972) Blueprint to Survival offers to avert ecological crisis with an 
alternative decentralised solution to state authoritarianism, on the basis 
that 'the ecological crisis, in its present acute form, originated partly in 
the transfer of power and wealth from smaller units in society to larger 
ones, particularly the modern corporation' (Orr & Hill 1978:465). As 
O'Riordan (1981:54) observes, Blueprint is an 'ecocentric document' based 
upon 'the ecologically harmonious concept of the preindustrial tribe', 
and would reverse centralisation with a return to appropriate scale and 
meaningful purpose, achieving quality existence, biotic rights, low impact 
technology, state equilibrium, conservation, social well being and full 
participation in decision making by societal decentralisation into 
autonomous, human scale units (Orr & Hill 1978:465-6). In the spirit of 
ecocentrism, Blueprint equally departs ideologically from Limits to 
Growth with its lack of faith in technological solutions to the problem of 
ecology. It proposes zero population growth, community self reliance in 
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utopian settlements, and a bevy of taxes that Young (1991:7-8) guarantees 
would cause hesitation from even the most determined of dictators, yet 
with scant regard for their implementation by the state. Though 
decentralisation remains, as Goodin (1992:147) argues, a guiding principle 
of contemporary green politics, Goldsmith et al's particular brand is 
nevertheless condemned for the authoritarianism inherent in its appeal 
to conservatism, tradition, hierarchy and reductionism (Pepper 
1993:191). 58 In the final analysis, Blueprint appears as determinist in its 
decentralisation of state authority as the Neo-Hobbesians are in their 
centralisation, with neither approach offering, in O'Riordan's (1981:65) 
terms, 'a peaceful and orderly pathway' toward worldwide social and 
ecological justice. 59 
Beyond the authoritarian Leviathan state and its decentralised utopian 
alternative, Orr and Hill (1978:466-9) argue, is scope for 'a creative 
combination of centralized coordination with selective decentralisation' 
to promote social stability, resilience, enhanced participation in decision 
making and an approach to averting ecological crisis that is nevertheless 
planned, regulated and administered by the state. However, given the 
ideological contentiousness of ecocentrism in a material world, and the 
structural constraints of accumulation based upon economic growth and 
resource exploitation in capitalist society, the quest for ecological justice 
from the state remains complex. Whilst the limits to growth debate has 
generated no imperative upon state action in terms of the preservation of 
ecological integrity as a means of avoiding eco-catastrophe, unrestrained 
economic growth enjoys precisely the primacy into the 1990s sought for 
58 Pepper (1993:24,52-53) particularly objects to Goldsmith's championing of India's caste 
system as a model for attaining a socially and ecologically sound society, his argument for 
'absolute', i.e. undisputed, belief systems and common values stemming from the eco-systems 
model of society as a key to social unity, and his advocacy of the family and whatever 
preserves it as essential to social organisation. 
59 Goldsmith (1988) himself retreats even from decentralisation in his later work. 
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planetary survival by both The Limits to Growth and Blueprint for 
Survival. Although ecological determinism has been rejected as contrary 
to natural freedom, determinism in the economic sphere, Pepper 
(1985:12) explains, is very much a part of conventional wisdom to which 
behaviour must conform. We can no more flout the laws of economics, 
he suggests, than 'we can fly in the air'. Given the difficulties of defining 
ecological crisis, the notion of an imperative based upon ecological 
uncertainty, however much more apparently valid or morally appealing 
than an imperative based upon economic growth and accumulation, has 
met with minimal success. The difficulty is compounded by the lack of 
coherence in the differing prescriptions embraced by contending green 
political philosophies, that offer equally contending, indeed often merely 
implied, views of the state. 
2.4.4 Environmental Theories of the State 
Eckersley's (1992) map of ecopolitical thought provides invaluable insight 
into the diversity of positions beyond the authoritarian leviathan state by 
reviewing critiques such as ecomarxism, critical theory, 6° ecosocialism 
and ecoanarchy. Of these, the role of the state is most explicitly discussed 
by Eckersley in terms of the latter two. In addition, Eckersley's 
description of thematic evolution in modern ecopolitical thought, 
reflects rather than explicitly addresses several key strands of state debate. 
In historical terms, her themes 61 of participation and survival 
60 Ecomarxists are divided by Eckersley into traditionalists and humanists, the latter 
critical of the 'scientific socialism' of the former. Eckersley's discussion is to demonstrate 
that an ecocentric perspective can be wrested from neither, since neither acknowledge the 
'unfreedom of the nonhuman world under industrialism' (Eckersley 1992: 75-95). Eckersley 
describes Critical Theory as a 'relatively distinct subset of humanist Marxist thought', and of 
later Critical Theory under Habermas as essentially straying 'very little from the structure 
of the basic Marxist response to the environmental crisis' (Eckersley 1992: 116). 
Although not explicitly discussed, the state solution of traditionalist and humanist 
ecomarxists and Critical Theorists (with the exception of Dryzek, discussed earlier in 2.3.5) 
would logically be fashioned upon anthropocentric, communist notions. 
61 Participation emerged with the 1960s civil rights movements, the crisis of survival 
theme rose to prominence as we have seen in the 1970s, whilst the emancipatory theme 
emerged into the 1980s (Eckersley 1992:7). 
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respectively evoke democratic and autocratic states, whilst emancipation 
evokes the transformation of the state, although Eckersley insists that 
these themes only 'roughly' characterise the last three decades 
respectively of ecopolitical preoccupations, with the temporal association 
a loose one not to be pressed, she claims, too far. Briefly, ecosocialism 
advocates key distributive, planning and regulatory roles for the state. 
State expansion would, in the ecosocialist state, be offset by the facilitation 
of community empowerment, and extended opportunities for democratic 
participation in all tiers of government. 
Ecosocialism offers a stark contrast to the 'strongly anti-statist position' of 
ecoanarchism. 62 Eckersley notes that ecoanarchists refer, in their use of 
the collective 'we', to the local community rather than the state, and hold 
that society is best transformed through 'popular struggles, exemplary 
action, and local self-help initiatives'. Ecoanarchists generally 'wish to 
see the abolition (rather than just the shrinking) of the modern [s]tate on 
the grounds that it is inherently hierarchical in usurping the decision-
making power of the local community'. Although many ecoanarchist 
theorists examine economic and political change 'in only a cursory way', 
Eckersley observes that their experimentation with the establishment of 
decentralised small scale 'exemplary ecological communities within the 
"shell" of existing society', may well serve to facilitate 'what Rozak has 
called the "creative disintegration" of society' (Eckersley 1992:132-133;182). 
Nevertheless, Eckersley (1992:182;185) is unconvinced that an anti-statist 
ecoanarchist framework would best serve ecocentric goals. The handing 
62 Eckersley notes that the tension between ecosocialism and ecoanarchism 'is currently 
being played out in day-to-day Green politics between the realist and the fundamentalist 
wings of the Green movement and Green parties, that is, between those who want to take the 
electoral route and gain political power and those who want to bring about change at the 
grassroots level and thereby avoid being corrupted by what is seen as the "power politics" of 
hierarchical institutions '(Eckersley 1992:183; see also 2.3.5 ,fn 6). 
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over of power to local communities will not necessarily, she argues, 
'make them Green, like-minded and "good'. 
Whilst Eckersley examines the implications for the role of the state of 
contending strands of ecopolitical thought, Butte! and Larson (1980:339- 
344) examine the various environmental ideologies likely to dominate 
under three competing 'leftist', 'centrist' and 'rightist' state structures, 
after Stretton's (1976) 'socialist', 'liberal' and 'conservative' typologies. 
Though schematically useful, this method continues to offer a crude 
characterisation of ecopolitical thought and the ideological basis of 
conflicting positions. In terms of state structures, environmentalism 'of 
the left' then advocates 'a decentralised and egalitarian society' as best 
able to respond to 'resource scarcity and environmental problems'. 
Environmentalism 'of the centre' advocates 'reformist intermediate' 
green measures in terms of the 'light', 'intermediate', 'dark' analogy, 
holds government 'primarily responsible for environmental control', 
and sees the state as needing to 'balance competing demands made by 
environmentalists, capital and labour'. Environmentalism 'of the right', 
finally, advocates 'centralised, relatively authoritarian control', frugality 
in adapting to environmental/resource constraints and resource 
decisions to be made by 'by a managerial elite which understands 
sophisticated technology and complex ecological processes' (Buttel & 
Larson 1980:339). 
The utility of the 'leftist', 'centrist', 'rightist' schema, despite its crudity in 
view of contemporary ecopolitical analysis, is its warning that 'customary 
political relationships between classes and groups forged in eras of 
resource abundance' may well fail to deal with resource scarcity. In the 
event of scarcity in the coming decades, it is then 'crucial to recognise that 
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this juncture may yield progressive or regressive changes'. 63 The authors 
argue that such a recognition may ensure that: 
[any] crisis of ecological scarcity might actually be turned into a grand 
opportunity to build a more humane post-industrial society; the 
alternative is to let the shape of the steady-state paradigm be decided 
for us by accepting the outcome of current needs toward technocracy 
(Buttel & Larson 1980:344). 
In terms of the ecocentric project, Eckersley argues that 'none of the 
political and economic reforms offered by the various Green political 
theories examined [are] likely to realise ecocentric objectives in the 
foreseeable future in the absence of extensive revision'. In the tradition 
of Lauber (1978) and Paehlke (1988), Eckersley advocates a revitalisation of 
'the institutional gains of parliamentary democracy and the (however 
imperfect) checks and balances they provide against the abuse of power' 
in order to democratise society at large and to ensure mutilevelled 
(international, interregional, and intercommunity) decision making at 
least theoretically compatible with an ecocentric perspective (Eckersley 
1992:181-183). Her ecocentric polity reflects Paehlke's (1988:308) call for 
the 'continuous enhancement of democratic participatory values and 
opportunities', and Orr and Hill's suggestion for both coordinated reform 
and democratisation of central government and its ecological decision 
making processes (Orr & Hill 1978:466-9). Such democratisation would 
conform to the 'deeply democratic instincts' that Paehlke (1988:292) 
argues characterises recent environmentalism, with its emphasis upon 
'greater openness and greater public involvement in administrative 
decision making', and the impact of its organisation and mobilisation 
over the last twenty years in revitalising and expanding participatory 
opportunities. 
63 Paehlke (1988:305) agrees suggesting 'What it does not necessarily follow, of course, that 
the potential next wave of resource limitations on economic prosperity will not seriously 
weaken the democratic hopes and efforts of contemporary environmentalists'. 
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Eckersley's 'democratic state legislature' would operate as part of a 
multilevelled decision making structure. It would be 'less powerful then 
than the existing nation state' and more responsive to the local, regional, 
and international political determinations taken by 'democratic decision 
making bodies'. Political and economic power both within and between 
local communities would be more greatly dispersed in such a polity than 
under the existing nation state, macro-controls would more extensively 
guide market activity, and an 'ecocentric emancipatory culture' would, 
therefore, inevitably flower (Eckersley 1992:185). 
Young (1981:3-4) explains that market free enterprise has no adequate 
incentives for the minimisation or the regulation of environmental 
impacts. He envisages multi-tiered responsibility generated by the state 
for protecting the ecosphere and maintaining ecological balance." It is 
necessary, he argues, 'to go beyond the liberal conception of the state as a 
modest actor endeavouring to correct for occasional market failures and 
to contemplate a more activist state taking vigorous steps to protect the 
ecosphere from the ravages that are an inevitable, though often 
unintended, result of the unrestricted operation of free enterprise' 
(Young 1981:4). 
64 Young claims that political theorists have neglected the role of the state in what he 
calls the realm of 'natural resources', and describes this as responsible for 'a general lack of 
sophistication regarding the nature of the state and the capabilities of government' in 
natural resource management (Young 1981:5). Young simply proposes an ecological perspective 
as an alternative framework to the market rule, philosophically laissez faire state 
approach to natural resource usage. 
State intervention, for instance, then 'guided by the dictates of maintaining ecological 
balance' would take one of three, not entirely mutually exclusive, forms: 
devolution (where the transfer of natural resources into private hands is desirable); 
operation (where the state intervenes, setting itself up as an operating authority 
with a monopoly over the use of resources); and 
regulation (where state intervention restricts the activities of private actors). 
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2.4.5 The Contradictions of Ecology 
Just as ecopolitical philosophies may be criticised for their contending, 
often implied utopian state and anti-state societies, so the revitalisation 
and enhancement of the democratic state advocated by participatory 
ecopolitical theorists may be treated with caution where it fails to address 
the obstacle of economic constraint discussed in 2.4.1 upon the 
'flowering' of ecocentrism. Bell (1992:209) argues that 'ecology's 
emphasis on limits, on non-material needs, and on careful economic 
planning, strike at the heart of capitalism's expansive thrust and its 
individualistic economic practices'. The 'fundamentally anti-capitalist 
and subversive' nature of the doctrine of ecology that Bell describes must 
be addressed before the difficulty of squeezing the logic of ecological 
integrity between the state's accumulation and legitimation functions can 
be appreciated. Simply put by Walker (1989:38), the obstacle of economic 
constraint upon the goal of ecological integrity, is that the state will limit 
its responses to environmental issues 'at the dictation of perceived 
strategic and economic necessity'. In terms of enhanced democracy, 
Paehlke concedes that future environmental protection in such a state 
may nevertheless 'require economic constraints that are greater than, or 
different than, a democratic majority might be willing to tolerate' 
(Paehlke 1988:305). Equally problematic may be the contradiction Weale 
foresees of a democratic polity such as Eckersley's that has imposed a 
priori ecocentric constraints upon the outcome of discussion and debate 
(Weale 1993:342; discussed in 2.2.4, fn 17). Indeed, with capitalism reliant 
upon relentless economic growth, as Bell argues, and likely to prove 
incompatible with 'long term ecologically viability', then a viable 
• ecological society, it follows, must necessarily be non-capitalist (Bell 
1992:211). 
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In terms of overcoming economic constraint as an obstacle to ecological 
integrity, Eckersley's framework of decentralised economic and political 
power is promising at least for acknowledging Lauber's argument that 
growth to the detriment of the environment is pursued not by the 
populace but by political and economic elites. According to this view, the 
obstacle of economic constraint should be addressed not by centralising 
state power and issuing deterministic 'natural' laws, but by checking elite 
power, thereby checking growth. The democratised state would then 
restrain, limit and break down the concentration of elite power - a 
purpose for which Lauber argues, 'liberal democracy is rather well fitted', 
and suggested as possible within Eckersley's ecocentric polity (Lauber 
1978:200; Walker 1989:36-37; Eckersley 1992:184; Paehlke 1988:305). 
Against such faith in democratisation and the capacity of an enhanced 
democracy to realise ecocentric goals, Dryzek explores the non-capitalist 
alternative, invoking Hardin's ecologically tragic 'unreliability of the 
individual'. Dryzek holds that 'ecological rationality' should take 
priority over competing forms of reason in collective choices with an 
impact upon ecological integrity. An open, emancipated society is thus 
seen as potentially lacking pragmatism, co-ordination and the ability to 
solve ecological concerns, particularly where democratic market systems 
are retained and continue to respond more readily to corporate rather 
than ecocentric imperatives 65 (Dryzek 1987:58-59). Despite its 
anthropocentric limitations, discussed in 2.3.4, Dryzek's approach is a 
worthy attempt to rescue ecology from the constraints of state, capital and 
market, and to offer it refuge in an 'autonomous public sphere' with 
immunity from the state. Dryzek concedes, however, that the prospects 
of achieving such autonomy are 'dim', given the 'obduracy of the 
Dryzek (1987) reviews nine potential societal systems, before advocating open and 
discursive 'communicatively rationalised' social choice. Market rule is rejected by Dryzek as 
self interested. Highly structured, centralised organisation is rejected for lack of flexibility, 
as are both the formal rule of laws and the promulgation of desirable values. 
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market, capitalism and the administrative state'. Yet he claims that his 
proposal for freeing ecological discourse is useful for calling attention to 
the constraining pressures of market and capital upon state action, and 
the need to counterbalance these with equal pressure from an 
autonomous public sphere concerned to promote ecological values 
(Dryzek 1990:104-108). 
Blake follows both Dryzek, in depicting ideological contradiction in terms 
of opposing values and rationality, and Neo-Marxism, in describing any 
tendency towards the legitimisation of ecological imperatives as an 
undermining of democratic capitalism. The basis of the state's response 
to ecological concerns, Blake observes, is that it is deep rooted and 
constrained within the structural contradiction between 'private capital' 
and 'democratic social' interests raised in 2.4.1. The further ideological 
contradiction between the opposing ecological world view and 
'institutionally dominant' industrial perspective equally inspires policy 
practices that mitigate and displace rather than resolve environmental 
concerns. Having failed to be resolved, Blake argues, these concerns will 
simply multiply and, in the long term, threaten the legitimation of 
democratic-capitalist social structures. The deepening legitimation deficit 
resulting from unmet ecological demands, however, will 'open new 
potential for structural change' by the system either adapting or being 
forced to adapt to accommodate demands rather than suffering its own 
demise (Blake 1986:3;21). State intervention to mitigate the ecological 
effects of economic activities is, then, dictated by the extent to which it is 
perceived to be system supporting, i.e. where regulation is to avert an 
eventual threat to capital accumulation, or system threatening, i.e. where 
intervention seeks to 'thematise the ecological world view' (Blake 
1986:9). The extent of the state's incorporation of ecological demands will 
be the extent to which they contradict economic rationales, undermine 
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capital accumulation and threaten either the viability of the growth 
economy, or the state's own popular legitimacy (Blake 1989:6). 
2.4.6 The Ecologically Sustainable State? 
To question whether the state in capitalist society can adopt the logic of 
ecological integrity is, as we have seen, to question the extent to which 
the logic of capital accumulation can be adapted to accommodate 
ecological demands. The easiest 'wins' for environmentalists, as we saw 
in 2.3.6, tend to be those in the hierarchy of ecological issues which most 
conform (rather than contend) with dominant values, and therefore least 
threaten capital interests. Profoundly ecocentric demands, such as those 
inspired by the principles of ecocentric rather than anthropocentric 
egalitarianism, for example, and those most challenging the central 
values and ideology of industrial society, are the least likely to succeed. 
There is no certainty, therefore, that the state in capitalist society will act 
to ensure that capital accumulation functions, not only efficiently in • 
economic terms, but equitably in social and ecological terms. However 
whilst state support for capital accumulation constrains the realisation of 
ecological demands, unmet demands may be equally threatening to state 
legitimacy. Lauber's, Walker's, Eckersley's and Paehlke's arguments 
discussed above for the enhanced democratisation of the state, seek to 
break the state-capital nexus by enhancing the reliance of the state upon 
popular support, thereby enhancing its willingness to contradict capital 
objectives in order to protect its own legitimacy. In the meantime, given 
its tendency to identify the public interest with that of capital (Head 
1984:41-44), the state continues to rely upon mitigating and displacing as 
well as accommodating ecological demands. 
Despite the diversity of demands from the environmental movement 
over the last twenty years, the difficulty that states continue to face in 
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dealing with these is, as Dobson (1990:73) suggests, that 'the foundation 
stone of Green politics' remains the contentious belief that 'our finite 
Earth places limits on industrial growth'. These limits have again been 
making headline news, O'Riordan (1989:77) observes, as the market 
oriented politics of the 1980s have taken their social and ecological tolls. 
Short term economic gains are being won at the expense of huge, social 
and environmental costs, as relentless growth brings poverty, hardship 
and extensive damage to life sustaining ecosystems, especially in third 
world countries, with: 
loss of tropical forest cover, widespread drying of the savannah 
margins, regional pollution of inland seas and oceans, atmospheric 
contamination on a vast scale in the form of increased acidity and 
greenhouse warming, and growing alarm over the distribution of 
toxic chemicals in consumer goods and waste discharges (O'Riordan 
1989:77). 
In 1987, societal sustainability, long advocated by environmentalists for 
its recognition of the 'limits to growth', was acknowledged by the UN 
General Assembly following the tabling of the Bruntland Report entitled 
Our Common Future. 66 The goal of sustainable development was, Beder 
observes, 'largely accepted' by the governments of one hundred nations, 
and defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' 
(Beder 1993:3). For the first time, there was an additional awareness of 
the link between poverty and environmental degradation, and the need, 
not only to put industrialised nations on sustainable development paths, 
but to change development policies harming people and environments 
in the less developed nations of the south (Conroy & Litvinoff 1988:xiii). 
However, the contradictions and limitations of sustainable development, 
and its preoccupation with human rather than ecological survival, were 
soon to become apparent. 
66 This report by the then Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland was later to 
be released by the United Nations (World Commission on Environment and Development 
1990). 
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For sustainability to satisfy ecocentric criteria, it would need to observe 
the global concerns identified by the original Limits to Growth research 
(i.e. accelerating industrialisation, rapid population growth, widespread 
malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources, and a deteriorating 
environment); adopt solutions to these concerns, based upon ecological 
notions of interdependence, alternative technology, deindustrialisation 
and community empowerment, (Dobson 1990:73-4), to limit economic 
growth and industrial development whilst redistributing income to the 
extent required to ensure environmental preservation; and conform to 
the physical, biological and moral first principles of steady state 
economics, including the logic of ecological integrity as articulated, for 
example, by Aldo Leopold's land ethic: 67 
Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically 
right as well as economically expedient. A thing is right when it 
tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise (Leopold 1949:223). 
Instead, sustainable development has accommodated ecological demands 
in Sandbach's terms, (noted in 2.2.5), of averting a threat to the interests 
of capital by rhetorically purporting to strike common ground between 
developers and environmentalists, whilst implicitly failing to adapt 
ecocentric criteria to the conditions of resource use. Whilst 'sustainable' 
from an ecocentric viewpoint suggests the maintenance of ecological 
integrity, Beder (1993:18) observes that from the point of view of 'non-
ecological elites' it means simply sustaining a supply of raw materials 
when the existing supply runs out. The threat to capital interests of 
'global communalism', argued by O'Riordan to lie at the heart of the 
sustainability debate, is averted by adopting this latter definition without 
67 Specifically, world environmental groups have defined sustainability to include: respect 
and care for the community of life; improvement in the quality of human life; conservation of 
the Earth's vitality and diversity; minimisation of the depletion of non-renewable resources; 
observation of the limits of the Earth's 'carrying capacity'; a change in personal attitudes 
and practices; care by communities for their own environment; national frameworks for 
integrating development and conservation; and the creation of a global alliance (IUCN, 
UNEP, & WWF, 1991:9-12). 
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then resorting to the massive redistribution to wealth and power that an 
ecological basis to state economies would require (O'Riordan 1989:93). 
Sustainable development has been embraced, O'Riordan suggests, by the 
'environmentally perplexed', conservative environmentalists, who are 
nevertheless prepared to forsake earlier demands for a steady state in the 
interests of mediation, cooperation and an end to the contentious conflict 
that has characterised decades of environmental politics (Beder 1993:18). 
The satisfaction of ecological demands remains, as Walker (1989:38) 
argues, a major adaptive challenge for the modern state. However, to 
accept a version of sustainability that denies ecocentric criteria is clearly 
unsatisfactory. This solution merely reflects the state's interest in 
averting a legitimation crisis, or loss of public support, by appearing to 
distance itself from the interests of capital, whilst, to employ Lindblom's 
(1982:325) terminology, imprisoning environmental interests within the 
logic and limitations of the market system. Ecological concern is not 
served by such co-option, nor by the bureaucratisation associated with 
sustainable development processes that, as we saw in 2.3.3 & 2.3.5, equally 
threatens to suppress and diffuse rather than resolve environmental 
demands. 68 Whilst the environmental movement is sufficiently diverse 
to enable its members to attempt ideological and institutional change by 
working at a variety of levels, in theory at least environmentalists can 
rely upon the state to respond to its concerns where these threaten the 
legitimacy of democratically elected governments, bearing in mind, 
however, the powerful obstacle of growth based economics in market 
Diesendorf (1993) discusses the shortcomings of the Australian ecologically sustainable 
development process, including: the hasty, superficial division of working groups into 
industry sectors; the few women and aboriginals participating in the process; the belated, 
inadequate community consultations; the dominance of vested interests; the bureaucratic 
support for industry sponsors of government agencies; the limited resources of environmental 
as opposed to industrial interests; and the bureaucratic undermining of the process in the 
documentation of its reports that were so vague and meaningless as to precipitate the collapse 
of the ESD forum completely after protest from all but the government representatives (see 
also McEachem 1993; & Papadakis 1993:128-134 for further discussion). 
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societies to social and ecological change. The enhanced democratisation 
of the state discussed above may assist, as Lauber argues, in checking the 
pursuit of growth by political elites, however given its benefit to all 
political elites (no matter what their ideological orientation), it may be as 
Lindblom suggests (noted in 2.3.2) that 'no market society can achieve a 
fully developed democracy because the market imprisons the policy 
making process' (Lauber 1978:216; Lindblom 1982:332). The difficulties of 
influencing policy formation when additionally faced with the challenge 
of weakening the growth based paradigm, its political structures and its 
ideologically sustained legitimacy remain despite enhanced democracy. 
2.5 Conclusion - The Quest for Ecological Justice 
In 2.2, we saw that despite the plethora of views characterising the 
environmental movement, ecological values are essentially defined by 
the four 'pillars' of ecology, social responsibility, grass roots democracy 
and non-violence, and that, in opposing industrialism and unbridled 
growth, the ecological paradigm offers a powerful critique of the status 
quo, as Eckersley explains, whilst offering differing political prescriptions 
for attempting the transition to an ecologically sound future. Section 2.3 
considered the hegemony of dominant ideology, its legitimation of 'the 
institutions and politics of industrial capitalism', and, in Cotgrove's 
terms, its systematic repression of the articulation of alternate 
viewpoints. The ideological constraint of ecological demands follows, as 
2.3 concludes, the identification of ecocentrism as a contending, rather 
than conforming, set of values within the dominant industrial paradigm. 
Ideological bias toward orthodoxy, whilst frustrating the legitimation and 
generalisation of ecological integrity as a policy concern within orthodox 
politics, does not necessarily, it is argued, negate the potential to achieve a 
broad range of other ecological goals. A review in 2.4 of the capacity of 
the state to respond to ecological demands found, indeed, that the extent 
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of the state's response to, or incorporation of, ecological demands will be 
the extent to which they contradict economic rationales, undermine 
capital accumulation and threaten either the viability of the growth 
economy, or the state's own popular legitimacy. 
The quest for ecological justice, or the realisation of ecological demands is 
confined, however, within an ideologically and structurally constrained 
policy environment, so that the more direct the ecocentric challenge to 
dominant values, institutions and the industrial imperative, the more 
constrained is the achievement of ecological ends. The less demands are 
met, the more environmentalists, having turned initially to pluralistic 
political pressuring to achieve their ends, will seek to influence 
mainstream political processes and parties. The threat to the legitimacy 
of democratically elected governments from the political campaign 
efforts of environmental activists has indeed achieved results, as is 
instanced by the political record of the last twenty years in Tasmania for 
example. However the problem remains, as Porritt (1984:x) observes, that 
ecological opposition to the dominant world order 'cannot possibly be 
articulated through any of the major parties, for they and their ideologies 
are part of the problem'. Indeed there is more in common between left-
right political parties and orthodox politics, such as the commitment to 
economic growth and industrialism that is ecologically harmful, than 
there is between these and the advocates of an alternate ecological politics 
that would call a halt to the politics of natural resource depletion. As 
environmentalists experience a 'filtering' by mainstream politics and 
processes of those of their demands considered threatening to the status 
quo, they will continue to seek legitimacy by forming their own political 
groupings and pressuring for ideological and structural reorientation 
beyond ecological expediency and toward long term ecological and social 
justice, and indeed toward planetary survival. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS 
3.1 Chapter Outline 
Chapter Three comprises three main sections: (3.2) Environmental Policy 
Analysis; (3.3) Explaining Policy Constraint; and (3.4) Frameworks of 
Analysis. Having considered the nature of environmental values in 
Chapter Two, Chapter Three determines a framework of analysis capable 
of explaining the ideological and structural constraints found to have an 
influence upon environmental policy and the realisation of ecological 
demands that contend, rather than conform with dominant social values 
and goals. A number of case studies are examined where environmental 
policy is found to be constrained by capital interests and industrial 
imperatives. The Chapter also reviews theoretical explanations of 
causality in policy making, and considers analytic frameworks capable of 
explaining broad influences upon specific policy processes. It argues that 
because of the ideologically contentious nature of environmental 
demands, analysis must consider the potential for the mobilisation of bias 
toward orthodoxy to frustrate the generalisation of ecological integrity as 
a policy concern, and the policy actions of the state must be seen as 
potentially constrained by the priority it accords industrial interests 
within capitalist societies. The framework of analysis used in reviewing 
Tasmanian environmental policy is one that sees policy as the translation 
of dominant values into the capacity of institutions and policy processes 
to constrain value contenders - prescribing 'policy boundaries' capable of 
accommodating or routinely excluding environmental interests. 
Chapter Three begins by discussing how the findings of the preceding 
Chapter help define the nature of the environmental policy problem and 
therefore the requirements for a framework of analysis. The case studies 
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examined (in 3.2.3; 3.2.4; 3.2.5 & 3.2.6) confirm a mobilisation of bias away 
from the realisation of ecological demands where these threaten material 
interests, revealing the shortcomings in the pluralistic notion of 'equality 
of influence' in interest group politics and the formation of policy. The 
Chapter examines the utility of power theory in environmental policy 
analysis for the various levels of explanation it offers from the likelihood 
of environmentalists achieving their goals in interest group bargaining, 
to the nature of the ideologically and structurally sustained hegemony of 
dominant growth based values, and the constraints therefore upon the 
legitimation of ecological integrity as a policy concern within a restricted 
policy environment. After reviewing a number of policy approaches, the 
Chapter concludes that Downey's (1987) adaptation of Simeon's (1976) 
'policy funnel' best explains the influence of prevailing values, power 
and the role of the state, found in Chapter Two to define policy responses 
to the demands of environmentalists. This framework is adopted for 
consideration of the Tasmanian studies in following chapters. 
3.2 Environmental Policy Analysis 
3.2.1 The Nature of the Environmental Problem 
In his overview of ten recent Australian case studies in environmental 
policy, Walker laments the lack of 'universal agreement on the nature of 
environmental problems' and on the methods or techniques to be used 
in their study. Having suggested that the political economy perspective 
may be the most powerful for being the most illustrative approach, 
Walker qualifies this by adding that whilst this perspective may explain 
the neglect of environmental considerations, it does not suggest how 
these may be incorporated either into analysis or 'into political decision 
making'. On the other hand, Dryzek's notion of ecological rationality, 
and Goodin's application of 'ethical principles to environmental 
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problems', each appeal to Walker for demonstrating that consistency at 
least is possible in approaching problem analysis, whilst confirming that 
'to encompass the vast range of environmental problems, any grand 
theory would, at the very least, have to be extremely complex' (Walker 
1992:251-2). 
One of the first hurdles for environmental policy analysis is a recognition 
of the ideological, and therefore of the practical, complexity of ecological 
demands. As an emerging alternate paradigm, or view of the world, 
environmentalism brings with it, as we saw in Chapter Two, not only 
attitudes, goals and policy demands, but a challenge to the mental 
framework of a world defined by capital accumulation, and responsible 
therefore for ecological degradation and potential ecological catastrophe 
(Berman 1984:49). As a world view, environmentalism encompasses not 
only alternate core values, but notions of economy, polity, society, nature 
and knowledge directly opposed to those inspired by growth-based values 
(Cotgrove 1982:27). Despite 'pernicious and persistent' convention, it is 
wrong, Hay argues, to describe 'environment' as 'mere issue', or indeed 
as 'a single issue' that will fit within a broader issue-context: 
It is rather a comprehensive system of interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing values, a fully-fledged tool (that is) for interpreting social 
existence - a competitor not with other issues, but with the other 
great ideological systems; socialism, liberalism, conservatism (Hay 
1993:8; see also 2.2.4 for a review of the limitations of issue analysis). 
Walker (1992:3, 14) explains that the essence of environmental issues, the 
nature of ecology and the consequences of 'human disruption of 
otherwise self-regulating and resilient natural ecosystems',' requires the 
student of environmental policy to view problems in their broader 
1 Walker (1992:6) adds that the 'solving' of ecological problems may then involve 'a 
genuine attempt at amelioration by investigating the disruption to the ecosystem, and the 
establishment of a new ecological equilibrium'. Otherwise, it may simply be displaced (a 
typical response as we saw in 2.4) as an externality in the process of production. 
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context, for practical rather than metaphysical reasons. In terms of more 
traditional policy concerns, ecology is disadvantaged both by a general 
ignorance of its relationship to other concerns, and the difficulty 
politicians find fitting it within the routine conceptual framework of 
'widely accepted theories and world views 1 . 2 Political perception is then a 
key determinant, Walker suggests, to the resolution of environmental 
problems, and indeed to the success of the environmental movement. If 
political gain is measured in the traditional terms of 'compromise and 
horse trading', 3 Walker continues, then the environmental movement 
could be said to have enjoyed considerable success. However, when gain 
is measured in more complex ecological terms, (for example, in the 
halting or reversing of ecological degradation to the level required for the 
preservation of biodiversity and the prevention of eco-catastrophe), then, 
Walker concludes, 'the picture is far less satisfactory' (Walker 1992:4). 
Given the practical need that Walker identifies for seeing environmental 
problems 'as wholes and in their broader context', it may then appear, he 
notes, that the case study approach to environmental policy analysis is 
inadvisable for its lack of 'wholism' (Walker 1992:14). However, in his 
study of corporate power and environmental policy, Blowers (1984:9) also 
reviews the relevance of case study analysis of complex ecological 
problems and argues that the illustration of generalisations, and indeed 
the undertaking of comparative theoretical inquiry, is necessarily reliant 
upon the detailed probing that case study analysis undertakes. 4 Indeed, 
2 Paehlke (1989:210) notes that environmentalism seems foreign to the political 
decision making process, which, according to Lowi's 'interest group liberalism', responds to 
the most organised groups, whose members tend to be wealthy and tend to seek concrete, 
economically self-interested, and immediate gains. 
3 Walker (1992:13) notes that in any case, lelnvironmental policy issues are frequently 
unfit for compromise, not least because ecological systems do not understand political 
constraints'. 
4 Blowers (1984:9-10) cites Dunleavy (1981:182) as arguing that the case study approach 
'can usefully serve as the basis for the comparative assessment of theoretical approaches, 
the exposition of gaps in the analyses, the testing of hypothetical relations in an 
empirical context, and the assessment of the different approaches'. 
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Blowers's own findings are that Mlle study of an environmental issue in 
a specific local context has suggested that certain theoretical assumptions 
derived from other issues on a national basis may be challenged' 
(Blowers 1984:254). Equally there is value, Simeon (1976:551) observes, in 
undertaking 'coordinated case studies' that apply 'similar questions, 
frameworks and methods to carefully selected issues of different sorts' to 
yield cumulative results. Whilst Walker acknowledges that his 
insistence upon the policy approach of pragmatic wholism 'can impose 
unmanageable burdens on the analyst' (Walker 1992:14) - fa difficulty 
acknowledged by Barrett and Hill (1984:238), who stress that empirical 
studies must raise questions about policy context despite the risk this 
poses of 'taking projects beyond the point of manageability] - Simeon 
(1976:551) warns against studies becoming so easily submerged in the 
minutiae of detail, that broader factors influencing policy outcomes are 
completely missed. 5 
3.2.2 The Problem of Environmental Policy Analysis 
Walker's lament for normative analysis has resonated throughout policy 
literature since its emergence twenty years ago as 'a significant subfield 
within the discipline of political science' (Sabatier 1991:144), often 
concluding, as Walker does, that no one theory is altogether adequate in 
explaining the problem at hand (Walker 1992:249), and more generally 
that 'the appropriate mode of analysis will vary according to the issue and 
its context' (Hogwood & Gunn 1984:5). Theorists commonly advocate 
such techniques as policy analysis undertaken at various levels with 
particular attention paid to the interaction between levels; a synthesis or 
bridging of theoretical approaches or indeed simply recognition that a 
5 Simeon (1976:551) is critical of the case study approach - where mandatory 
theoretical chapters at the beginning of the work bear little relationship to the case study 
detail; where studies fail to develop new hypotheses or generalisations for later 
application and testing; and where studies are isolated, unique and often exotic, offering 
insights that may actually be misleading. 
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theorist's particular policy focus may well be a narrow area of interest but 
from within a broad field of influence. 'Micro', 'middle' and 'macro' 
levels of policy analysis would then respectively address decision making, 
policy formation and political systems, assessing policy making and policy 
effectiveness within a broader analysis of the distribution of economic 
and political power within political systems (Ham & Hill 1984:17-18). In 
addition to recognising the ideological complexity of environmentalism 
as a policy concern, studies of environmental policy must then consider 
the influence of the industrial paradigm, acting, in Hall's terms, as a 
policy paradigm - that is constraining action, choice, processes and the 
ability of environmentalists to achieve their demands where decision 
makers are guided: 
by an overarching set of ideas that specify how the problems facing 
them are perceived, which goals might be attained through policy 
and what sort of techniques can be used to reach these goals. Ideas 
about each of these matters interlock to form a relatively coherent 
whole that might be described as a policy paradigm (Hall 1992:91). 
Rodman (1980:64-65) argues that the study of environmental policy and 
politics has itself been constrained by the preoccupation of modern 
political science with modelling itself upon the 'linear, one dimensional, 
cause and effect' analysis of modern natural science that so contradicts 
ecological notions. Instead of finding political society interpreted in the 
classical sense as if it were an organism, Rodman (1980:66) continues, we 
find it interpreted by one dimensional modern analysis as if it were a 
mechanism. In analysis, we then encounter 'variations of the Darwinian 
view of nature that legitimate either capitalist competition, socialist-
anarchist mutual aid, or perpetual "development", and, furthermore, a 
'pretension to a nonteleological, autonomous status [that] has amounted 
in practice to an unquestioning acceptance of the basic presuppositions of 
the modern paradigm, so that being "value-free" has typically meant that 
one's "values" are not conspicuous because they are so widely shared' 
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(Rodman 1980:65). Rodman suggests that this 'domestication' of analysis 
has served the present day 'politics of wealth' by failing to critique the 
modern paradigm, whilst reducing the study of environmentalism to 
within the framework of 'the policy process' and the politics of getting 
(who gets what, when, and how). In noting the short sightedness of such 
analysis, Rodman concludes that, rather than perceiving environmental 
issues as unrelated concerns (which the 'regulations, incentives, and 
technical innovations' of the market economy could combine to keep at 
tolerable levels), the interdependency of issues must be emphasised, as 
must their place within a modern industrial paradigm committed to 
industrialisation and the technological domination of nature (Rodman 
1980:50-51). 
Walker's (1992:233-254) review of approaches suitable for environmental 
policy analysis is as frustrating to the reader as no doubt it is to the author 
himself. 6 In part this is because Walker sets himself several concurrent 
tasks - in discussing the fate of pressing environmental problems given 
the priorities of modern political culture; in considering the politics of 
environmental policy described by his case studies; in searching for 
appropriate policy explanation which, he concedes, in each case is likely 
to vary; and in exploring the policy models that he reviews, not only for 
their explanatory ability, but also their utility in prescribing ecologically 
sound future choices. For the purposes of this discussion, Walker is 
concerned by 'displacement', or symbolic politics, that is designed to 
reassure public unease about environmental issues without substantially 
resolving the causes of their unease. He is concerned with his finding of 
environmental decisions based upon radically incomplete information 
6 Walker notes the political economy perspective; corporatism, brokerage and symbolic 
politics; 'middle-level' process theories (rational-comprehensive, disjointed incremental 
and 'mixed scanning' decision making models); and the issue-attention cycle (Walker 
1992:236-251). 
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that is exclusively controlled and subject to professional biases. He warns 
of entrenched business interests that hegemonically dominate politics, 
perpetuating development myths whilst blocking consideration of viable 
alternatives, sustaining their own power by the exploitation 'both of 
natural resources and human beings' (Walker 1992:233-236). Walker 
argues that a policy explanation of these circumstances must concede that 
context does in fact limit decision options, as the following case studies 
demonstrate, and that the explanatory value of decision strategies in 
these circumstances ranges from 'minimal' to 'quite irrelevant'. 
3.2.3 Crenson & the Lin-Politics of Air Pollution 
Crenson explores constrained environmental decision making in his oft 
quoted study of the 'un-politics' of air pollution, employing non-decision 
making analysis to review the relative impacts of industrial influence 
and power reputations upon pollution control in two adjacent steel 
towns, Gary and East Chicago, in Indiana. Crenson's study is concerned 
with explaining why East Chicago addressed its air pollution problem in 
1949, whilst Gary, although similarly populated and polluted, took no 
action before 1962. He explicitly attempts, as Lukes (1977:42) observes, to 
find a way to explain 'things that do not happen' on the assumption that 
'the proper object of investigation is not political activity but political 
inactivity', hence his interest in non-decision making. This practice is 
described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962:948) as A's ability to create or 
enforce social values, political values, and institutional practices 'that 
limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only 
those issues that are comparatively innocuous' to A's interests. It is an 
approach Blowers (1984:229) sees as neo-elitist for combining traditional 
elitist focus upon disproportionate power with an interest in key issues 
that challenge the ability of this power to dominate the policy process. In 
terms of power theory, (discussed in 3.3.3) non-decision making borders a 
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two-dimensional behavioural view of power (exhibited only in decisions 
and non-decisions) and a three-dimensional situational view of power 
(power that is non-individualistic), in addition to considering how power 
may be exercised to prevent issues being raised (Lukes 1977:44-45). 
Crenson relies upon the mobilisation of bias insights of Schattschneider, 
and of Bachrach and Barate to find that democratic pluralist politics, for 
all its 'apparent penetrability and heterogeneity', may in reality restrict 
the scope of the political process to a limited range of acceptable issues 
and demands, with much of the restricted influence exerted indirectly 
(Crenson 1971:23). He finds, in terms of his empirical studies, that 'the 
perceived influence of political and economic elites can have an 
important effect upon the level of political activity in the field of air 
pollution' (Crenson 1971:182). In the 'one company' town of Gary, for 
example, strong party political culture and organisation combined with 
the power reputation of US Steel as indirect influence to prevent the air 
pollution issue surfacing on the city's political agenda, thereby delaying 
legislation until 1962. Conversely in East Chicago, where both political 
power and industrial influence is more dispersed (that is, with no strong 
party organisation, and a number of steel works, rather than one large 
company) indirect influence did not impede the early adoption in 1949 of 
pollution controls (Lukes 1977:42). Observable action in these studies is 
therefore an incomplete guide to environmental policy making, just as 
Ham and Hill (1984:66) explain that it is to the distribution of political 
power, in spite of pluralist notions about the penetrability of the political 
process. Emphasis upon observable politics, political actors and their 
actions may then lead investigators to overlook the power of obstruction 
identified in Gary, that enforces inaction on environmental policy whilst 
7 Discussed in 2.3.4 in terms of the constraint of 'orthodoxy' upon ecological discourse 
and the realisation of ecological values, interests and demands. 
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maintaining the impenetrability of the political process (Crenson 1971:21; 
see 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion of the explanatory limits of pluralism). 
Whilst Crenson's study is a pioneering demonstration both of decision 
making as an activity that may be channelled and directed by the process 
of non-decision making, and of the undue influence of industry in a 'one 
company' town in establishing the boundaries to environmental policy 
(Crenson 1971:178), it is of limited utility as a broader framework of 
analysis for offering an explanation of constraints upon environmental 
policy making only at the behavioural and situational, rather structural 
or ideological levels. Where Crenson talks of structural or ideological 
factors, he does so in terms of the local community, organisation, and 
political culture of Gary or East Chicago. He explains, in the case of these 
two towns, that the limits to policy making are specific to place, so that, 
whilst air pollution legislation is obstructed by corporate power in Gary, it 
may not necessarily be obstructed in similar steel towns elsewhere. The 
'inarticulate ideology' that Crenson identifies promoting the 'selection 
perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts' is described 
as specific to the political institutions of Gary, responsible for that town 
developing its own unique political climate, rather than described in the 
broader sense of dominant industrial ideology mobilising bias in general 
against the realisation of environmental values and demands (Crenson 
1971:23). 
The value of Crenson's study for this discussion remains its 'unmasking' 
of the operation of constraining influences upon environmental decision 
making. Whilst political power may appear fragmented, and penetrable, 
and whilst policy making may appear to be open, although lacking 
coordination, such 'disjointedness', Crenson finds, may well disguise the 
'causal mechanism' of a restricted decision making environment which 
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exploits certain kinds of conflicts whilst suppressing others (Crenson 
1971:178-80; Clegg 1992:82). As well, Crenson shows that corporate 
suppression and control of environmental concern may be achieved 
through power reputation alone without any recourse to action or 
participation by corporate actors in the political or policy arena. Decisive 
corporate control over the environmental agenda identified by Crenson 
in Gary may well have parallels elsewhere, with its symptoms 
characteristically recognisable as corporate evasiveness, silence and 
inaction in public debate on issues of concern, together with a local 
political inclination to support, and seek support in return, from major 
industrial concerns. Contrary to the tenets of the issue attention cycle, 
Crenson (1971:25) claims that political issues tend to be interconnected, 
with the promotion of one civic issue tending to drive other issues away. 
An apparent preoccupation with 'business and industrial development' 
will then tend, for example, to preclude discussion of their social and 
environmental costs, particularly where anticipated reactions, such as the 
loss of employment or the 'flight' of industry to a more sympathetic 
locality, could be the consequence of addressing public concerns. 8 
Crenson's comparative studies rest, as Lukes (1977:46) notes, firstly, upon 
his judgement that the citizens of Gary would prefer not to be poisoned 
by air pollution; secondly, upon his hypothesis that, given full 
information and a choice, the citizens of Gary would actively choose not 
to be poisoned; and, finally, on the basis of comparative data, that in East 
Chicago, where non-decisional power was not exerted or was exerted to a 
8 This tactic is known as 'job blackmail' and is shown by Schrecker's research (1985:14; 
1990:168-170) to be quite candidly used by members of the business community in dealing 
with governments. Blowers (1983:412) finds (i) that when jobs and profits are on the line, 
the business case meets with more sympathy from governments, and (ii) that when 
business is at its weakest in economic terms, it can best defend itself against environmental 
pressures. Polsby (1980:216-217) suggests that the people of Gary do make a choice in 
these circumstances and would rather have pollution and jobs, than no pollution and no 
jobs. However, Morriss (1987:148) remains unconvinced, arguing that 'posing the choice in 
this way precisely highlights the lack of power of those who live in Gary'. 
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lesser degree, citizens had in fact made and enforced such a choice. 
Whilst the difficulty of constructing similar case studies is well noted 
(Clegg 1992:118), the case for the enhanced democratisation of the policy 
process as a means of both fragmenting corporate power and achieving 
environmental ends is well proven by Crenson's analysis, albeit on 
wholly anthropocentric, rather than Eckersley's ecocentric, grounds. 
3.2.4 Sandbach, Environment, Ideology & Policy 
Sandbach (1980:106) argues the case for Marxist analysis of environmental 
policy, and the capacity of environmentalists to realise their interests, on 
the grounds that '[t]he  study of pressure groups and power makes little 
sense except in relation to the structures of constraint'. His theoretical 
project, like Crenson's, is to move beyond the assumption that power and 
the ability to influence policy and political processes is, as the pluralists 
maintain, equally enjoyed by environmentalists and their opponents. 
Whilst pluralist and elitist focus is upon 'who decides', and 'who has 
power over whom' in decision making, Marxist analysis is concerned 
with 'constraint' and 'how choice is shaped and limited'. However, 
despite his (1980:90) rejection of behaviouralism for obscuring objective 
conditions with its focus on factors in isolation, Sandbach is prepared to 
concede that environmentalists' behaviour is capable of drawing a 
positive policy response (Sandbach 1980:18). 
In seeking an explanation for the gains of the environmental movement 
since its rise in the late 1960s, Sandbach then follows Miliband's (1977) 
instrumentalist Marxist approach, acknowledging the concept of relative 
autonomy of the state from capital, and of environmentalists in 
circumstances of constraint. 9 This explains pluralist achievements in 
9 Poulantzas criticised Miliband for introducing the notion of elites, subjective choice 
and free will into Marxism. Indeed, by rejecting the Marxist tenet that thought and action 
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capitalist societies as - 'the granting of concessions to the subordinate 
classes or political forms which allow a real degree of choice, in order to 
maintain an overall world view which preserves capitalism by distorting 
beliefs, values, common sense assumptions and popular culture' (Cox et 
al 1985:66). 
Sandbach (1980) applies Marxist analysis to a range of environmental 
concerns, including the role that technology has played in economic 
development to the detriment of the environment. His project is to 
unmask power in environmental politics, and to explain the economic, 
political and ideological constraints upon the pursuit of ecologically 
sound alternatives. In terms of powerful capital interests behind the 
promotion of ecologically unsound technology, Sandbach discusses two 
approaches for addressing the hegemonic corporate control of the nuclear 
power industry and the future of the energy industry generally. The first 
approach, advocated by Lovins (1977), is restricted, Sandbach (1980:59) 
argues, for confining its concern to a rational discussion of the case for 
and against nuclear power,lo whilst ignoring nuclear power politics. The 
flaw in Lovin's 'soft' energy path, he claims, is that it fails to appreciate 
that 'soft' technology is as vulnerable to corporate capture as 'hard' 
technology, so that the problem for the future is not 'what' energy is 
produced, but 'who' controls it, and 'how' this control is legitimated. 11 
Sandbach prefers Martin's (1978) analysis for seeing nuclear power as 
'favoured by advanced industrial capitalism because it further centralises 
is determined and shaped by the logic and requirements of capitalism, Poulantzas argued 
that Miliband was no longer a Marxist (Cox et al 1985:68-69). 
10 Lovins (1977:37) advocates 'soft' energy alternatives, i.e. conservation, renewable 
energy and social changes in lifestyle, to the 'hard' energy path, for example offered by 
the nuclear power industry, where supply is centralised and controlled by a bureaucratic 
elite. Sandbach (1980:160) is unconvinced by the mutual exclusivity of this 'soft'/'hard' 
distinction, seeing an ecologically sound future as conceivably employing a mix of both. 
11 Beder (1993:240) lists impediments to the pursuit of alternative 'green' technology in 
industry as including: the initial cost of introducing these measures; industry ignorance of 
the long term cost savings against the initial investment; the lack of competitive pressure 
and performance standards, and so on; in addition to vested interests and political power. 
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control over investment and production, keeps decisions in the hands of 
employers and their hired experts, and maintains passive consumerism' 
(Sandbach 1980:163). 
Similarly, Sandbach explains corporate influence as responsible for the 
failure in Britain by local authorities to charge industrial polluters under 
the Public Health Act, and the failure, initially in Britain, as well as other 
countries, to set adequate levels of charges to deter pollution. Following 
its enactment in the early 1970s, parts of water pollution legislation in 
Britain remained virtually unimplemented, causing a deterioration of 
water quality toward the late 1970s discussed in 3.2.6 (Sandbach 1980:18). 
However, the local British authorities were keener to attract industry at a 
time of high unemployment than they were to tax polluters. 12 Industry 
also favours the imposition of pollution standards rather than taxation 
on the level of pollution, because it can delay, avoid or litigate to 
postpone having to meet standards with greater ease than it can taxes, 
and, ironically, has resisted paying taxes, by invoking the ideological 
rhetoric that these are a 'licence to pollute' (Sandbach 1980:55). Corporate 
interests have been well positioned, Sandbach observes, from the early 
development of pollution control policy in Britain in particular, to exert 
control over the process in partnership with governments and close 
alliances with pollution control inspectorates. 13 
12 In terms of air pollution, however, Sandbach (1980:208) notes that the Clean Air Act 
1956 has steadily reduced smoke and sulphur dioxide emissions into the air over Britain, 
resulting in the 1970s in a 50% increase in sunshine hours per day. 
13 Sandbach also describes the twenty year battle, including legislative provisions, to 
successfully implement pollution control standards in America, which has suffered 
setbacks from industrial collusion and the relaxation and deferment of industry standards 
(Sandbach 1980:56-7). Cunningham (1974:50) observes that the US automobile industry 
has also totally resisted government attempts to legislate against noxious exhaust fumes 
on the grounds of cost and lack of available technology, despite pollution threats serious 
enough to potentially result in the banning of cars from American cities. 
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Whilst Sandbach sees capitalism as encouraging the centralisation of 
power and decision making so as to increase corporate influence upon 
policy outcomes, it is not inevitable that environmentalists will fail to 
gain concessions. He acknowledges that where environmental groups 
are organised, their demands for increased participation in policy making 
and politics create a lever for the implementation of environmental 
policy despite objective circumstances of constraint. The power of capital 
is not invincible then, but like a Chinese 'paper tiger', can be defeated in 
the face of collective resistance (Sandbach 1980:128). His critique vacillates 
between determinist and instrumentalist Marxism, apparently according 
to the issue and evidence at hand, so that whilst tending generally toward 
the former approach, Sandbach draws on the latter as the contradiction of 
democratic achievement arises despite structural constraint. Whilst not 
always convincing given his ideological generalisations and eclectic use 
of theory, Sandbach nevertheless provides insightful description of the 
difficulties confronting environmentalists, (despite his flirtation with 
pluralist notions of equality of opportunity to influence policy), when the 
realisation of their demands would seriously undermine capital interests: 
Marxist accounts can be seen as useful in terms of their scope and 
breadth of analysis. They also possess a predictive utility and within 
their own terms are internally logical and coherent. Whether or not 
they are descriptively sound and empirically consistent, depends 
upon whether one accepts the initial premises or not. That they 
raise interesting concepts and insights for the further analysis of 
power - the importance of latent interests, the role of social 
conditioning and ideological hegemony in shaping attitudes and 
preferences, and the need to study the constraints which economic 
power places on the use of political power - is not, however, in 
doubt (Cox et al 1985:223). 
Where power is appreciated in the Marxist sense as the capacity to realise 
interest, environmentalists certainly appear disadvantaged compared to 
their corporate opponents in achieving policy outcomes. 
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3.2.5 Blowers & Power in the London Brick Dispute 
Blowers (1984) is also concerned, in his study of the London Brick dispute, 
to explain the disproportionate corporate power over environmental 
policy making enjoyed by the London Brick company of Bedfordshire. He 
employs competing theories of power, pluralism, neo-elitism and Marxist 
structuralism to build a picture and an explanation of the London Brick 
works dispute which from any single perspective, he concludes, is partial 
and therefore flawed. 0 Briefly, the conflict was over London Brick's 
eventually successful plans for the complete redevelopment of its brick 
making activities in Bedfordshire despite environmentalists' concern 
over site rehabilitation and air pollution (Blowers 1984:205). Blowers 
finds that over a long period of time, the company was able to exercise 
power to achieve its ends both by inaction, and by taking direct steps to 
thwart its opponents as required. 
When the company found itself in open confrontation with 
environmental interests, it sought to negotiate, and when that failed, it 
retaliated. Blowers observes that it is possible to perceive an oscillation in 
the balance of power, over the period of the dispute, between the 
opposing interests, for example, as the successes of environmental groups 
are met by a resurgence of business power (Blowers 1983:412). 
Furthermore, Blowers finds, as does Crenson, that corporate advantage 
varies with place, with some counties or regions providing more 
propitious business environments than others, so that the 'mediating 
14 His original analysis of the dispute was more simply a consideration of the opposing 
'pluralist' and 'political economy' perspectives of corporate power. Blowers concludes 
that both contribute to an understanding of corporate influence in the dispute despite their 
respective limitations. The former view regards the London Brick company as an interest 
group with roughly equal chances of success in a battle with other interest groups, whilst 
the latter contends that business possesses such reserves of power that the eventual 
outcome of any dispute is never in doubt (Blowers 1983:413). It is apparent from his later 
study that Blowers felt this explanation to be frustrating and incomplete, encouraging his 
adoption of an eclectic descriptive approach based upon Lukes' three-dimensional 
explanation of power. 
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concepts' of temporal and spatial difference must be accounted for in 
describing corporate power over policy making. 
Blowers finds the pluralist idea of a multiplicity of interests, enjoying 
different resources but equality of opportunity to influence policy, only 
superficially borne out in the London Brick dispute. Whilst ostensibly all 
interests were able to participate in the decision process regarding the 
future of the works, the company enjoyed privileged access in the early 
stages before consultation on its proposals formally commenced. An 
acceptance of the company's expansion plans by the decision makers was 
very likely achieved by this informal 'socialisation' process. Concerning 
suppression of the problem of pollution by the works, Blowers finds the 
company active in this regard, controlling information, defusing 
opposition, deflecting disclosure by settling compensation claims out of 
court, and in every way preventing the issue emerging publicly. 
In the end, however, Blowers finds that structuralism rather than 
pluralism or elitism best establishes the reasons underlying the dispute by 
identifying the contest as one between the material interests of 
production and profit on one hand, and of land and amenity on the 
other. Despite failing to account, as pluralism would, for the role of local 
actors in the dispute, the intensity of local conflict and the significance of 
participation by various groups, Blowers finds that the structuralist 
account exposes the real interests at stake, the dependence of workers on 
London Brick, and the ability of the company to achieve its goals despite 
an apparently powerful and implacable opposition. Over and above the 
conflict were structuralist forces at work which rendered the ambitions of 
the environmentalists futile, and London Brick's own win seemingly 
inevitable (Blowers 1984: 3, 6, 222, 227, 235, 241 & 291). 
105 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
Despite the descriptive utility of his theoretical synthesis of power 
approaches, Blowers acknowledges great difficulties in constructing what 
he calls a 'precise relationship' between power theory and evidence in the 
London Brick case. This is not merely because he is applying conflicting 
theories, but also because the approach he adopts, in his view, outruns 
empirical application. Blowers claims that his Brick Works study belongs 
to the 'new, innovative and somewhat innocent' area of urban studies, 
which, given its unorthodox, multi-disciplinary approach, is bound to 
experience methodological problems of falsifiability and conceptual 
precision. 15 However, he finds that without the use of the mediating 
concepts, which he employs to link the various interpretations of power, 
then the evidence is strained, as he observes, 'to support hypotheses 
which bear little relationship to the complex and confusing pictures 
presented by experience'. Blowers cites authors of other contemporary 
urban studies as equally interested in theoretical synthesis - Saunders, for 
example, who remarks that one sided theoreticism is likely to prove as 
sterile as one sided empiricism; and Dunleavy, who suggests that it does 
not seem utopian to detect signs of empirically supported common 
ground underlying contending theories (Blowers 1984:250-260). 
Blowers compares the findings of his London Brick Works study with 
American research such as Crenson's, and draws broad parallels between 
them about the relative power of corporate and environmental interests. 
15 Blowers's approach to overcoming methodological problems is two-fold. Firstly he 
does not put forward each theory of power as a clearly defined set of hypotheses capable 
of being supported or falsified by the evidence, but rather uses each perspective as a means 
of interpreting the evidence of the case. 
Furthermore, he collects the evidence provided by the various power theories, each of 
which clearly identifies certain aspects of the case whilst ignoring others, and then links 
this by his 'temporal and spatial' mediating concepts, to which he adds local and 
national considerations, as well as the political processes respectively exploited by 
environmental and economic interests (Blowers 1984:260-291). 
This attempt bears scrutiny - both for its comprehensive analysis of the Brick works 
dispute, and for indicating the difficulties to be confronted in synthesising conflicting 
accounts of power (see also discussion of Blowers and corporate power in 3.3.4). 
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Industry, he finds, has generally suffered from the shift in values to an 
increase in concern both for the environment, and for the public health 
risks of industrial pollution. However, it has reacted by averting what it 
regards as unacceptable costs - exploiting political circumstances in order 
to secure its political objectives - and by offering technical solutions to 
problems which beg broader questions of overall costs and benefits. In 
the first instance, Blowers finds, industry will always attempt to ensure 
that issues inimical to its own interests are not agitated to ensure that 
certain concerns never reach the overt decision making arena (Blowers 
1984:312-322). Blowers further reviews the Reserve Mining controversy, 
the British Clean Air Act and pollution control in the USA for signs that 
pollution controls may be forcing major changes in corporate strategies. 
Finding little evidence of this, he concludes that corporate interests 
possess greater effective power in contests with environmentalists, 
particularly where they exploit not only covert corporatist, but also overt 
pluralist, political arenas (Blowers 1984:323). 
3.2.6 Hill et al & Policy Inaction on Pollution Control 
Hill et al employ Blowers's multi-levelled analytic approach to examine 
the British government's inaction over the control of nitrate pollution in 
the problem areas of Severn-Trent, Anglia and Thames - as well as other 
intensively cultivated regions in the country where ground rather than 
surface water is the predominant public water supply, and therefore most 
likely highly contaminated by nitrates 16 (Hill et al 1989:228). The authors 
also discuss policy inaction on nitrate pollution as a general problem in 
Britain, one which has taken nearly two decades (and external pressure 
particularly from the EEC) to achieve prominence on the British political 
16 Intense cultivation combined with heavy nitrate fertiliser usage inducing nitrate 
leaching through disturbed soils, 'is concentrated in those parts of the country where the 
rocks are permeable and aquifers are essential water sources'. Whilst there are concerns 
with nitrate concentrations in surface waters, these concentrations are more easily 
dispersed, except where groundwater is an important source of supply (Hill et al 1989:228). 
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stage, despite alarming medical and scientific evidence on the dangers of 
contamination first surfacing in the early 1970s (Hill et al 1989:227-232). 
Hill et a/ find, in the case of nitrate water pollution in Britain, temporal 
factors complement policy explanations provided by pluralist, elitist and 
structuralist accounts. Pluralism explains how ignorance and apathy 
sustain the status quo against pollution control, elitism and structuralism 
address the underlying circumstances, whilst temporal analysis identifies 
a gradual weakening, over the period studied, of state support for the 
agricultural industry creating an environmental policy opportunity and 
demonstrating the potential for state autonomy (Hill et al 1989:239). 
The legitimacy of medical, scientific and, ultimately, public concern over 
British drinking water supplies being subject to nitrate contamination, 
was established in the early 1970s on the grounds of links between nitrate 
pollution levels and both infantile methaemoglobinaemia, and cancer, 
particularly cancer of the stomach. 17 At this time, surface water nitrate 
concentration levels were also recorded for the first time as exceeding 
45mg/1, close to the World Health Organisation and EEC recommended 
maximum safe levels of 50mg/l. Other events to draw the problem into 
the public arena included the unprecedented closure of some bore hole 
water supplies by water authorities; research interest in the amount of 
nitrate entering groundwater and its passage through water bearing strata; 
the formation of a Department of Environment Nitrate Sub-Committee; 
and a Royal Commission review of agriculture and pollution that failed 
to recommend a curbing of the agricultural fertiliser use, despite nitrate 
problem areas being known to be intensively cultivated. The authors 
note that this finding set the tone of government policy as sceptical about 
17 The authors report that medical evidence of methaemoglobinaemia is alarming, and 
that it has in each case been linked to drinking water contaminated to a nitrate level of 
around 50mg/I, the WHO recommended level, as well as the maximum concentration limit 
set by the EEC Drinking Water Directive (Hill et al 1989:227, 232). 
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the need to achieve the EEC Drinking Water Directive recommended safe 
nitrate concentration levels (Hill et al 1989:232). 
Whilst the nitrate debate gradually builds over two decades into an 
argument for increased pollution control and revised agricultural 
practices, Hill et al (1989:227) argue that no clear policy resolution has 
been achieved, leaving it unclear just what will be done to control the 
nitrate problem and importantly who will bear the cost. At the same 
time, the combined interests of the agriculture and fertiliser industries 
remain active in contriving to keep any change to acceptable nitrate 
pollution levels to a minimum, and to localise any policy interventions, 
rather than see a general revision of agricultural practices (Hill et al 
1989:239). Conflicting scientific and administrative signals about the 
dangers of nitrate and its links to agricultural practices appear to have 
resulted in ambiguous, flawed policy responses, prompting several 
equally conflicting views identified by Hill et al (1989:230) as representing 
alternative scenarios in the nitrate debate. The fact that debate emerged at 
all is due to a number of factors external to community (including the 
medical and scientific community) dissatisfaction with levels of nitrate 
pollution, and despite the best efforts of government and industry to 
contain ongoing community demands for action. 18 
The nitrate debate comprised the views: that the problem is exaggerated 
(promoted by major fertiliser manufacturers and bolstered by 
government ambivalence on action); that where nitrate concentration is 
a problem, it can be tackled by localised control measures (basically an 
18 Besides the significant pressure from the EEC (that lent enormous credibility to local 
efforts) for member states to meet its water pollution control requirements by mid 1985 and 
to curb agricultural production, the authors ironically also credit both water privatisation 
attempts by the national government, as well as complaints from environmentalists to the 
EEC about the legality of its derogation of nitrate concentration levels, with ensuring that 
the nitrate issue emerged onto the public agenda (Hill et al 1989:233-234). 
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administrative stance that has to date proven ineffective); and, that 
nitrate use in Britain should be generally restricted, rather than arbitrarily 
penalising farmers in certain specific geological zones. The latter radical 
action would not only address the problem of nitrate pollution, the 
authors note, but also the general damage done by 'intensive, chemically 
supported, arable farming', whilst furthermore offering a mechanism, in 
line with the current EEC commitment, for curbing agricultural 
production (Hill et al 1989:231). 
The authors are faced with explaining a long period of policy inaction 
over nitrate levels despite concern dating back to the early 1970s, as well 
as a 'flurry of policy activity' in the late 1980s apparently aimed at no 
longer evading the EEC Directive and searching for new ways to limit 
pollution, yet ultimately failing to deliver a pollution control outcome. 
A simple pluralist explanation for inaction is that nitrate in water cannot 
be detected by taste, so that without scientific warnings of its dangers, the 
public are unlikely to be concerned. However, once the public had been 
made aware, and had become concerned, attitude polling indicates that 
the majority nevertheless upheld 'the traditional view that the care of 
the rural environment should be left to agriculture' (Hill et al 1989:237). 
Whilst pluralism explains the significant weight that the EEC Directive 
lent to the campaigning efforts of the British Friends of the Earth, Hill et 
al turn to elitism to explain the ways in which the political agenda is 
controlled by small yet powerful groups such as the agricultural lobby. 
Against the powerful agricultural status quo, the authors see the scientific 
elite, for example, as constrained by their role as public employees despite 
their important research linking nitrate pollution to agricultural practice. 
It took until the late 1980s, when the tide of events generally appeared to 
turn against the agriculture industry, for the scientific community to shed 
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its 'common acceptance of shared caution' and to divide into industry 
supporters and those conscious of the problems faced by water authorities 
to which the cost of pollution control had been delegated. The authors 
find that only structuralism explains the manner in which economic 
considerations dominated state pollution policy, however incomplete its 
explanation of the weakening of state support for agriculture in the late 
1980s, and the manner in which this is exploited by those concerned to 
achieve improved environmental policy (Hill et al 1989:238-239). 
Each of these four studies above show a range of power analyses that will 
be considered in the determination of a framework of environmental 
policy analysis for use in Chapters Five and Six. None of the studies 
above, with the exception of Sandbach's Marxist approach, emphasises 
the ideological basis of environmental policy demands. Nevertheless, 
the studies show the consequences of ideological contention by detailing 
the mobilisation of bias against ecopolitical concerns. It will be argued 
later in this chapter that the focus of power analysis may in fact range 
from the most overt to the least overt of political arenas, and from the 
most overt to the least overt of influences, therefore, upon a policy 
outcome. The utility of power analysis as a 'multi-layered policy tool' is 
then apparent when we consider that ecopolitical concerns themselves 
are inspired by many differing shades of light to dark green, requiring 
differing policy explanations, as we shall see in 3.4. However, first we 
turn, in 3.3, to a critique of the studies above in terms of their utility in 
explaining environmental policy constraint. 
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3.3 Explaining Policy Constraint 
3.3.1 The Role of Power & Causality 
A review of the ideological nature of ecopolitical demands in Chapter 
Two, and the potential obstacle of dominant materialist ideology to their 
legitimisation as policy concerns, suggests that environmental policy 
analysis must account for capacity and constraint in the policy process. 
The case studies reviewed above found the realisation of environmental 
demands similarly constrained although in differing circumstances: by 
industrial influence and the corporate reputation for power of US Steel 
that ensured local policy inaction on air pollution in Gary, Indiana; by 
powerful capital interests promoting ecologically unsound energy 
technology and found by Sandbach to be thwarting the pursuit of 'soft' 
energy paths; by the disproportionate corporate power of London Brick 
over environmental policy processes affecting the fate of the disputed 
Bedfordshire brick works; and by collusion between the British 
government and the agricultural and fertiliser industries that has 
prevented policy action upon harmful levels of nitrate concentration in 
drinking water supplies despite years of lobbying by environmentalists. 
These cases suggest that the capacity of environmentalists to achieve their 
ends is deterministically limited by objective circumstances of constraint - 
despite Crenson's finding of enhanced democratisation as an appropriate 
means of fragmenting corporate power - that may otherwise so bind the 
state to the support of capital as to succeed in thwarting any genuine 
environmental policy response. 19 
19 In East Chicago, enhanced democratisation of local politics and policy making 
enabled pollution control to be achieved years before Gary, where power was centralised, 
policy tightly controlled, and corporate collusion routine to the process of governance (see 
3.2.3). 
112 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
It is apparent, certainly where ecological demands directly challenge 
capital interests, that environmental policy analysis must consider the 
influence of broad determining factors upon the specifics of the decision 
making process in order to adequately explain policy decisions and the 
outcome of conflict between opposing interests. Environmental policy 
analysis must then, in Simeon's (1976:550) terms, avoid a 'too narrow' 
focus on decision-making that will be at the cost of failing to comprehend 
the influences which shape such factors as the range of alternative 
decisions considered, the assumptions and values behind policy choices, 
the kinds of action that decision makers may have taken and the forces 
behind certain policy outcomes. 
Simeon's approach is intended to 'link up the study of policy with the 
more traditional concerns of political science and in particular with the 
three most vital elements: 'power, conflict and ideology'. A review of 
socio -economic context, the system of power and influence, dominant 
values and ideas, formal structures and institutions, and the policy 
process will help to isolate and comprehend the multitude of factors 
which define the parameters within which policy makers operate. This 
perspective Simeon calls the 'funnel of causality', the purpose of which is 
to relate policy to the study of politics generally, and to define the 
opportunities and constraints influencing the policy process (Simeon 
1976:550,556,566). 
The 'causality' approach is useful both in considering the capacity of 
environmentalists as ideological contenders to realise their demands, and 
in reviewing the studies of corporate power and non-decision making 
discussed above. Three principles 'flow' from the causality perspective 
that are both particularly significant to a consideration of environmental 
policy, and confirm the importance of a broad analytic perspective. The 
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first, that policy emerges from the play of economic, social and political 
forces, is an entirely apt description of environmental policy formation 
given its contentious origins. The second, that as choice in which 
resources are limited and goals and objectives differ, policy making is a 
matter of conflict, again echoes the circumstances of environmental 
decision making and the many bitter disputes that policy decisions have 
sought to resolve. The final principle, that policy analysis from the 
causality perspective is comparative across both space and time, has 
already proven valuable in general discussion of the policy gains of 
environmentalists over the past two decades, and has added depth to both 
Blowers's analysis of the brick works dispute, and the study by Hill et al of 
many years of policy inaction over nitrate polluted water in Britain. 
Whilst Simeon's approach acknowledges the causal quality or agency of 
influences such as dominant values and structures of power upon policy 
outcomes, it also does not deterministically deny that the policy process 
itself may have some effect independent of constraint (Simeon 1976:556). 
This policy perspective rather resembles Barrett and Hill's approach that 
describes 'the importance of the complex "shell" in which any specifically 
identifiable policy "core" may be imbedded', and the inter-relationship, 
therefore, of structural and substantive policy issues. 20 This 'shell-core' 
perspective addresses the way in which policy issues are viewed, placing 
policy concerns, as Simeon does, in the context of values, interests and 
power (Barrett & Hill 1984:238). 
20 Knoepfel and Weidner (1982:91-92) developed the 'shell-core' approach as a 
method of analysis attempting to precisely depict actor agency against a background of 
structurally fixed power relationships in the implementation of air pollution control 
policy. The 'analytic grid' must be fine enough, the authors argue, to cover the variety of 
interests within each of the greater socio -cultural, economic and politico -administrative 
systems. 
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Adapting the 'shell-core approach', Whitmore's (1984:242) argument for a 
'policy paradigm' to be seen around the core to explain ideologically 
charged policy choices returns us to the problem for environmental 
policy analysis of material constraints upon ecological demands, and 
Hall's suggestion, noted in 3.2.2, that an overarching set of ideas 
interlocks relatively coherently to define the limits or boundaries of 
policy outcomes (Hall 1992:91). It leads us furthermore to a review of the 
ability of various theories of power to address constraint in 
environmental policy making, at levels of analysis that may be seen to 
constitute layers of analysis around Barrett and Hill's policy core. We 
begin with a critique of the pluralist view of liberal democracy in which 
any interest group 'can ensure that its political preferences and wishes are 
adopted if it is sufficiently determined' (Ham & Hill 1984:27). 
3.3.2 The Explanatory Limits of Pluralism 
It is apparent in the work of Crenson, Sandbach, Blowers and Hill et al, 
that environmentalists do not enjoy equality of access and influence in 
the policy making process, but that power as the capacity to achieve policy 
outcomes, contrary to pluralist tenets, is disproportionately held by their 
corporate opponents. The pluralist analytic perspective is not, however, 
dismissed entirely by these authors. Whilst pluralism may not be able to 
explain the outcomes of their case studies, both Blowers and Hill et al 
nevertheless argue for its integration with 'elitism' and 'structuralism' 
into a descriptive analysis of environmental policy that would otherwise 
be partial and therefore flawed. As mentioned earlier, Crenson concedes 
the value of enhanced democratic practices, and Sandbach the 
campaigning efforts by environmental activists, in achieving the 
fragmentation of corporate power and the realisation of ecological 
demands - conceding thereby that public or community power may be 
separate, as pluralism maintains, from economic power. There is evident 
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value, on the basis of these findings, in incorporating pluralist analysis as 
a layer of explanation within environmental policy analysis. At the same 
time, the explanatory limitations of pluralist analysis must be clearly 
understood. Pluralists are criticised for their focus on key decisions and 
actual behaviour, and their failure to consider the pressure of capital to 
confine decision making to relatively safe issues (Ham & Hill 1984:63; 
Sandbach 1980:36). 
Clegg (1989:9) notes that, for many pluralist writers, power is something 
that 'a concrete individual had to be seen to be exercising', and something 
that is exercised in order to have those subject to it fall in with the 
individual preferences of the powerful: 
Characteristically pluralists regard power as most likely to be 
dispersed among many rather than fewer people; to be visible in 
instances of concrete decision making rather than through 
reputation; to be competitively bargained for rather than 
structurally pervasive; to be best viewed through relatively formal 
instances of voting and to be more widely dispersed than narrowly 
concentrated in communities (Clegg 1989:9). 
Crenson shows, however, that pluralism fails to account for neglect of 
environmental issues and behaviour that restricts rather than addresses 
the range of community, environmental and political concerns which he 
is able to identify - indeed that relegates some issues such as air pollution 
control in Gary to political oblivion. The proper object of investigation 
required to explore 'non-decision making' is therefore not political 
activity, as pluralism holds, but political inactivity, or politically enforced 
neglect (Crenson 1971:25-6). Crenson (1971:177-184) dedicates an entire 
chapter to detailing the failings of pluralist analysis on the basis of his 
case study, including its failure to recognise issue obstruction, to 
acknowledge covert power, to see the victims of power as ignorant and 
invisible, and to appreciate its own tenuous link to democracy. 
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However, pluralist methodology, pioneered by Dahl's (1961) study of 
power in the town of New Haven, selected key political issues to examine 
on the basis that they were issues in open conflict between two or more 
actors (Ham & Hill 1984:27). Not only were issues not in open conflict 
excluded from consideration, but, as Clegg (1989:64) observes, nearly 50 
percent of New Haven's inhabitants were also excluded, on the basis of 
their non participation in elections. In making such exclusions and 
confining itself largely to the study of observable phenomena, Cox et al 
(1985:121) note the main weakness of pluralism may be, (as Cox et at say 
pluralist theorists at least implicitly recognise), that 'it is a description 
rather than an analysis of power relationships'. Indeed, even before his 
critics had done so, Dahl acknowledged obstacles to participation in 
political life that Lukes (1974:14) describes as unable to be accounted for by 
pluralism. 21 
Crenson (1971:25) finds that 'the pluralism of observable political activity 
may actually be a rather stunted kind of diversity, hedged about by 
concentrations of political influence which prevent the further growth of 
local political heterogeneity'. Indeed, Hill et al (1989:236-237) are unable, 
in pluralist terms, to explain the contradiction of public discontent over 
agricultural practices and 'a strong public bias towards non-interference'. 
Equally problematic for pluralist analysis as instances of non-decision 
making, Sandbach (1980:114) explains, are the instances of environmental 
policy where government has heeded public concern, and responded by 
making decision making processes as open and apparently representative 
as possible, however leaving covert influences over policy outcomes 
virtually unchanged. 
21 Given this admission, the question then to be addressed, Clegg (1989:64) argues, is 
'what is the status of the formal model of power premised on an agency perspective'? 
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As we saw in 2.3.5, such government action may well function as mere 
'placebo' policy response, achieving illusory participation that Amy (1990) 
found symbolic and placatory, and in which environmentalists often 
ended up trading their core demands. In the early phase of the London 
Brick works dispute, pluralist emphasis upon observable conflict would 
equally see local quiescence on the subject of pollution and industrial 
dereliction as evidence of consensus that these were non issues (Blowers 
1983:410). In fact Blowers found the company's long established, low 
profile strategy, its pacification of local farmers, the liberal planning 
conditions applying to its works and site, and its close relationship with 
the Alkali pollution inspectorate, an adequate defence against early 
challenge by environmentalists. 
Whilst the overt political arena of concern to pluralists is fraught with 
dangers for environmentalists as ideological contenders and political 
outsiders (not the least of which are those experiences discussed in 2.3 of 
communicative distortion, co-option, suppression and misrepresentation 
of environmental concerns by dominant political processes), there is 
equally no doubt that it is also an arena well exploited both in terms of 
short term ecopolitical gains, and attempts in the longer term to 
transform materialist society. Pluralism as a description, a methodology 
or an evaluation, however, will only ever provide an account of visible 
decision making - a valuable initial account of what appears to have 
happened, or what is 'apparent' in an environmental dispute. This first 
layer of explanation must be transcended if issues such as the role of 
ideology, the influence of corporate power, and the mobilisation of bias 
against ideological opponents are to be addressed in analysis. Although 
pluralist analysis is blind to the way in which the political agenda is 
controlled, and the manner in which pluralist researchers may assume 
the bias of the political system under observation, it is well placed to 
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document policy change, the extent to which environmentalists impact 
upon policy processes, and indeed the success of their efforts in revising 
power relations between themselves and their avowed political 
opponents. 
However, notwithstanding this descriptive utility, it remains difficult to 
reconcile the pluralist sense of politics as an equitable bargaining process 
with either the structural power imbalance found in 2.3.6 to potentially 
constrain ecological demands, or Cotgrove's view of environmentalists 
as relative political outsiders, ideologically opposed to basic societal 
values, and systematically repressed by dominant interests 22 (Cotgrove 
1982:88). In all, Cox et al argue that the drawbacks to pluralism are 
substantial for ignoring concepts like the mobilisation of bias, non-
decision making, agenda setting, the role of ideology and suppression of 
preferences through the unconscious operation of social and political 
values and institutions, and therefore on balance it suffers from a limited 
explanatory utility (Cox, Furlong & Page 1985:219-220). 
3.3.3 Power in Three Dimensions 
Lukes places pluralism as the first of his three dimensions of power. He 
sees pluralism as a one-dimensional view of power; the two-dimensional 
view belongs to its critics; whilst his own three-dimensional view moves 
beyond simple pluralist analysis, to provide a 'deeper', 'more satisfactory' 
view of power relations and latent conflict. 23 Lukes observes that 
22 Cunningham draws on Gouldner's concept of 'normalised repression' to explain power 
as the ability to define what is moral, and the success of governments in portraying 
environmentalists as anti-social and hysterical (Cunningham 1974:86-7). 
23 Lukes defines power in the first dimension as the ability of A to prevail over B in 
formal political decision making (normally in government) on one or more key issues, when 
there is a direct and observable conflict between A and B over outcomes. 
The second dimension is defined as the ability of A to prevail over B in determining the 
outcomes of observable conflicts of interest in formal decision making and also in 
determining what is to count as a formal issue, where there is a conflict of interest over 
policy preferences and observable grievances over these preferences outside the political 
system. 
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pluralism offers a clean-cut paradigm for the behavioural study of 
decision making by political actors, but assumes the bias of the political 
system under observation and is blind to the ways in which its political 
agenda is controlled (Lukes 1974:57). Lukes' two-dimensional typology 
follows Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) account of power's 'second face', by 
which these authors consider not only the classic political question of 
'who gets what, when and how', but 'who gets left out and how'. This 
two-dimensional typology 'embraces coercion, influence, authority, force 
and manipulation', notes the 'confining of the scope of decision making 
to relatively safe issues', and examines both decisions and non-decision 
making (Lukes 1974:17-20). In a sense, Lukes argues, the second face of 
power argument extends the pluralist boundaries of the political system 
to include, not just key issues, but 'potential issues which non-decision 
making prevents [such as Crenson and Hill et al each reveal in their 
studies] from being actual' (Lukes 1974:19). The second face of power is 
not confined to formal decision making within the political system, but 
may operate in other ways, i.e. - it is 'manifest not just through overt acts 
of conflict but can be exercised by covert means through denial and 
closure of access to the political system' (Cox et al :1985:34). 
A limitation of the second face of power is recognised by its proponents, 
Lukes claims, as the difficulty of empirical verification. If the intention of 
the second-dimension is to move beyond merely an extended case of 
behaviourism, then, Lukes (1974:18) argues, it is jeopardised by Bachrach 
and Baratz's empirical insistence 'that their so-called non-decisions • 
which confine the scope of decision making are themselves (observable) 
decisions', and similarly that if 'there is no conflict, overt or covert, the 
presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation 
The third dimension is defined as the ability of A to prevent B from realising his/her 
"real" interests or from articulating them effectively due to the mobilisation of bias 
resulting from the institutional structure of society (Cox et al 1985:32). 
120 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
of values, in which case non-decision making is impossible' 24 (Lukes 
1974:19). This account is of limited utility in pursuing potential links 
between non-decision making, and the impact of industrial influence or 
dominant materialist ideology upon environmental policy formation. 
Furthermore, Crenson shows that lack of conflict over environmental 
issues does not necessarily indicate universal public acquiescence that no 
issue exists, or, if an issue does exist, that its policy resolution is entirely 
satisfactory. Lukes moves, with his own conception of power, away from 
behaviouralism and toward Marxian recognition of latent conflict, 25 and 
of subjective and real interests that need not be expressed as policy 
preferences or grievances to exist (Cox et a/ 1985:35). Having ventured 
into Marxist territory, in which Lukes sees his radical view of bias 
mobilisation as Gramscian licence to examine social forces, historical 
patterns and the concept of hegemony, he then fails to resolve, in his 
own words, where to draw the line 'between structural determination, on 
the one hand, and an exercise of power, on the other' (Lukes 1974:25, 
57) . 26 
Both the two and three-dimensional views of power offer greater scope 
than pluralism in explaining the role of bias mobilisation in the 
constraint, suppression and narrow definition of environmental concern. 
However these views have their own difficulties of definition. Lukes 
uses the individualistic 'second face' of power to launch his own three 
24 Empirical verification forced a modification of this nondecisional thesis, (later seen 
by the authors as an unwise retreat), away from a trenchant critique of pluralism, to a 
position 'closer to that of modified behaviourism' Clegg (1989:79). Critics had argued 
'that grievances and issues that not exist could not be researched' (Ham & Hill 1984:68). 
25 Latent conflict relies on the contentious notion of false consciousness, and the 
unarticulated 'real' interests of those excluded from decision making (Lukes 1977:24-5). 
26 Lukes vacillates, Clegg explains, between conventionalism and realism condemning 
Dahl's positivism, yet remaining epistemologically imprecise (Clegg 1989:86). He 
retreats to the very (albeit modified) methodological individualism that he initially 
sought to demolish (Debnam 1984:17), leaning toward the power conception of his 
predecessors, yet, like them, failing to follow structural dimensions 'to which they 
rightly point' (Isaac 1987:15). 
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dimensional view. Yet Schattschneider's mobilisation of bias theory 
brought by Bachrach and Baratz to their 'two-dimensional' view may be 
argued to adequately suggest Lukes' own three-dimensional view. To 
this could be added Lukes' failure to reconcile elite power theory with his 
'radical' view, perhaps in an attempt to contain the potential for elitism 
to blur the distinctions between the dimensions he describes. He 
acknowledges, for example, that the theoretical framework of Crenson's 
concept of non-decision making borders the two and three-dimensional 
views, and he additionally carries mobilisation of bias from Bachrach and 
Baratz's view of power through to his own (Lukes 1977:17;43). Elite 
consideration of behaviour and control, both of which are of interest in 
exploring corporate influence on environmental policy making, could be 
argued to operate in any, or simultaneously in each, of Lukes' three 
dimensions of power. Blowers' recourse to 'neo-elitism' - a combining of 
power in the second and third dimension - resists these difficulties of 
definition by gathering together the theoretical middle ground between 
pluralism and structuralism to descriptively review issue suppression, 
corporate power and environmental policy making in the London Brick 
dispute (Blowers 1984:253-258). 
3.3.4 The Value of Corporatism 
Whilst the power debate, particularly power in Lukes' three dimensions, 
remains problematic and unresolved, theorists nevertheless agree, as 
Simeon observes, that power is central to an understanding of policy: 
[The means by which policy is carried out is related to the level of 
conflict and to the distribution of power: the more widely influence 
is distributed, as in the pluralist model, the more voluntaristic the 
means; the more intense the conflict, the less the likelihood of 
compromise, and the more the chance of coercion (Simeon 
1976:570). 
Simeon is concerned, however, that there be no automatic assumption of 
the self interestedness of elites, but that a 'third model of power' be 
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employed (beyond pluralism and elitism) to work back in detail through 
the political process, and establish the actions, attitudes and/or alliances 
that may have influenced a policy outcome. Blowers (1983:413), then, on 
the basis of a painstakingly detailed study, asks whether London Brick 
was a master of its own fate, or a naive, innocent victim of circumstance; 
whether it enjoyed disproportionate political power, that is, or whether it 
was simply an interest group 'with roughly equal chances of success' as 
any other interest group. He employs a 'dual state' concept 27 to explain 
how the company exploited its national government support to 
overwhelm local government opposition, forging corporatist links with 
officials in an exclusive, collaborative bargaining arena excluding their 
environmental opponents. By managing to confine environmentalists 
to the overt pluralist political arena, where the public sympathy tended 
toward jobs over 'intangible' clean air and environmental amenity, and 
confident of the national government's willingness to intercede should 
the local outcome fail to favour the brick works, the company ensured 
that environmental demands neither prevailed over corporate goals and 
tactics at the local level, nor in any way impinged upon national policy 
making (Blowers 1984:289). 
Blowers (1984:228-230) employs neo-elitism, as mentioned above, to 
reveal corporate influence. He acknowledges that the disproportionate 
power of certain elite groups derives from their superior resources, and 
he recognises both non-decision making and bias mobilisation as means 
of suppressing concern for the environment. However, it remains for 
27 As 3.2.5 mentions (see fn. 15), Blowers' use of temporal and spatial mediating 
concepts, as well as 'local-national' considerations, and a review of covert and overt 
political arenas represents his attempt to link analysis from the conflicting pluralist, 
elitist and structuralists accounts of power. 
The 'dual state' thesis, first proposed by Saunders (1981), explains the central state's 
primary function as 'social investment in support of capital accumulation', whereas the 
primary role of local government is social consumption with interests more likely to be 
mediated through competitive politics (Blowers 1984:277). 
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Blowers to explain not only how but why industry is able to command 
unstinting loyalty from the state, as London Brick did of the national 
government in the brick work dispute, as US Steel did of the local 
government in Gary, as the agriculture industry did of the British 
government on the setting of nitrate levels, and indeed as industry has 
traditionally done of the Tasmanian State Government as Chapter Four 
will argue. For such explanation, Blowers (1984:277) uses corporatist 
analysis - which he says is 'variously used to refer to an ideology, a 
process, or a strategy', and 'appeals to elites with its idea of exclusive 
participation and to Marxists with its suggestions of collusion between 
state and capital'. Corporatism simply expresses: 
the will of both government officials and interest representatives in 
all fields to avoid conflict in the development and implementation 
of policy, and to do so by creating monopolistic representative 
groups working through formal structures for collaboration (Pross 
1986:215). 
The political implications of corporatism for policy making have been, 
Self (1985:125) argues, loss of flexibility and openness in favour of more 
routinized, established and closed bilateral monopoly relations between 
government departments and interest groups. By definition corporatism 
locks unions, employers and governments into arrangements that may 
well exclude and constrain environmental interests. As Self (1985:108) 
explains, corporatist values, in principle, oppose those of liberalism and 
democratic pluralism, by striving for systematic order and harmony at the 
expense of individual freedom, with the result 'a lessening of electoral 
accountability of the decisions reached as a result of negotiations between 
members of the higher echelons' (Simmie 1981:105). This lessening of 
accountability reflects the 'imprisoning' of institutions and policy making 
in market oriented societies that Lindblom (1982:330) argues is brushed 
aside ordinarily as an embarrassing feature of ostensible democracies. 
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Corporatist analysis indeed offers valuable insight into not only how 
industry may collude with government to resist environmental 
demands, but also why. In 2.4.1, we saw that the ability of the state to 
adopt the logic of ecological integrity is constrained by the imperative of 
capital accumulation and the priority, therefore, that the state accords 
both material interests and economic growth. In practical, if not 
ideological, terms, corporatism explains this priority, and the limitation 
of 'perceived strategic and economic necessity' upon environmental 
policy responses that Walker describes (Walker 1989:38 in 2.4.5). 
Corporatism has further utility in identifying arrangements at a variety of 
levels, as McEachern (1993b:174) explains, from the level of central 
government, through 'meso' or 'sectoral' levels between organisations 
and public officials, and generally at the more dispersed level of policy 
communities in which 'corporatised interests' again may become the 
privileged 'insiders'. 
3.3.5 Reviewing Ideological Constraint 
It remains to consider, in reviewing power theory and policy constraint, 
what Lukes' third dimension of power, and explanations of ideological 
hegemony beyond the third dimension add to environmental policy 
analysis. Whilst Lukes has flirted, as we have seen, with the concept of 
ideological hegemony as a constraint upon the realisation of interests in 
his third, 'radical' dimension of power, he has difficulty, Ham and Hill 
maintain, in explaining how it is that 'real interests', i.e. those exercised 
relatively free of constraint, can be identified (Ham & Hill 1984:71). This 
presents Lukes with methodological difficulties that, in Clegg's view, 
have deflected the entire debate over power theory away from Lukes' 
three dimensional typology, (for its 'ambiguous' coupling of notions of 
'non-decision making' and 'non issues', with the core concept of 
'hegemony'), and towards 'less analytically pre-emptive' explanations 
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(Clegg 1989:2). 28 In moving beyond these difficulties, Clegg (1989:103) 
observes that Lukes' critics have a number of choices including retreating 
away from the concept of hegemony into the 'narrow', 'restricted' world 
of empiricism that 'limits our ability to say almost anything of 
consequence on the topic of power'. Alternately theorists may undertake 
detailed exploratory analysis, for example of the explanatory potential of 
each of the different conceptions of power, as Blowers (1984), Hill et al 
(1989) and Gaventa (1980) have done, systematically comparing various 
conceptions of the same phenomena. 
Gaventa (1980:15) believes that Lukes' third dimension of power provides 
scope that, to date, is the least developed, least understood of the three 
views. Beyond attempts to identify mechanisms of power in latent 
conflict, a study of power in the third dimension may involve 'the study 
of social myths, languages and symbols', 'the study of communication', 'a 
focus upon the means by which social legitimations are developed' and 
the location of 'the power processes behind the social construction of 
meaning and patterns'. In Gaventa's case study of an Appalachian coal 
mining community, Clegg concedes that a causal link between hegemony 
and relative powerlessness is persuasively argued from its basis in 'a case 
constructed primarily through the fine detail of historical analysis', and 
for improving on Lukes' model 'by not making the focus of interests a 
constitutive feature' (Clegg 1989:14). Gaventa gives 'the actual processes 
of myth, persuasion, legitimation, ideologization and so on' a reality that 
Lukes was clearly unable to convey in his own condensed study (Clegg 
1989:109; Gaventa 1980:13). In general, however, Clegg sees the power 
debate as having moved beyond the third dimension to deal with two 
28 Clegg's (1989:xv) own project beyond these difficulties is essentially to temporally 
trace power debate, from its origins in Hobbes and Machiavelli's opposing notions of 
agency and strategic power, to their modernist applications, in arriving at his own 
'circuits of power' that he suggests orders the debate into 'three family groupings clustered 
around loci of dispositional, agency and facilitative concepts of power'. 
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distinct contemporary concerns in power theory, firstly critiquing the 
dominant ideology thesis, and secondly exploring post-structuralist 
'analysis which proposes that: 
ERJather than thinking of either ideology or hegemony as a state of 
mind, one would better regard it as a set of practices, primarily of a 
discursive provenance which seeks to foreclose the indefinite 
possibilities of signifying elements and their relations, in 
determinate ways (Clegg 1989:16; italics added). 
There are other means of evading Lukes' methodological 'dead ends', as 
Ham and Hill suggest (1984:71), besides resorting to an exploration of 
post-structuralist discursive practices. However, these 'other means' do 
not necessarily contradict the usefulness of post-structuralist inquiry. 
Post-structuralism does help to identify opposing discourse in ecopolitical 
conflict, however it less helpful in identifying the dominant material and 
industrial sources of ideological constraint. Lindblom, on the other hand, 
utilises the insights of elitism and marxist structuralism to adopt a mixed 
critical pluralist/corporatist approach. This enables his recognition of 
selective social mechanisms that mobilise bias and exercise agenda 
control in the promotion of corporate interests, without leading him into 
the 'abyss' of structural determinism, whereby 'agents' are no more than 
the 'bearers of objective forces which they are unable to effect' (Lindblom 
1982:329; Ham & Hill 1984:35). Lindblom's mechanism is the market 
punishment that social or environmental reform automatically triggers: 
The efficacy of the recoil mechanism is evidenced by the continuing 
historical failure of egalitarian aspirations to achieve a significant 
change in the distribution of wealth and income among social strata, 
and by the continuing autonomy of corporate management in a 
world in which increasing numbers of thoughtful people are 
arguing, on environmental and other grounds, that no group of 
leaders can be allowed to exercise so autonomous a control over our 
lives (Lindblom 1982:330). 
Crenson's study of non-decision making adds, to Lindblom's observation, 
that even the power reputation of the market for automatic punishment 
of 'non-market' reforms could preclude the initiation of environmental 
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policy measures. Crenson and Gaventa are both able to evade Lukes' 
methodological obstacle of 'real interests', with Crenson simply assuming 
that the citizens of Gary have an interest in not being poisoned that is 
'scarcely disputable'. Crenson as the 'observor' then makes a judgement 
based upon 'the value of human life' that may certainly apply to other 
environmental policy issues. The inarticulate ideology that he finds in 
Gary's political institutions suppresses the air pollution issue, promoting 
'the selective perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts' 
(Lukes 1974:45, 46; 3.2.3 for discussion). Gaventa, on the other hand, finds 
the legitimation of 'dominant ways and values' in the Appalachian 
Valley achieved in the third dimension by further indirect mechanisms 
of constraint, i.e. the promotion of a community ideology of loyalty 
against the interests of the rank and file; a shaping of conception through 
media information flow; a denial of participation cultivating a routine of 
non-challenge; and a manipulation of the 'power field' through the 
invocation of myth, rumours or symbols where routines of non-
challenge are broken (Gaventa 1980:255-256). 
3.3.6 Syntheses of Power Approaches? 
It is apparent that power analysis in each of Lukes' three dimensions, as 
well as the dimensions beyond, contributes to a broad yet detailed picture 
of capacity and constraint in the realisation of environmental demands. 
Several considerations stand out in reflection, such as the descriptive 
ability of pluralism, the explanatory value of corporatism, the utility of 
non-decision making and bias mobilisation in the second and third 
dimensions, and the structuralist explanation of institutional constraint. 
Each dimension has its limitations, however. Pluralism offers a valuable 
account of the overt political arena, to which, Blowers argues, corporate 
interests prefer to keep environmentalists confined. However, pluralism 
assumes that there is an equality of opportunity to influence policy 
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outcomes. For the purposes of this discussion, pluralism fails to 
appreciate the environmental challenge as ideologically distinctive, and 
potentially constrained within the dominant industrial paradigm. Non-
decision making and bias mobilisation analysis complement pluralism 
for explaining the obstacle of material interests and dominant values to 
the legitimisation of environmental policy concerns discussed in 2.2.5. 
Together, the second and third dimensional perspectives explain the 
manner in which dominant interests and ideas, as Sandbach argues, 
marginalise environmental concerns whilst appearing to resolve them 
(Sandbach 1980:36-38 in 2.2.5). 
Corporatism complements the second and third dimensions of power by 
reviewing state-capital arrangements that may exclude environmental 
interests and direct concerns. 29 It identifies the mechanisms that the state 
may employ to facilitate, support or direct corporate activity, and clearly 
contrary to pluralism, it suggests that power has increasingly centralised 
as governments, in Self's (1985:115) terms, have acted 'to give different 
support to some interests while trying to neutralise the demands of 
others'. Whilst the second and third dimensional accounts demonstrate 
how contending values and demands may be prevented from entry to the 
overt decision making arena, corporatism, as we have seen, explains how 
and why this may occur. Corporatist insight has been incorporated into 
pluralism by Lindblom to show the privileged position of business, and 
by Marxists, such as Sandbach, into their discussions of power in capitalist 
societies, to show the manner in which economic relations shape human 
action and constrain environmental policy formation (Cox et al 1985:230). 
The structuralist account of objective policy determination complements 
29 There is furthermore scope within corporatist analysis for recognising the relative 
autonomy of the state, following Lindblom's explanation of 'government as operating under 
a realistic mixture of political pressures and economic constraints', rather than seeking an 
explanation from 'any visible structural imperative (Self 1985:118). 
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Lukes' three dimensions of power by defining the scope and capacity of 
policy response, and can usefully be included in a 'multi-layered' 
explanation of environmental policy constraint. 
It is relatively common for theorists applying conflicting views of power 
to conclude that each view has both theoretical and empirical explanatory 
utility. It is equally common for theorists to suggest, as Gaventa does, that 
'only through the interrelationship of the dimensions and the re-
enforcing effect of each dimension on the other' will the total impact of 
power be understood (Gaventa 1980:256). However, theoretical syntheses 
of power are not easily achieved. They face the obstacle of reconciling 
very different theoretical approaches, each drawing upon very different 
disciplinary traditions, each derived from different, largely incongruous 
images of the totality of the polities, or the states, which are the objects of 
their analyses, and each claiming to be the proper and correct method of 
analysing power in capitalist societies (Etzioni-Halevy 1989:18). Cox et al 
conclude that it is impossible to arrive at a 'correct method of power 
analysis', since no universally accepted 'meta' theory of power can ever 
be agreed upon. 
They welcome the convergence of interest in issues of power and 
constraint by scholars of different theoretical persuasion, and suggest that, 
of itself, this will undoubtably lead, by cross fertilisation, to a greater 
understanding of the mechanisms of change and continuity in capitalist 
society (Cox et a/ 1985:231). In the meantime, they advocate the adoption 
of an eclectic, detached perspective, which, in the absence of an 
overarching general theory of power, would involve keeping an open 
mind to the insights which competing theories offer, recognising that 
some concepts of power will inevitably remain essentially contested (Cox 
et al 1985 vii-viii, 39). If syntheses such as this are shunned, Ham and 
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Hill (1984:61) warn, then there is a real danger that methodological and 
definitional debates will end up overwhelming 'the substantive 
questions [about power] that originally interested researchers in this field'. 
Case study analyses such as those by Blower (1984), and Hill et al (1989), 
strive descriptively, if not methodologically, for a synthesis of 
explanations with mixed results. Blowers finds great difficulties in 
constructing a 'precise relationship' between power theory and the 
empirical evidence in the brick works dispute. This is not merely because 
he is applying conflicting theories, but also because the eclectic approach 
he adopts, in his view, outruns empirical application. Blowers sees his 
study as part of the 'new, innovative and somewhat innocent' area of 
urban studies, which, given its unorthodox, multi-disciplinary approach, 
is bound to experience a range of methodological problems. He finds that 
without the use of the mediating concepts mentioned above, which he 
employs to link the various interpretations of power, the evidence is 
strained 'to support hypotheses which bear little relationship to the 
complex and confusing pictures presented by experience'. Other urban 
studies authors are equally interested in synthesis, Blowers observes, - 
Saunders, for example, who remarks that one sided theoreticism is likely 
to prove as sterile as one sided empiricism, and Dunleavy, to whom it 
does not seem utopian to detect signs of empirically supported common 
ground underlying the contending theories of power (Blowers 1984:250- 
260). 
Simeon acknowledges the importance of power theory in explaining 
policy by including power as a key approach in his 'causality funnel' from 
which, as discussed above, policy is seen to emerge from multiple causes. 
In terms of the conceptual and methodological debate, not only about 
theories of power, but also between each of the other approaches which 
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comprise the policy funnel, Simeon himself also notes that competing 
power theories are more usefully seen as complementary on the basis that 
each theory makes some contribution, but that none alone provides a full 
understanding of policy outcomes. He adds that although the most 
useful policy models appear to be the power-resources (spanning Lukes' 
first and second dimensions) and cultural-ideological (spanning Lukes' 
second and third dimensions) ones, the utility of each approach varies (as 
we have seen) depending on the aspect of policy one wants to explain 
(Simeon 1976:566-570). 
Different approaches to power have validity at different levels of analysis, 
as Brugger and Jaensch (1985:80-81) observe, and the model of power one 
uses will depend upon the questions one wants to ask. By distinguishing 
power from other key approaches (that is socio-economic context, ideas, 
institutions and policy processes) Simeon nevertheless overlooks the 
potential for each of the theories of power to address and, as we have 
seen, to add depth to each of these levels. Overlap between power theory 
and policy approaches will need to be reviewed before adopting Simeon's 
framework of analysis for explaining environmental policy outcomes, 
and it is to this task which we now turn. 
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3.4 Frameworks of Analysis 
3:4.1 Power and Policy Analysis 
Power theory, as reviewed in 3.3.6, provides a 'multi-layered' explanation 
when considering the key concern of this thesis, namely the capacity of 
environmentalists to realise their policy demands, and, as we shall see, 
plays a key role in the framework of analysis applied to environmental 
policy making in Tasmania. However the place of power analysis within 
the broad policy approach discussed so far needs clarification before the 
framework adopted for Tasmanian analysis is detailed at the conclusion 
of this Chapter. 
The basic elements of the framework for Tasmanian analysis reflect 
Downey's (1987) application of Simeon's (1976) causality funnel, however 
with a deeper appreciation of the value and levels of power analysis. The 
aspects of analysis that must be considered prior to introducing this 
framework are then: the overlap between power and policy analysis, the 
suitability and manageability of analysis at multiple levels, the details of 
Downey's model, the problem of linear focus that the causality approach 
may generate, and an acceptable resolution of these issues that facilitates 
an approach to environmental policy analysis and an explanation of the 
actions of the state in Tasmania. 
The focus of power analysis may range, as we have seen, from the most 
overt to the least overt of political arenas, and from the most overt to the 
least overt of influences, therefore, upon a policy outcome. If we return 
to a consideration of the character of environmentalism and the nature 
of environmental issues, discussed particularly in 2.2.1 to 2.2.3, the utility 
of power analysis as a multi-layered policy tool soon becomes apparent. 
In Chapter Two, environmentalism is introduced as paradigmatically 
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opposing dominant industrialism; environmental values as subversively 
challenging prevailing values and policy boundaries; and the satisfaction 
of ecopolitical demands requiring the radical distancing of the state from 
the interests of capital. However, it is noted that whilst conceptually 
convenient, the transformation of values into structured paradigms is 
fraught with problems and contradictions, and that in reality there are 
almost as many 'shades of green' as there are environmental issues. 
Indeed, this diversity is seen as both one of the Green movements 
greatest strengths, in ensuring the 'unfolding' fin Fox's (1990) terms] of its 
many ecological, social, and ethical concerns, and it greatest weakness, in 
denying the movement a single, defining political voice. 
In policy terms, it would be a mistake to assume that environmentalism 
is easily defined, for example as single issue politics. If environmentalists 
are located within mainstream policy processes, it would furthermore be 
a mistake to assume that they represent the totality of environmental 
belief on a particular issue, and that the issue is therefore 'resolved' and 
off the agenda for having an institutionalised resolution process. Indeed, 
if we consider environmentalism in the shades of 'light' to 'dark' green 
discussed in 2.3.1, we find that the 'deepest' shade of green offers the 
greatest policy challenge to dominant values, and is most resistant to 
mainstream policy processes. This 'deepest' shade of green is inspired by 
'the key value of ecocentrism', and, as we have seen, defines what is 
novel and distinctive about Green politics, around which the values of 
the ecological paradigm cluster (Eckersley 1992b:160; Hay 1988:27; in 2.2.4). 
This ecocentric shade of green furthermore inspires environmental 
demands that most challenge the values of the dominant paradigm, and 
are therefore the least easy to satisfy in policy terms. In 2.3.6, following a 
review of the boundaries of ideological constraint upon the realisation of 
environmental demands, we found a 'hierarchy of environmental 
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issues' paralleling the shades of 'light' to 'dark' green environmentalism, 
with the easiest achievements for environmentalists involving the least 
threat to dominant industrial interests and most readily acceptable to the 
state (Dempsey ez Power 1973:616; in 2.3.6). 
A multi-layered approach to power analysis offers an explanation for the 
capacity of environmentalists to achieve a policy response or experience 
constraint at a variety of levels. The hierarchy of environmental issues is 
captured by a hierarchy of power analysis - beginning with the first 
dimensional pluralist account of visible action, moving on to the second 
dimensional account of covert influence and bias mobilisation toward 
certain policy outcomes, and concluding with the structuralist account of 
objective circumstances of constraint and ideological accounts of the 
policy privilege of dominant discourse. 
Whilst the struggle to legitimise and realise any environmental demand 
is usually initiated in the overt pluralist political arena, to confine power 
analysis to a pluralist account as we have seen is, in Eckersley's terms, to 
'miss or underplay' in this case the significance of the environmental 
challenge to capital interests and the mobilisation of bias to contain any 
such threat to the capital accumulation process. As we saw in 2.4.1, the 
satisfaction of ecological (i.e 'deep green') demands requires such a radical 
distancing of the state from capital interests that Bell (1992:210), for 
example, argues that only limited (i.e. 'light green') reforms may ever be 
achieved. 
Both Simeon (1976:568) and Downey (1987:31) recognise the role of power, 
specifically the distribution of power, in the determination and analysis 
of public policy. Downey, as we shall see in 3.4.3, adapts Simeon's policy 
approach to an analysis of environmental policy in the interests of best 
135 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
describing and appreciating 'the various influences and assumptions 
which define the context within which public policies are made'. Simeon 
observes that power offers at once the 'most plausible and most complex' 
of perspectives: 
We would expect policy outcomes, especially the distributional 
dimensions, to be a function of the number of interests involved, 
the degree of disagreement or conflict among them, and the relative 
means of influence which each is able to bring to bear in the policy 
process. But grave problems arise in the conceptualisation and 
measurement of power itself, and in describing the structure of 
power in society (Simeon 1976:568). 
Whilst the debate between power theorists 'shows no signs of abating', 
Simeon is concerned that the difficulties inherent in what he calls the 
'influence focus' should not lead to its abandoning altogether, but rather 
that conflicting theories should each be able to make their contribution to 
an explanation of public policy (Simeon 1976:569). The limitation of the 
role of power in Simeon's framework of analysis is its restricted focus 
upon the distribution of power, i.e. of interests in society and of the 
resources available to satisfy these interests," when power could be 
argued to manifest as a policy determinant of various dimensions within 
each of Simeon's 'socio-economic', 'power and influence', 'dominant 
values and ideas', 'formal structures and institutions' and 'policy process' 
levels of policy analysis (noted in 3.3.1). An explanation of 
environmental public policy at any of these levels, if it were to properly 
account for power as the capacity to achieve the policy demands of 
environmentalists, could then be extended to review power in the first, 
second, and third dimensions, and beyond these to review structuralist 
power and ideological constraint. 
30 Although Simeon does concede that the 'distributional' power approach to policy 
within the context of his 'causality' framework of analysis would take a variety of forms. 
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3.4.2 Macro, Middle & Micro Levels of Analysis 
It is worth considering the growing role that eclecticism is playing, not 
only in power theory, as we have seen in 3.3.6, but in policy analysis, as 
theorists attempt to link specific policy processes and outcomes with a 
broad range of influences. Ham and Hill advocate a framework 3 ' that 
mirrors both Simeon's and Downey's emphasis upon the context within 
which public policies are made, and indeed that is adopted by Hill et al 
(1989; in 3.2.6) in their study of non-decision making on nitrate pollution 
in Great Britain. Blowers and Hill et al use contrasting paradigms to 
establish influences upon environmental policy, as we have seen, and in 
doing so expose the limitations of the theories of pluralism, neo-elitism 
and structuralism to the extent that no theory appears valid without the 
explanatory contribution of the other. Even where corporate power and 
structuralist influences appear the best explanations, as they do in both 
studies, this conclusion rests upon information gleaned from other 
accounts, and, in Blowers' case, upon mediating spatial, temporal and 
political concepts that link the otherwise disparate levels of analysis. The 
broader analysis of the structuralist account is then tempered both by the 
minutiae of detail afforded by observation, and by the state-capital nexus 
that is found by Blowers to mobilise bias toward a given policy outcome. 
Whilst the first, second and third dimensions of power identify overt, 
covert and latent influences upon public policy outcomes and policy 
formation, the pluralist, neo-elitist and structuralists accounts, as Blowers 
and Hill et al employ them, describe both influences and arenas of state 
action in their case studies. Neither author attempts the task of relating 
31 In order to account for social, political and economic influences upon public policy 
formation, they consider: 'the micro level of decision-making within organisations; the 
middle range analysis of policy formulation; and macro analysis of political systems, 
including examination of the role of the state' (Ham & Hill 1984:17). Ham and Hill note 
that the interaction between levels is significant and problematic, as does Simeon, who 
observes that these interrelationships provide independent contributions to analysis of 
the central dimensions of policy (Simeon 1976:556). 
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power theory to state theory, although both employ power terminology, 
in particular non-decision making, in each of their analyses. Indeed Hill 
et a/ explicitly explore the pluralist, neo-elitist and structuralist arenas in 
an attempt to explain non-decision making on ground water pollution 
controls, whilst Blowers explores each of the arenas in describing the 
brick works dispute as well as explaining the role of corporate power in 
determining its outcome. Crenson, on the other hand, focuses solely 
upon non-decision making as an empirical exercise in discrediting 
pluralism, whilst Sandbach tempers his Marxist approach by recognising 
the role of agency in achieving a policy outcome. Before turning in 3.4.3 
to Downey's recommendation of Simeon's framework as an approach for 
environmental policy analysis, it is worth considering how the 
pluralism, neo-elitism and structuralism relate to Simeon's categories, 
and whether there is any obvious obstacle to reviewing power in each of 
his categories, or levels of analysis, as suggested above in 3.4.1. 
The broadest level of analysis advocated by Simeon (1976:567) is 'socio-
economic environment'. This covers the general characteristics defining 
the policy context or setting, such as geography, demography, technology, 
and limiting the resources available for achieving a policy resolution. 
Whilst these features may determine the scope of policy, and provide an 
invaluable starting point for comparative analysis, Simeon claims that 
they are unable to explain the detail of policy responses and processes. In 
terms of structuralist analysis of environmental policy, this level may be 
seen more specifically as the political economy of the policy setting found 
wanting by Walker in 3.2.1, (in spite of its 'illustrative' utility), for its lack 
of specific attention to process. Simeon's broadest level of analysis does 
not parallel, preclude nor contradict the structuralist account so much as 
precede it by placing structuralist considerations in a broader, potentially 
limiting descriptive context. The 'middle level' of Simeon's typology 
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considers the 'fundamental political variables' of power, culture, ideology 
and institutions. Here the correlation between these factors and the 
middle level of elitist and neo-elitist explanations employed by both 
Blowers and Hill et al is on shaky ground, although not altogether 
irrelevant, since elitism belongs to 'power' analysis but is less a part of 
cultural, ideological and institutional approaches. Simeon's final level of 
'policy process' correlates relatively easily with pluralism and Lindblom's 
critical pluralism, by focusing upon day-to-day influences leading up to a 
policy outcome. 
Davis et al note that policy analysis 'must look to insights from a range of 
approaches and avoid being confined to the narrow concerns (or jargon) 
of any one approach'. Their application of Simeon's causality funnel, has 
analytic focus moving 'from the broadest possible scope to detailed 
concern' on the basis that: 
A funnel technique assumes that different explanations are required 
at different levels as the analyst's perspective moves closer and 
closer to the specific (Davis et al 1988:9). 
In their causality model, Davis et al examine Australian public policy 
after Simeon, at the 'macro level' of the role of the state, at the 'middle 
level' role of bureaucrats, parties and interest groups, and at the level of 
outcome where they examine key policy fields and specific policy choices. 
This approach accommodates the authors' need to 'describe the local 
policy arena and processes, to explore the interplay between people and 
institutions, and to emphasise the continuing role of the political'. They 
find that structural and electoral constraints limit policy making rather 
than a failure by decision makers to comprehend better policy options, 
and that only the political process, operating within such constraints, 
rather than 'rational' choice or policy planning techniques determines 
'who wins' in the shaping of Australian public policy (Davis et al 1988:9). 
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3.4.3 Downey's Categories of Analysis 
By moving on to consider Downey's adoption of Simeon's causality 
approach, we return to our concern with environmental policy analysis. 
Having established that such analysis must acknowledge the complexity 
of environmentalism, the hierarchy of environmental issues from most 
to least threatening to dominant interests, and the overt, covert and 
latent constraints upon environmental policy formation, Downey's 
adoption of Simeon's framework to a consideration of environmental 
policy appears a useful approach. We shall return to the question of the 
manageability of this approach for Tasmanian analysis in the conclusion 
of this chapter after reviewing the utility of Downey's and other policy 
frameworks. Briefly, Downey believes that policy analysis must reflect 
the complexities of environmental decision making. He finds Simeon's 
approach reasonably thorough for its explanation of 'the selection, scope, 
means, and, ultimately, the distributive dimensions of government 
policy', but also useful to his own project of identifying the range of 
factors restricting environmental choice and innovation, thereby creating 
problems in the promotion of 'desired changes' in policy (Downey 
1987:30). Downey argues that the demonstration of 'complexity' in the 
formation of policy, challenges the 'narrow, idea-less pragmatism school 
of public policy analysis', but he warns that conclusions based upon a 
broader approach must be drawn from detailed study rather than mere 
hypotheses about the role of causal forces (Downey 1987:34). 
Downey's basic explanatory concerns parallel the concerns of this thesis 
that environmental policy analysis not rely upon a simplistic 'issue 
based' focus, but that it proceed from a recognition of the fundamental 
nature and complexity of environmentalism and of the range of 
environmental issues, and that it identify constraints upon the 
realisation of policy goals. Downey seeks to explain apparent ad hoc, 
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'erratic fluctuations in the level of government commitment and 
methods of intervention' that have resulted in significant 
environmental policy variations. Explanations by analysts of policy 
variation as the result of governments pragmatically, reactively 
'muddling through' fail to convince Downey. He argues that to employ 
pragmatism as a policy explanation is inadequate. It ignores ideological, 
economic and social influences upon the policy process, and in short, 'is 
nothing more than a handy excuse for avoiding more difficult questions 
and for failing to attempt more incisive explanations': 
Government responses over time to environmental concerns can be 
described as a most blatant form of ad hockery, and on occasion have 
been characterised by the policy makers themselves as simply doing 
what was 'best' in the circumstances. However, it must be 
emphasised that these responses have not been formulated in a 
vacuum (Downey 1987:31). 
If 'method' is to be gleaned from the apparent policy madness of ad hoc 
decision making, Downey argues that it will only be by 'appreciating the 
various influences and assumptions which define the context within 
which public policies are made' (Downey 1987:32). The broader context of 
the policy environment, is, Downey suggests, the obvious starting point 
for analysis, before moving through Simeon's other categories of power, 
ideas, institutions and the policy process. The broad context may include 
state allegiances and dependencies, as well as its political economy, and its 
physical and industrial characteristics. In terms of power as a policy tool, 
Downey (1987:31) adopts neither a pluralist nor neo-Marxist position, but 
notes that the influence and access of various interests to decision makers 
must be reviewed before determining 'not only who is in a position to 
influence policy and to whom benefits accrue, but also whether or not 
benefits received are necessarily a consequence of influence'. 
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Whilst he only briefly deals with the broader socio-economic context of 
policy analysis, and the distribution of power, the role of institutions and 
the policy process, Downey (1987:31-32) is more forthcoming about the 
utility of ideology as a tool for environmental policy analysis, arguing 
that policy 'should be examined with reference to ideas'. Ideologies, 
dominant ideas, and policy paradigms, he argues, each account for policy 
orientation and assumptions behind environmental decision making, for 
example a 'common belief' in: 
the appropriate role of the state in society, the legitimate participants 
in the policy process, preference for, or an aversion to, the market 
system, emphasis on economic growth over a concern for the 
distributive dimension of policy and the like (Downey 1987:31). 
Environmentalists campaigning against pollution in the early 1970s, for 
example, were seen as attacking 'individualism and materialism' and 
'the free enterprise consumer economy', and therefore won few victories 
and discovered that 'the inertia to change was greater than expected and 
bold words did not always lead to bold actions in the political arena'. The 
primacy of the business ethic is 'above challenge', Downey argues, and 
dominates environmental concerns 'particularly in difficult economic 
times' (Downey 1987:32). As Doern and Phidd (1983:53) note: 
Ideologies remain an important element of political life not because 
ideologies 'cause' or automatically lead to policy preferences and 
action by governments in power, but because ideologies can help 
foreclose certain policy options or reduce levels of commitment to 
particular courses of action and to particular ideas. 
Whilst related to ideology, Downey sees dominant ideas like 'efficiency', 
'individual liberty', 'equality' and so forth as each having their own 
influence upon policy, and constituting 'another level of normative 
content'. Policy paradigms, on the other hand, usually apply to a specific 
field of policy, and prescribe Ifplrinciples concerning the manner in which 
issues should be construed and handled', with an obvious example being 
Keynesian economics (Downey 1987:32). A dominant policy paradigm 
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may be tempered or challenged by a contending one, for example as 
environmentalism is argued in Chapter Two to challenge industrialism. 
3.4.4 The Policy Flow Approach 
Despite the importance of the levels of analysis proposed by Simeon in 
his broad framework, the causality funnel analogy itself presents major 
difficulties. The cause and effect linearity that 'funnel analysis' implies 
could undermine the utility of Simeon's inquiry if it were taken literally. 
It is useful to review Sabatier's (1991b:149) criticism of Hofferberts' (1974) 
earlier model upon which Simeon's appears very much based, that is, the 
'open systems (funnel of causality) approach'. Hofferbert positioned his 
funnel sideways, and indicated that the broad analytic focus at its mouth 
then narrowed through levels of analysis in a causal fashion to influence 
policy output at its opposite, narrowest width. His conceptual framework 
then explains policy outcome as the 'direct and indirect function' of: 
... historical-geographic conditions, socio-economic decisions, mass 
political behaviour, government institutions, and - most directly - 
elite behaviour (Sabatier 1991b:149-50). 
The causality funnel's 'development sequence' is criticised by Sabatier 
(1991b:150) for its 'black-box' approach to policy explanation, and indeed 
for lending causal weight to socio-economic characteristics. 32 However, 
rather than analytically ranging through general to specific influences in 
arriving at a policy output, as Downey suggests, Simeon proposes the 
opposite direction of analysis, defying his own description of a funnel of 
influence and its inference of broad factors weighing down on specific 
outcomes. Simeon notes that whilst his categories of analysis 'group and 
make sense out of a wide variety of determinants of policy', the starting 
point for analysis, he argues, should be the policy outcome, from which 
32 Sabatier's (1991b:153) own model focuses upon 'the interaction of competing advocacy 
coalitions in a policy subsystem/community' however acknowledging both the constraints 
of basic social structures and constitutional rules, and changes in the broad socio-economic 
conditions external to the policy subsystem. 
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the analyst must work backwards as far as required into the political 
process to achieve an explanation (Simeon 1976:555-6). Such analysis 
may, in a particular case, establish causal influence after Hofferbert, 
however Simeon investigates before making assumptions and advocates 
not a linear analytic path, but rather the pursuit of a range of 
complementary policy approaches. 
An approach that avoids the difficulties of causality and linearity, and yet 
accounts for the considerations of power and values that are of concern to 
this discussion is the 'policy flow' model and its application to analysis of 
the most internationally analysed Tasmanian environmental dispute - 
the Franklin-Lower Gordon Dam controversy (Simmons et al 1974; Davis 
1984). The focus of the policy flow model is upon 'executive, legislative 
and judicial participants in the policy process, with a view to explicating 
the relationship of values to public policy' (Simmons et al 1974:457). It 
suggests that public policy choices emerge from 'interactive processes' 
into which 'actors, groups and agencies' are drawn on particular policy 
issues. Policy making in general is explained as the network of these 
interactive processes within 'a total system', with the various participants 
in policy making seen as belonging to 'sub systems' that are 'constrained 
by formal and informal arrangements derived from the total system'. 
The concern of the policy flow model is, as is Simeon's and Downey's 
concern, to 'identify aspects of policy making normally obscured', and so 
to capture the complexity of the policy making process beyond individual 
decisions (Simmons et al 1974:458 -460). 
For the purposes of this discussion, 'policy flow' overcomes the problem 
of causality discussed above, being designed to contrast traditional linear 
focus in policy analysis with focus upon interaction and policy evolution 
in the identification of 'the total milieu of policy formation'. The 'black 
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box' funnel analogy is overcome by a 'policy interaction milieu' that is 
graphically depicted as a spherical policy environment, into which flow 
interests, values and power arrangements, and out of which spin public 
policies. Whilst this milieu is seen as dynamic, the authors nevertheless 
acknowledge the potential for tendencies toward both entropy, where lack 
of 'resources and energy' see policy fail to emerge, and hypertrophy, 
where policy is so 'dominated by a particular characteristic' that its 
evolution is inhibited or paralysed and 'the social need that spawned the 
process in the beginning is fin fact] no longer served'. The authors 
illustrate domination with the example of hydro-industrialisation in 
Tasmania, and its constraining impact upon the state's ability to respond 
'to interests demanding environmental protection of valued natural 
resources' (Simmons et al 1974:460-461). (This constraint is, in fact, the 
focus of Chapter Four's review of the capacity of environmentalists to 
achieve their policy demands in Tasmania). 
Values and power are interpreted more restrictively in the policy flow 
model than in Simeon's analysis, focusing respectively upon the values 
of the policy participants and the power arrangements brought by them to 
a specific policy arena. There is, however, nothing to suggest that these 
concepts cannot be interpreted more broadly, for example by placing the 
milieu of policy interaction (or policy community in more contemporary 
terms) within its greater socio-economic environment. Davis's (1984:6) 
elaboration of the policy flow model in his review of the Franklin-Lower 
Gordon Dams controversy reveals that, 'utilising variables common to a 
number of other policy models', he is able to enhance the explanatory 
utility of 'interactive milieu' analysis. 33 In introducing the characteristics 
of the policy issue, Davis captures the key technocentric-ecocentric value 
33 Davis's (1984:6-7) approach is to explain the controversy with reference to: the 
policy issue; the time horizon; the principal protagonists; tangible and intangible input 
variables; policy process; policy style; policy outcome and impacts; and policy feedback. 
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clash introduced in 2.2.1 in terms of opposing dominant material and 
alternate ecological paradigms. Davis (1984:12-13) subsequently notes that 
policy 'actions and decisions [throughout the Dams controversy] were 
based more upon beliefs and political leverage than any detailed 
evaluation of factual evidence'; that the government exploited the value 
clash by promoting anti-conservationist sentiment in an attempt to 
achieve its own policy goals; and that the issue was 'ill-handled' by 
'incompetent politicians' who thwarted democratic decision making in 
the interests of retaining 'insensitive bureaucratic power' over the policy 
process. 
3.4.5 An Environmental Policy Approach 
The framework of analysis adopted here to review environmental 
decision making in Tasmania is concerned to establish the ability of 
environmentalists to achieve their demands in circumstances of policy 
constraint. As noted in Chapter One, and confirmed by Davis (1984:2), 
Tasmania sought early this century to overcome its isolation and 
vulnerability as a peripheral island economy by adopting the policy of 
hydro-industrialisation. In Downey's terms, hydro-industrialisation 
functioned as a policy paradigm that defined the context within which all 
other development decisions were to be made (Downey 1987:32). The 
policy primacy of hydro-industrialisation went unchallenged until the 
rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s. An ideological challenge was 
first posed to development policy by environmentalists in the dispute 
over the flooding of Lake Pedder, and deepened with the subsequent 
Franklin-Lower Gordon, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp 
mill disputes. 
The boundaries of constraint upon the realisation of environmental 
goals, and the political boundaries of state action and response to 
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environmental demands were overtly prescribed by hydro-industrial 
imperatives. A study of the policy outcomes of these disputes must 
therefore, in Simeon's terms, review the political, economic and social 
framework within which policy is made, in order to explain both the 
forces that limit and the forces that extend the range of policy 
alternatives. The intent of the case study reviews in Chapter Four and 
the analysis in Chapter Five is to establish whether, as Chapter Two 
suggests, dominant values inform policy boundaries capable of 
accommodating or routinely excluding environmental demands. 
The framework of analysis chosen for reviewing the Pedder, Franklin, 
Electrona and Wesley Vale case studies follows Simeon's concern to 
identify broad influences upon specific policy outcomes. However, some 
important modifications are undertaken to Simeon's approach. Firstly, 
Downey's emphasis upon the influence of ideology, dominant ideas, and 
policy paradigms is drawn upon to introduce the case studies as studies in 
paradigmatic conflict. As Hay and Haward note, 'Tasmania is a crucible 
of environmentalist conflict'. In conflicts between the 'greenies' and the 
'proponents of large scale development' in Tasmania, the authors argue 
that the issues and values at stake are more focused and distilled than 
anywhere else in the world (Hay & Haward 1988:435). 
Each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes saw the 
dominant development paradigm challenged by ecocentric demands that 
classically opposed prevailing values and policy boundaries. In terms of 
the shades of 'light' to 'dark' green discussed in 2.3.1 and 3.4.1, these 
ecocentric demands represent the most intractable, deepest shade of 
green. This deep ecocentric green challenge is motivated, Hay and 
Haward (1988:442) argue, by the threat of the wholesale destruction of 
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Tasmania's remnant wilderness areas, and has lent powerful 
momentum to the structuring of the state's green political movement. 
Having introduced each conflict in terms of the dominant economic and 
alternate ecological values at stake, Chapter Four is preoccupied with the 
documentation of the empirical detail of the disputes. As we have seen, 
ecocentrism inspires demands that are least easy to satisfy in policy terms, 
so that whilst Chapter Four essentially documents the nature of each of 
the conflicts and the mechanisms introduced to resolve them, it is also 
concerned to identify the relative opportunities of the opposing interests 
to influence the policy outcome. The empirical documentation then also 
considers the overt, covert or latent opportunities available to the value 
contenders in the pursuit of their opposing economic and ecological 
goals. In summary, the approach to the Tasmanian studies is essentially 
in two parts. Chapter Four documents the four key disputes, presenting 
in each case the broad policy environment before describing the issues at 
stake, the details of the conflicts, and the specific events and policy 
processes involved in the resolution of an outcome. Discussion moves 
initially as Downey suggests from broad influences to specific details and 
outcomes, however returns at the conclusion of Chapter Four to reflect 
upon the opportunities and constraints experienced by opposing value 
contenders, and upon the capacity of environmentalists therefore to 
achieve their policy demands in Tasmania. This review of power as the 
capacity in various dimensions to achieve a policy outcome further 
modifies Simeon's approach, and serves to introduce broader analysis in 
Chapter Five of the efficacy of the environmental challenge over two 
decades in Tasmania. 
The adoption of this broad policy approach follows Ham and Hill's 
(1984:17) recognition of the need in policy analysis to stand back from the 
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world of everyday politics in order to ask what they call 'some of the 
bigger questions' about the role of the state in contemporary society and 
the distribution of power between groups. The bigger questions in terms 
of Tasmanian environmental policy analysis, include the following 
concerns - What is the nature of conflict in each dispute? How are 
conflicting concerns accommodated or constrained? Is there equality of 
opportunity to influence the policy process and to resolve the dispute 
outcome? Have two decades of bitter conflict led to policy learning or 
improved decision making practices? Any analysis that failed to 
appreciate environmental disputation in Tasmania as ideologically 
charged would, in Eckersley's terms, miss or underplay what is novel and 
distinctive about the nature of the environmental challenge to hydro-
industrial state development practices. However, the approach adopted 
here of reviewing ecopolitical conflict and policy influences at a variety of 
levels is an attempt to ensure that the hierarchy of environmental issues 
can be matched to a hierarchy of ecopolitical influence from the most to 
the least overt of political arenas, and an attempt to explain not only 
constraint by Tasmanian state governments of the goals of 
environmentalists in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley 
Vale disputes, but also to explain the external influences that were 
successfully brought to bear upon the state to thwart the proposed 
Franklin Dam and the Wesley Vale pulp mill. 
3.4.6 Environmental Policy Analysis 
The policy approach adopted here may be one that addresses, at least in 
regards to several Tasmanian case studies, Walker's lament for the lack of 
agreement both on the nature of environmental problems, and the 
techniques to be employed in their study, as noted in 3.2.1. Discussion in 
Chapter Three has drawn upon ecopolitical theory in Chapter Two to find 
that environmentalism is ideologically contentious, and beyond the 
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explanatory reach, therefore, of simplistic issue attention analysis. As 
Chapter Two explains, economic growth and material values serve as the 
ideological reference points for the dominant paradigm or world view, 
whilst ecocentrism and non-material values serve as the ideological 
reference points for the alternate environmental paradigm. 
Conflict between the opposing paradigms is then a contest of meaning 
between dominant and contending values as environmental values 
struggle for legitimacy in a material world, rather than jostle in a 
pluralistic way for attention in an impartial polity or policy process. Yet, 
despite its utility in revealing the fundamental values at stake in the 
struggle to realise environmental interests, goals and demands, Chapter 
Two finds paradigmatic analysis overly simplistic. Indeed, the chapter 
identifies and discusses the many difficult 'shades of green' that comprise 
contemporary environmentalism, and finds that there is a hierarchy of 
environmental issues ranging again from 'light' to 'dark' green - with 
'deep green' issues most inspired by ecocentrism and posing the greatest 
threat to dominant material interests. 
Chapter Two concludes with a consideration of the extent to which the 
state is able to distance itself from traditional growth imperatives in order 
to respond to environmental policy demands. The chapter finds that the 
state is not an impartial mediator of environmental conflict, but that its 
response to demands is constrained by the priority it accords material 
interests and the growth imperative within capitalist societies. As noted 
in 2.4.6, the easiest 'wins' for environmentalists in policy terms tend to be 
those 'light green' demands in the hierarchy of ecological issues which 
most conform with dominant material values, and therefore least 
threaten capital interests. 
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The hierarchy of 'light' to 'dark' green environmental issues, it is argued 
in Chapter Two, ranges from least to most inspired by ecocentrism, from 
least to most threatening to dominant values and material interests, and 
from least to most difficult for the state to satisfy in policy terms. In 
Chapter Three, it is argued that only analysis undertaken at various 
levels can capture the complexity of environmentalism as a policy 
problem, and indeed satisfy calls such as Walker's noted in 3.2.2 for 
pragmatic wholism in environmental policy analysis. The case studies of 
power analysis and environmental policy making reviewed in Chapter 
Three demonstrate mechanisms of constraint upon the realisation of 
environmental demands that may be exercised, in Lukes' terms, as overt, 
covert or latent influence. In 'power' terms, the intensification of 
constraint upon the realisation of demands can therefore be understood 
as the mobilisation of bias against a value contender that intensifies as 
does the shade of light to dark green. 
Hence the legitimation of deep green demands as mainstream policy 
concerns is most frustrated by the mobilisation of bias toward dominant 
orthodox values. Chapter Two suggests that whilst economic 
determinism is regarded as conventionally wise and responsible, 
ecological determinism is rejected as contrary to the principles of liberal 
democracy and natural freedom. In the case studies reviewed in Chapter 
Three, the mobilisation of bias against ecological imperatives is seen to be 
achieved by a combination of political power and corporate influence that 
overtly and covertly enforces policy inaction on environmental issues 
and concerns. It remains then to explain the role of power analysis in the 
achievement of this policy constraint. 
The case study review in Chapter Three of power as the ability to prevent 
decisions from being taken leads, in 3.3.1, to a consideration of the role of 
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causality in policy formation. However, rather than consider causality in 
its narrowest sense as an exercise intended to cause or prevent an event 
or action, causality is considered in Simeon's terms as a societal 
influence. Whilst acknowledging the causal quality or agency of 
dominant values and structures of power upon environmental policy 
formation, Simeon does not, however, deterministically deny, as 3.3.1 
notes, that the policy process may have some effect independent of 
constraint. The framework of analysis that Simeon adopts evades the 
methodological difficulties, discussed particularly in 3.3.2, of empiricism 
facing pluralist analysis, and of determinism facing structuralist analysis, 
by settling, in Hall's (1992:91) and Downey's (1987:32) terms, for a 'policy 
paradigm', that is essentially a 'multi-layered' descriptive approach. 
Nevertheless, Chapter Three finds that the range of contending power 
theories addresses constraint in environmental policy making at levels of 
analysis that reveal layers of influence lacking in Simeon's approach. 
Simeon's broad causal approach is then well complemented by the 
descriptive insight gleaned, as we have seen, from employing the full 
range of contending theories of power. As discussed in 3.3.6, this includes 
Lukes' three dimensions of power, as well as the competing, yet 
descriptively complementary, structuralist and ideological accounts. 
Furthermore, there has been increasing recognition, also reviewed in 
3.3.6, of the need for descriptive syntheses of power in policy analysis 
given the unlikelihood of a universally accepted 'meta' theory ever 
arriving at one 'correct' method of power analysis. It is concluded in 3.4.1 
that a multi-layered approach to power has great utility in explaining the 
capacity of environmentalists to achieve a policy response or experience 
constraint at a variety of levels, and to address the intensification of 
constraint against the realisation of environmental demands that 
fundamentally threaten capital interests. 
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3.5 Conclusion - The Role of Values, Power & the State. 
In conclusion then, in Chapter Two, a range of ideological and structural 
constraints were found to influence environmental policy formation by 
mobilising bias against the realisation of environmental demands. It was 
suggested, after Vickers (1972:29), that environmental policy is not the 
product of an ideologically benign process, but of a web of circumstances 
that favours dominant industrial over contending ecological values. Bias 
toward dominant values, as we have seen in 2.3.6, may frustrate the 
legitimation of environmental concerns where political discourse and 
policy processes define legitimacy in orthodox terms. A structural power 
imbalance may then constrain the realisation of ecological demands, as 
their proponents are drawn into debate, the terms of reference of which 
have been set by their ideological opponents. 
Environmental policy analysis must acknowledge the ideological 
contention between dominant and ecological values, and the potential 
for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy to frustrate environmental 
demands. However, since this contention has not deterministically 
limited the achievement of a broad range of environmental policy goals, 
analysis should also recognise both the range of ecopolitical demands 
spanning the opposing dominant and ecological paradigms, and the 
realisation of environmental goals in circumstances of ideological 
constraint. Simeon's causality approach provides a valuable account of 
the broad range of influences upon policy formation, albeit modified (in 
3.4.5) for environmental policy analysis. 
Whilst the strength of Simeon's approach is its wide ranging focus upon 
the many influential factors shaping and constraining policy formation, 
the limitations of his approach for our purposes include its superficial 
view of ideological contention, policy influence and political power, as 
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well as its suggestion of linearity in policy analysis conveyed by the 
'funnel of causality' notion. For the purposes of environmental policy 
analysis in general, and for the review of Tasmanian studies in particular, 
the role of ideology in the policy process is a crucial consideration, as is 
the role of dominant societal influences in suppressing the legitimation 
of ecological values. In Chapter Four, each of the case studies is firstly 
introduced in its broad policy context. As we saw above, the Tasmanian 
environmental policy context has historically been defined by hydro-
industrialisation and its constraining impact upon the state's ability to 
respond to ecopolitical demands. 
More recently, as Hay and Haward (1988:435) argue, conflict between state 
development imperatives and ecological demands has seen the issues 
and values at stake more distilled and focused than anywhere else in the 
world. In modifying Simeon's policy approach, and ensuring its 
manageability for Tasmanian case study analysis, Chapter Four reviews 
the ecopolitical challenge to the paradigm of state development, before 
detailing the decision making process, the actions of the state in resolving 
conflict, and the multi-layers of influence in the policy process. Chapter 
Five moves from the specific case studies to general conclusions about 
the role of values, power and the state in the realisation of ecopolitical 
demands in Tasmania, and discusses the utility and insights of Simeon's 
modified framework of analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ECOPOLITICAL DISPUTES FROM PEDDER TO WESLEY VALE 
4.1 Chapter Outline 
Chapter Four comprises four main sections reviewing case studies that 
span twenty years of ecopolitical conflict in Tasmania: (4.2) the Lake 
Pedder dispute; (4.3) the Franklin River dispute; (4.4) the Electrona silicon 
smelter dispute; and (4.5) the Wesley Vale pulp mill dispute. As noted in 
3.4.5 and 3.4.6, the chapter details the disputes, which are then analysed 
more broadly in Chapter Five. After Simeon (1976:551; see 3.2.1), this 
evidence is reviewed by applying 'similar questions, frameworks and 
methods' to each study with the aim of gaining cumulative results for 
analysis. With the exception of the Electrona dispute, these conflicts are 
well documented individually by Australian authors such as Southwell, 
Davis, Bates, Hay, Chapman and Economou, as we shall see. The choice 
of these cases is not so much for their notoriety, however, as for revealing 
the paradigmatic nature of conflict, and the efforts of conservationists, 
environmentalists and development opponents to achieve their goals in 
constrained policy circumstances. 
Each study begins with a review of the policy context of the dispute, and 
considers the issues at stake, before turning to the dispute detail and the 
role of the state in achieving a resolution. The aftermath of each dispute 
is considered to set the tone both for the subsequent study and the chapter 
conclusion. The discussion finds, in each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin 
River, Electrona smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes, there was a 
profound ecocentric challenge to the dominant development imperative 
in Tasmania. As the following review shows, the disputes fall into two 
'development policy' periods, pre and post the 1983 thwarting of the 
Franklin River dam. Pre-1983, hydro-industrial policy was hegemonic, 
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leaving conservationists excluded from the policy processes, and 
encouraging the emergence of Tasmanian environmentalism in protest. 
The Pedder and Franklin River disputes, (of the early 1970s and early 
1980s respectively), were characterised by political and bureaucratic 
secrecy, exclusion tactics, expedient decision making, failure to properly 
define the impact of the proposal or consider alternatives, and ad hoc, 
reactive management of the state's natural resources. Post-1983, 
emphasis shifted to the industrial side of the hydro-industrial equation, 
with hydro-industrialisation's demise as a development panacea, and the 
stripping of the powers of the Hydro Electric Commission. 1 However, 
importantly in this latter period, the legacies of the policy expediencies of 
the hydro-industrial era were only too evident in the Electrona and 
Wesley Vale disputes, (of the mid to late 1980s respectively), with the 
Liberal State Government dismissing its opponents as anti-Tasmanian, 
and riding rough shod over a range of environmental and community 
concerns. In the pre-1983 period, the loss of Pedder to 'hydro-inundation' 
served as a forerunner dispute to success against a similar fate. Similarly, 
in the post-1983 period, the failure of opponents to halt the Electrona 
smelter, served as a forerunner loss to successful efforts to halt the 
Wesley Vale pulp mill, a proposed development thirty times larger than 
Electrona. 
The following review finds that in the cases studied, ecopolitical conflict 
prompted by a clash between ecological and development imperatives, 
has intensified where ad hoc policy making and exclusion tactics were 
employed to constrain opponents, so that, paradoxically, conservative 
opposition has proved a fillip to the state's environment movement. 
The disputes reveal a failure by state governments to improve policy 
Davis (1993:121) notes that by the mid 1980s, 'reform of the Hydro-Electric 
Commission was in progress', and 'energy sources other than hydro-electric were under 
investigation'. 
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processes to incorporate an appreciation of ecological values. They reveal 
instead bureaucratic and political attempts to match the sophisticated 
campaigning of environmentalists with exclusion tactics of their own to 
constrain them. Chapter Five moves beyond these details to examine the 
ideological, political and institutional background to these disputes to 
make sense of the routine assertion of dominant industrial values in 
Tasmania. Both Chapters conclude that from the rise of hydro-
industrialisation, Tasmanian governments have failed to acknowledge 
the intrinsic value of the state's unique natural areas. In Fox's terms, 
their approach to land management has not only been anthropocentric 
(human-centred), but on the scale of human-centredness, has been the 
most exploitative. Exploitative anthropocentrism is the antithesis of an 
ecocentric, or ecology centred approach. It views natural areas for their 
use value rather than for their intrinsic ecological value, and is 
characteristically concerned with the physical transformation value of the 
non-human world, for example by damming, clearing or scenery mining, 
rather than its preservation (Fox 1992:3). 
4.2 The Pedder Dispute - 'a jewel impounded' 
4.2.1 The Policy Context - the hydro-industrial imperative 
Having traditionally adopted an exploitative approach, particularly 
towards the state's South West wilderness, Tasmanian governments 
have valued the development of these areas for their instrumental 
economic worth, over their preservation as intrinsically, ecologically or 
spiritually valuable. So despite its national park status, the state's hydro-
industrial imperative threatened, and subsequently achieved, the 
flooding of Lake Pedder - a ten square mile, whisky-coloured lake 
bounded by mountains, button grass, pink quartzite beaches and glacial 
dunes high up in the South West wilderness (see locality map 4.1). 
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and uninhabited natural areas (Kiernan 1990:20). 
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Before inundation in 1972, Pedder had been an ecologically unique and 
aesthetically exquisite jewel in the crown of Tasmania's wild, untouched 
Locality  Map 4.1 - Lake Pecli-ler 
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The neglect of the intrinsic value of natural areas has been compounded 
in Tasmania by a sorry record of ad-hoc, expedient management policy, 
that as Davis (1984:12) suggests, saw 'error compound upon error' in both 
the Pedder and Franklin conflicts. The routine of ad hoc, expedient policy 
response to conflicting land use imperatives was established in the late 
1960s and early 1970s with events leading to Pedder's inundation. The 
campaign to save Pedder constituted the first overt challenge to hydro-
industrial policy from conservationists who were rebuked by Labor 
Premier Eric Reece for 'meddling in public affairs' (Burton 1990:82). The 
campaign provoked hostility from the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) 
as well as its bi-partisan political supporters. Hydro-policy proponents 
shrouded Pedder's inundation plans in secrecy, keeping conservationists 
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in the dark for nearly two decades. Despite the 1955 declaration by the 
State Government of Pedder as National Park, HEC Commissioner Allan 
Knight 2 had indicated in 1954 'that a dam might be built' at junction of 
the Gordon-Serpentine rivers (Lowe 1984:25). 
Later it was discovered that the HEC had indeed placed flow recorders on 
these rivers as early as 1953 (Kiernan 1990:20; Southwell 1983:19). Whilst 
community suspicion over Pedder's fate was met with outright political 
and bureaucratic denial, successive events confirmed the HEC's 
inundation plans. In 1963, federal funding of $5 million saw the 
construction of the Gordon Road covering 90 km from Maydena to 
Middle Gordon into the heart of the South West wilderness (Bates 
1983:1). This was followed two years later by Premier Reece's chance 
remark that Pedder may in fact be 'somewhat modified'. By 25 May 1967, 
when the HEC finally tabled its inundation plans in State Parliament, 
amid a blaze of its own publicity intended to quell opposition, public 
concern had heightened to public outrage. 3 
Given the lack of access to information confirming the HEC's inundation 
plans, the campaign to save Pedder was waged in difficult circumstances. 
In 1962, nearly ten years after the flow indicators were thought to have 
been placed on the Gordon-Serpentine rivers, a conservationist watchdog 
body, the South West Committee, was formed (Gee & Fenton 1978:276). 
In terms of its ability to impact upon the policy process by which Pedder's 
2 The declaration was made on the advice of the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Board 
following lobbying predominantly by members of the Hobart Walking Club. It was a 
submission to the TSPB from HWC members, who had flown and walked to the area since 
1946, that had achieved the 23,800 ha park status (Gee Sr Fenton 1978:251). 
Ironically, Knight chaired the same Board that had recommended the Lake Pedder 
National Park. Dr Geoff Mosley (1981:42), former Australian Conservation Foundation 
Director, describes Knight's role on the Board as a 'spook', there to protect HEC interests. 
3 1967 Gordon River Power Development Stage 1 Act sealed Pedder's fate, with 
inundation complete in 1974, and power generation commencing in 1978. 
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fate would be sealed, the Committee 4 later experienced great constraint, as 
we will see, that prompted the formation of more radical conservation 
bodies and ultimately the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian 
Group. 5 Not least of the obstacles to the realisation of conservationist 
objectives included the impossibility of asserting scenery preservation 
and recreation arguments for keeping Pedder in its natural state, against 
the hydro-industrial 'logic' for inundation. 
The Pedder region had long been visited by Hobart and Launceston 
Walking Club members, either by making the three day walk in, or, since 
the mid-1940s, by making light plane landings on Pedder's distinctively 
'firm, pink quartzite sands' (Kiernan 1990:20). In the minds of the artists, 
walkers and campaigners who had witnessed Pedder, an aesthetic 
appreciation of its beauty was justification enough for its preservation. 
'Aesthetics preceded science' for these devotees, who used their artistic 
impressions to bring Pedder's splendour to Tasmanians, most of whom 
had little idea of what the lake looked like (Bonyhady 1993:29), and only 
raised science as a last resort. In the tradition of Tasmanian 
development, proponents of inundation failed to be moved by ecocentric 
concepts of aesthetic value. Indeed, the HEC mocked the loss of Pedder by 
calling its drowning an 'enlarging', and asserting its engineering and 
construction work worthy of the Lake Pedder reputation by retaining the 
Pedder name to describe the impoundment (Davis 1980:165). 
4 The South West Committee was formed when members of the Canine Defence League 
'became disturbed over irresponsible shooters abandoning dogs in the South West', as well 
as the loss of Tasmanian Tiger habitat 'from carelessly lit fire' (Southwell 1983:9). 
5 In the early stages of the dispute, the South West Committee had actively sought 
discussions and negotiation with government. Only when it was 'ignored and derided did 
more militant and mobilised conservation groups emerge' (Davis 1980:165). 
Groups to form included the South West Committee (1962), Save Lake Pedder National 
Park Committee (1967), the Tasmanian Conservation Trust (1968), Lake Pedder Action 
Committee (1971), the United Tasmanian Group (1972), and the Tasmanian Wilderness 
Society (1976). 
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4.2.2 The Pedder Dispute - from conservation to green politics 
It is difficult to establish precisely when the battle for Pedder began. The 
decade between Knight's 1954 indication, and Reece's 1965 confirmation, 
that Pedder would be modified, was as a decade of community suspicion 
and official denial. Despite the rumoured 'modification' plans for 
Pedder, in the late 1950s, the 'common view' was that National Park 
status, and the region's own remoteness, would protect it. Exploration 
activities had already covertly commenced, however, with HEC 
'helicopter sorties and vehicle tracks' into the Strathgordon and 
Serpentine, proving that, by 1961, 'a good deal of money' had been spent 
on investigation in the area (Southwell 1983:20). Conservationists' 
unease grew over the Gordon Road. It was clear by 1964 that this road 
was not destined for tourism use, but was 'a heavy duty construction 
whose massive earthworks showed up clearly as crude scars even on 
satellite photograiphs from outer space' (Southwell 1983:20). However, 
the essentially conservative South West Committee was persuaded by 
Commissioner Knight's announcement that power development in the 
South West was nothing other than a remote possibility. The Committee 
was confident that its own plans for a South West National Park were 
based upon common sense that would be appreciated and endorsed by the 
State Government. Ifflt came as a rude shock' a Committee member later 
reported, 'to discover the generally low calibre of these incompetent, 
expedient politicians who seemed to have no conception of planning for 
the future' (Southwell 1983:20). 
Serious campaigning by conservationists started in March 1967 with the 
formation of the Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee (SLPNPC) 
just months before the 'Gordon River Power Development Project Stage 
One' report was tabled by the HEC in Parliament recommending Pedder's 
flooding as the first stage of the Middle Gordon Power Development 
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(Bates 1983:1; 4.2.1 fn. 3). Political activism was not, however, unilaterally 
embraced by the conservationist community, even though most were 
aware by that stage of the impending report that would betray official 
promises that Pedder was under no threat. Mosley argues that 
conservationists were of two breeds, split 'between their feelings as 
citizens and their feelings as bushwalkers'. Pedder supporters were 
drawn from bushwalkers who regarded the South West wilderness as 
'their terrain', but were divided over whether to oppose development 
within it. Equally, they comprised progressives prepared to challenge 
parliamentary and bureaucratic powers, and conservatives prepared only 
to appeal for rationality in the policy process. As Mosley explains, this 
division 'came into the open' in 1967 (Mosley 1981:44). The brewing 
activism in the months preceding the tabling of the HEC's plans, and the 
impending revelation that their years of suspicion had been justified, 
exploded afterwards into on a frenzied campaign by the SLPNPC to 
thwart Pedder's inundation. It had taken a decade for conservationists to 
appreciate how little they had impacted on land management policy, and 
indeed how little national park status meant to development proponents, 
yet the SLPNPC's activism was still considered intemperate by some 
conservationists. 
The Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee organised a petition of 
8,500 signatures opposing Pedder's inundation - claimed by Mosley to be 
the largest petition ever in Tasmanian history - within weeks of the 
parliamentary tabling of the HEC's plans (Mosley 1981:45). Coupled with 
public concern over decision making practices, and pressure from 
conservationists, this prompted the Legislative Council to establish a 
Select Committee Inquiry into 'the Establishment of the Proposed 
Gordon River Power Development and its effect on Lake Pedder and Lake 
Pedder National Park' (Bates 1983:1). In 1964, just prior to his indication 
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of Pedder's likely 'modification', Reece established an Inter-Departmental 
South West Committee comprising the HEC, Forestry Commission and 
Department of Mines. In effect, this Committee usurped the activities of 
the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Board, and may have been intended 
to counter the South West Committee's conservationist influence. 
Conservationists were refused representation on the Inter-Departmental 
Committee - which further explicitly rejected the promotion of 
conservation values in the South West (Lowe 1984:25; Gee & Fenton 
1978:239-241). The Inter-Departmental Committee's recommendation for 
an enlarged South West National Park was eventually released by 
Premier Reece as a means of countering public concern over the HEC's 
designs on Lake Pedder (Southwell 1983:21). 
The Legislative Council Select Committee of Inquiry into the Pedder 
issue eventually supported inundation, but backed the enlarged South 
West National Park recommendation. Without waiting for its findings, 
Premier Reece introduced legislation enabling Pedder's inundation, and 
approving $95 million for the impoundment, accompanied by legislation 
vesting 1.6 million acres of South West wilderness with the HEC. Both 
Bills passed into law on 24 August 1967 after the Select Committee's 
findings were finally handed down, with Reece immediately halving the 
recommended 363,000 ha South West National Park (Johnson 1972:56;58; 
Kiernan 1990:20-21). 6 Reece's pre-emptive actions showed that he never 
doubted approval would be gained for the HEC's plans, and that, by 
vesting control of large tracts of the South West with the HEC, he had 
equally anticipated further battles looming over hydro-industrialisation. 
6 Conservationists claimed that the Select Committee wanted to save Pedder, but not on 
the cost options put to it by the HEC. Its 'price' for agreeing to Pedder's loss was gazettal 
of a 363,000 ha South West National Park that was later halved by Reece. 
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Enabling legislation settled the policy outcome for Pedder, but the dispute 
was far from over. The radical conservationist cause was still to breathe 
life into Tasmania's moribund politics, by intensifying its campaigning, 
and evolving into a fully fledged green political party despite failing, 
even in a bid for federal intervention described in 4.2.3, 7 to save Lake 
Pedder. Although the Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee had 
spent its efforts and disbanded after Reece had achieved legislation for 
inundation, a few individuals refused to concede Pedder's loss 
(Southwell 1983:23). They may well have gained heart from the Reece 
Government's ousting in the 1969 State election, as Tasmania's first 
ecopolitical casualty,8 with Labor losing office for the first time since the 
Depression (Gee & Fenton 1978:241). Meanwhile, the Liberal Opposition 
had paradoxically campaigned on a policy of 'no delays' to HEC projects, 
as well as a plan to replace ad hoc policy with a National Parks and 
Wildlife Service, and a Community Conservation Advisory Board. 
Incoming Premier Bethune nevertheless retained Reece's hydro-
industrial vision including Lake Pedder's flooding (Lowe 1984:30). 
Conservationists meanwhile had ironically gained unprecedented access 
to Pedder with the completion of the Gordon Road. In Easter 1971, at the 
annual 'get-together' of Tasmania's walking clubs, over one thousand 
people trekked or flew in to bid Pedder farewell (Bonyhady 1993:30). 
With inundation less than one year away, the South West Committee, 
the Walking Clubs and the Australian Conservation Foundation had 
each given up the fight. However, this pilgrimage touched 
7 Kiernan (1990:31-33) describes the failure of the Federal Labor Government under 
Prime Minister Whitlam to save Pedder despite a Federal Labor Party Caucus resolution 
to do so. 
8 Reece had engendered the concern of both his hydro-industrial support base over 
delays to Pedder's inundation, and his detractors firstly for resisting any influence of 'the 
rising younger section of the Party', and secondly for excluding conservationists from policy 
processes that lacked any coherence on conservation issues. It was broad public discontent 
over the Pedder issue that saw him become an ecopolitical casualty (see Lowe 1984:29). 
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conservationists with a sense of impending loss, sparking at least some 
back into action. Inspired by the 'get-together', activist Brenda Hean and 
others convened a public meeting at the Hobart Town Hall at which the 
call was made for a state referendum. Legislative Councillor Shoobridge, 
the sole politician to have visited the lake, moved a referendum motion 
in State Parliament that was quashed on the basis of the HEC's own cost 
estimates of saving Pedder (Lowe 1981:168; Southwell 1983:23). 
Conservationists brought together by the public meeting established the 
Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC), and launched a campaign effort 
that soon turned national, prompting the Liberal Prime Minister to offer 
federal funding for an optional power scheme that Bethune vehemently 
rejected. The LPAC then moved into state parliamentary campaigning, 
establishing the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group 
(UTG). Following the collapse of Bethune's coalition government, the 
UTG contested the 1972 state election, in which they continued to fight 
inundation. The Liberal and Labor parties declared Pedder a 'non-issue', 
leaving it to the HEC to counter the UTG - despite the breadth of alternate 
social, economic and community issues in the UTG's policy platform (see 
5.2.2, fn 4). The HEC ran an extraordinary campaign, using public funds, 
basically claiming that a vote for the UTG was a vote for increased power 
prices. 9 However, the UTG only narrowly failed to gain one seat, and 
influenced the outcome of another under Tasmania's unique system of 
9 Southwell (1983:27) claims Pedder campaigners had experienced such difficulties 
gaining balanced media coverage in Tasmania, that the Victorian LPAC took out a 
national advertisement countering some of the HEC's more contentious assertions. The 
HEC responded with an 'astonishing' series of national advertisements, followed by 
election eve scare mongering ads in all Tasmanian papers misrepresenting the LPAC. 
The HEC threatened increased power tariffs if the Pedder scheme was stymied. It 
subsequently campaigned vigorously, for the damming of the Franklin, only abandoning 
plans to repeat its 'unthinkable' electoral advertising efforts in 1982 after intense public 
pressure (Bates 1983:15). The use of these tactics well into the 1980s are all the more 
extraordinary for the fact that by the late 1960s, according to Davis, the 'myth of hydro- 
industrialisation was wearing thin' (Davis 1993:120). 
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proportional representation.w In a swing back to Labor, Reece was 
returned to power, and expeditiously resolved Pedder's inundation using 
tactics, including his self appointment as Attorney Genera1, 11 the passing 
of 'doubts removal' legislation sanctioning an otherwise illegal 
inundation of part of the enlarged South West National Park, and the 
rejection of an inundation moratorium recommended by a Federal 
Committee of Inquiry (Bates 1983:7; Gee & Fenton 1978:241; Lowe 1984:41). 
4.2.3 The Role of the State - failed federal support 
Two levels of the Tasmanian state played a part in the Pedder dispute - 
the State Government, formed by the political party commanding the 
majority in the House of Assembly, and the Legislative Council, 
comprised of so-called independent Legislative Councillors sitting in the 
Upper House. Although the inundation of Pedder was a vision of Labor 
Premier Reece's realised by the HEC, it was a bi-partisan vision overtly 
shared by his Liberal political opponents and members of the Legislative 
Council, and upheld uncritically by the Tasmanian media. The hydro-
industrial vision was further a pragmatic arrangement, between business, 
bureaucracy, and trade unions, responsible for Labor's long hold on state 
political power (Lowe 1981:178). 
By sharing this vision, the Liberals shared a development ethos beyond 
political ideology, that left them curiously supportive of both the Labor 
Government and its union constituency. The emergence of 
environmental politics revealed the extent of bi-partisan support for 
10 Although Reece and the ALP were returned with a clear majority, the UTG polled 
well with 7% of the total vote, and the near election of one UTG candidate 'standing 
primarily on a conservation platform, with limited funds, no press support, and only three 
weeks campaigning' (Johnson 1972:60; Gee & Fenton 1978:241). 
11 After Mervyn Everett QC resigned that is, convinced that conservationists had the 
standing to proceed with a realtor action to legally challenge Pedder's flooding. Reece 
had rejected this advice, prompting Everett's resignation, and settled the matter with the 
HEC (Doubts Removal) Act sanctioning the otherwise illegal flooding (Bates 1983:7). 
166 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
hydro-industrialisation, prompting the UTG in their 1972 election 
campaign, to dub the Labor and Liberal parties the 'Laborials' (Bell & 
Sanders 1980:70-80). Development proponents treated the campaign to 
save Pedder as subversive for flouting hydro-industrial policy, so that 
whilst seeking to influence the decision making over Pedder's future, 
conservationists were subsequently kept in.the dark, ignored, discredited, 
misrepresented and obstructed by politicians, bureaucrats and the media. 
The bi-partisan political support Pedder's inundation enjoyed at the state 
level, was not shared by the Federal Government, whose intervention to 
halt the scheme was nevertheless a slim hope by conservationists, given 
the lack of federal grounds for the evaluation of state projects. 12 In 
addition to funding the Gordon Road, the Federal Liberal Government 
had in 1966 financially supported inundation with $55 million of 'special' 
funding for the Pedder project (Southwell 1983:20). Although the State 
Government was refusing to receive petitions opposing inundation for 
their 'conflict with Government policy', the quarter million signatures 
were taken seriously by Liberal Prime Minister McMahon. However his 
approach to Liberal Premier Bethune on seeking inundation options was 
rebuffed as interventionist by the State Premier (Southwell 1983:25). 
Neither McMahon nor his successor, Labor Prime Minister Whitlam, 
were more than half hearted in their intervention attempts, although 
Whitlam was persuaded by his Minister for Environment, Dr Moss Cass, 
to fulfil his election promise of a Committee of Inquiry into Pedder's 
future. The Committee endorsed the LPAC moratorium option, whereby 
the feasibility of saving Pedder, including rehabilitation costs of $8 
12 The legislative backing with the potential to justify intervention was gained after, 
and as a direct consequence of, the Pedder dispute, with the establishment of the 
Australian Heritage Commission, the Register of the National Estate, and the 
Commonwealth's Environmental (Impact of Proposal) Act 1975 (Burton 1990:87). 
From 13 February 1973, it became policy for all development proposals in which the 
Commonwealth of Australia is involved to require an environment impact statement (Bell 
& Sanders 1980:70). 
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million, would be funded by the Commonwealth. Cabinet rejected this, 
but in a victory for Dr Cass, was overruled by Caucus, after a moving slide 
show by photographer Olegas Truhanas (Gee & Fenton 1978:242). 
It was only at this late stage, as the waters were rising on Pedder, that key 
scientific information, and evidence refuting the HEC's dubious claims, 
as well as its failure to pursue cost options that could have saved Pedder, 
was coming to light 13 (Kiernan 1990:21; Lowe 1984:25-27; Johnson 1972:9; 
McHenry 1972). As close as Lake Pedder was at this stage to being saved, 
several key political forces thwarted Caucus's resolution. At the federal 
level, Whitlam delayed communicating Caucus's compensation offer to 
Reece, and finally sent word on a party basis. Reece, who had refused to 
co-operate with the federal inquiry, ignored Whitlam's communication 
of Caucus's offer and pressed ahead with inundation. LPAC's final 
appeal to the Australian Council of Trade Unions, backfired when 
President Hawke 'torpedoed the proposal', by referring it back to the pro-
dams Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council which rejected the 
moratorium offer (Kiernan 1990:31-3). 
4.2.4 The Aftermath of Dispute 
The failed federal support of the Whitlam Government, in retrospect 
betrayed only a symbolic will to save Lake Pedder. However, Whitlam's 
Committee of Inquiry gave Pedder campaigners credibility, by declaring 
the lake as too important to destroy, and for condemning, as Bates notes, 
'the decision making process which had led to this ill conceived power 
development' (Bates 1983:2). The loss of Pedder was inconsolably tragic; 
however the campaigning efforts of conservationists achieved important 
secondary gains crucial to winning the looming Franklin River dispute. 
13 In 1972, independent research, confirmed Pedder's habitat, which had barely been 
studied before inundation, as biologically distinct and supporting at least 17 endemic 
species, prompting 184 scientists to sign a petition opposing inundation (Johnson 1972:9). 
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These included the launching of environmentalism and the world's first 
green party in Tasmania, the sophisticated campaigning skills learnt in 
state and federal political arenas, and the wide public attention, beyond 
Tasmania's parochial shores, drawn to the intrinsic value of the South 
West wilderness. Broad recognition of this value, combined with the loss 
of Pedder, inspired a determination in conservationists to save the rest of 
the South West from 'the rapacious grasp' of the HEC (Bates 1983). 
As mentioned in 4.1, the policy lessons learnt by the proponents of the 
exploitation and physical transformation of the South West involved not 
incorporating ecological values into development policy processes, but 
learning how to better constrain their environmental opponents. The 
1968 South West National Park declaration, had subsumed the 1955 Lake 
Pedder National Park and subsequent Pedder impoundment within its 
boundaries (Gee & Fenton 1978:251). However, just as Park status had not 
protected Pedder from inundation, offering only symbolic security to 
intrinsic ecological values, neither was it to protect the South West from 
the designs of the HEC. Indeed, in the wake of Pedder, with the energy 
and vigilance of conservationists at a low ebb, the HEC turned swiftly 
from its victory to 'business as usual', ensuring that legislative approval 
for the Pieman scheme to flood the Pieman, Mackintosh and Murchison 
Rivers 'passed quickly through both Houses of Parliament without, once 
again, the benefit of any Parliamentary or public inquiry. After which, 
the HEC's attention turned to the Lower Gordon and Franklin Rivers' 
(Bates 1983:2). 
169 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
4.3 The Franklin Dispute - 'last wild river' 
4.3.1 The Policy Context - countering hydro-industrialisation 
If the State Government had learnt to exercise policy exclusion tactics and 
legislative veto to achieve its hydro-industrial goals given the emerging 
threat of ecological values, conservationists had equally learnt from the 
Pedder dispute to exploit democratic processes in the politicisation of 
their demands for wilderness preservation. For their campaigning tactics 
in the Franklin dispute, they were denounced by their critics as 'greenie 
anarchists challenging parliamentary democracy itself' (Bates 1983:12). 
After Pedder they were fiercely determined not to be steamrolled into 
compromise or defeat in the looming dispute over the damming of the 
Franklin River (see locality map 4.2). The 1970s had been dismal years for 
conservation in Tasmania - the early years marred by the drowning of 
renowned wilderness photographer Olegas Truhanas, and loss of the 
incomparable Lake Pedder; whilst later years saw the flooding without 
scrutiny of the Pieman River, (one of the state's finest remaining wild 
rivers west of Cradle Mountain), and the revocation for forestry of almost 
a third of the Hartz Mountain National Park (Bates 1983:2; Southwell 
1983:42). These events, combined with the imminent 'hydro-threat' to 
the South West's Franklin River, inspired the 1976 formation of the 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society in a bid to turn the tide to conservation. 14 
Despite hydro-electric encroachment, Tasmania's South West remained, 
in the late 1970s, one of the last great temperate wilderness areas in the 
world. 15 The Lake Pedder Action Committee had discovered, during the 
14 The Society's predecessor was the South West Tasmania Action Committee, set up in 
1974 to achieve the protection by the Federal Government of South West Tasmania as a 
national park for all Australians, safe from development pressures (Southwell 1983:45). 
15 The State Government's South West Advisory Committee recognised the South 
West's World Heritage significance in an interim report May 1976. It was subsequently 
also found by UNESCO in February 1978 to be worthy of World Heritage status (Gee & 
Fenton 1978). 
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Pedder dispute, that, in a list of the world's most valuable natural lakes 
and waterways, UNESCO had described Peddel as 'a unique wilderness of 
incomparable significance and value', the destruction of which 'must be 
regarded as the greatest ecological tragedy since the European settlement 
of Tasmania' (Southwell 1983:26; Kiernan 1990:26). Whilst the Pedder 
impoundment had eventually ensured this tragedy and halved the South 
West region, the HEC's Franklin dam proposal would have bisected the 
remaining wilderness with flooded rivers and dams that would have 
reduced its natural values to utter insignificance (Thompson 1981:70). 
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Locality Map 4.2 - Franklin River 
(Scale 1:50),000. Source : Bast , Map Dept. of Environment & and Management) 
The flooding of the Franklin-Lower Gordon was considered a foregone 
conclusion by hydro-industrial proponents, despite the area's world 
heritage conservation status determined by UNESCO in 1982, and parallel 
bureaucratic efforts by the National Parks Service to establish a Wild 
Rivers National Park to protect the region (discussed in 4.3.3). However, 
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sophisticated campaigning by conservationists achieved Prime Minister 
Hawke's decisive intervention, with his passing of the Commonwealth's 
World Heritage and Properties Conservation Act (1983) that subsequently 
enabled the High Court to confirm the legality of the federal bid to save 
the river (Bates 1983). 
Franklin campaigners had learnt from the Pedder dispute to argue for the 
preservation of intrinsically valuable natural areas as much on economic 
as aesthetic grounds. They embarked on an aggressive media campaign 
and systematic lobbying in the parliamentary arena, that targeted and 
destroyed the HEC's own project cost estimates, state power projections, 
and therefore its economic credibility. However, at the same time, the 
campaigners built a parallel aesthetic dialogue that visually marketed the 
beauty of the South West and readily conveyed the spoiling of the 
Franklin River by road construction, an oil spill, a chain saw, or an HEC 
bulldozer (Sanders 1981:158). The visual marketing of the Franklin was 
critical to the success of the campaign. It began in State Parliament with 
the 1977 launching of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) film, 
'Last Wild River'. 16 Stickers, posters and pictorials were later joined by 
the yellow 'No Dams' triangle, that has since become an international 
emblem for wild areas preservation. From its inception, TWS resumed 
the UTG's industrial arguments that 'historically the extensive 
development of low cost power has not assisted the state's development 
relative to the mainland', and that contrary to traditional development 
mythology, the establishment of a hydrocracy had not protected the state 
from more general problems of commercial and industrial development. 
In the Franklin dispute, TWS's conservationist arguments against hydro- 
16 A reluctant Dr Bob Brown joined a novice film-maker Paul Smith on a pioneering 
rubber rafting trip down the Franklin in the summer of 1976, during which the 16mm film 
was made. Bob Brown was moved to passionate campaigning and a life times dedication 
to conservation after this experience (Southwell 1983:47). 
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policy were buoyed with critical mainstream economic findings such as 
Tasmania's poor growth rate, its virtually stagnant population, and its 
employment being little affected by the establishment of major power 
consuming projects relative to smaller industries (Johnson 1972:93). 17 
In their campaigning, conservationists were constrained by the routine 
HEC tactics of the withholding of information on development options 
and economic costs; the delaying of the public release of information 
until it was ready to present to Parliament; and the suppression of, or the 
failure to, document, social and environmental impacts (Lowe 1984:25; 
Johnson 1972:61). Eleven years before its plans for the Franklin were 
tabled in Parliament, the HEC had built a road into an 'investigation site' 
below Mt McCall. In the late 1970s, it denied resuming activity in the 
region despite sightings by rafters and conservationists. However in its 
1979 parliamentary report of the Stage Two Gordon River Power 
Development, (to harness the Lower Gordon, King and Franklin Rivers 
and flood the Franklin at an estimated $1.3 billion), the HEC documented 
$6.5 million worth of expenditure that had already been spent without 
parliamentary approval on the suspected 'investigations' (Bates 1983:2). 18 
However pre-emptive actions by the HEC designed to facilitate its plans 
for the Franklin were this time matched by the pre-emptive actions of its 
opponents. Conservationists had already announced the HEC's own 
plans some months before their 1979 tabling in Parliament, and had 
already achieved public opposition, polled at 2:1 against the scheme by 
this time (Gee & Fenton 1978:268; Green 1981). Neither was the HEC able 
17 Hay (1987:6) notes that employment in Tasmania's majOr energy-consuming industries 
peaked in the early 1960s and has been declining ever since. 
18 Parliamentary agreement to HEC proposals had long been considered a mere 
formality. With a blank cheque for expenditure always at hand, the HEC possessed 
powers unequalled by any public authority in Australia (Thompson 1981:25; Herr & Davis 
1982). 
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to rely upon the exclusion of conservationists from the policy process that 
would decide the fate of the Franklin River, nor upon the bi-partisan 
political support that it had always enjoyed previously for hydro-
industrial projects. On the contrary, a change in political leadership from 
Labor Premier Reece, upon his retirement in 1975, to his successors 
Neilsen and subsequently Lowe, saw a remarkable if brief transformation 
as we shall see from autocratic to consensual policy making, and from the 
HEC's operational autonomy, to its unprecedented scrutiny by the short 
lived reformist Lowe administration. 
4.3.2 The Franklin Dispute - from reformism to 'business-as-usual' 
It had taken two decades from the first public mention of Pedder's likely 
'modification', to its inundation by the HEC. As we saw in 4.2.4, the HEC 
was keen after the Pedder dispute to return to the 'business-as-usual' of 
hydro-industrial inundation. During 1971, against the backdrop of the 
Pedder dispute, and confident of its outcome, HEC Commissioner Knight 
briefed State Parliament, not only on the proposed Pieman River Power 
Development, but also, in notional terms, of the integrated power 
scheme to follow. This referred to Stage Two of the Gordon River Power 
Development, and was later realised by Premier Lowe to have first 
flagged the Franklin dam proposal (Lowe 1981:168). Conservationists had 
been aware of the HEC's ambitions for the Lower Gordon and Franklin 
since at least the early 1960s, with leaked documents indicating that 'the 
HEC's grand design would leave few river valleys of the South West 
unflooded' (Southwell 1983:48). In spite of the dispirited disbanding of 
the LPAC after Pedder's inundation, its most influential, experienced 
members kept their conservationist aspirations to secure the South West 
against hydro-industrialisation alive by working within the UTG before 
forming the South West Tasmania Action Committee, the predecessor of 
the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (Southwell 1983:45; see 4.3.1, fn 14). 
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These efforts paid dividends after the UTG's campaigning in the 1974 
federal half-senate election, and 1975 federal by-election in the Bass 
electorate. Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser undertook, on 
assuming office in November 1975, 'to fund a major wilderness park in 
the South West' and 'a joint Federal State Resources study of the area' 
(Southwell 1983:47-48; Lowe 1984:63). 
The State Government's own policy apparatus set up under Premier 
Reece to manage the South West, had been, Davis (1980:163) explains, 
driven by the 'territorial imperatives' of the public development 
agencies. As mentioned in 4.2.2, the assessment and protection of the 
South West's resources by the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Board 
was usurped by the Inter-Departmental South West Committee 
established in 1964 by Premier Reece (see also 4.2.1, fn 2). Whilst the 
Board was replaced by Premier Bethune's establishment of the National 
Parks and Wildlife Service in 1970, the real administrative control over 
the resources of the South West remained with the Inter-Departmental 
Committee. This was dominated by the HEC, and actually ensured the 
'attrition and frittering away of the public domain by wasteful 
exploitation and ad hoc decision making' as the resource based state 
departments encroached upon and exploited the South West wilderness 
(Davis 1980:165; see also 4.2.2). After Pedder's flooding and Premier 
Reece's retirement, the Labor Government set up its own South West 
resources inquiry. The South West Advisory Committee was established 
on 17 November 1975, chaired by Sir George Cartland, 'to inquire into 
and report on land use planning of the south west wilderness area' and 
'produce an accurate definition of the resources and competing values of 
the area' (Lowe 1984:64). Its May 1976 interim report was criticised for 
making no significant park recommendations, for failing to set any curbs 
upon development, and suggesting only the South West's 'conservation 
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area' gazettal, together with park status for a few localities with some 
safeguards on their development, but with no interim protection (Davis 
1980:164). The August 1978 final report found that it would be 
'impractical and unwise to constitute the whole of South West Tasmania 
as National Park' (Gee & Fenton 1978:255-256). However, it did set the 
scene for the preservation of both the Franklin and South West by 
recommending that the State seek annual funding for South West 
Tasmania from the Commonwealth 'on the basis that the area is of world 
heritage status and a unique national asset' (Southwell 1983:49). 
The Franklin dispute arose against this background of campaigning by 
conservationists for the general protection of the South West, as well as 
apparent bureaucratic efforts to find a policy solution to the conflicting 
imperatives of conservation and exploitation. Although conservationists 
boycotted the Cartland Inquiry on the grounds of the 'biased' composition 
of its Committee, this Inquiry at least adopted participatory procedures 
and received public submissions for the first time in the history of South 
West management (Southwell 1983:48; Davis 1980:163). It was soon clear, 
however, that the HEC demanded 'unstinting loyalty from its political 
masters', and would brook no opposition to its hydro-vision for the 
South West (Bates 1983:16). In early 1977, before the finalisation of the 
Cartland report, the HEC had Premier Neilsen release a statement of its 
plans to dam the Franklin in two stages, flooding first the Gordon and 
Denison splits, and then the Franklin River gorges (Southwell 1983:48). 
However, to his own political cost, Neilsen's successor, reformist Premier 
Lowe, broke the tradition of automatic parliamentary acceptance of the 
HEC's plans. He attempted the first ever assertion of Ministerial control 
over the HEC by establishing an independent Energy Directorate within 
the Premier's Department, and calling for the HEC to present options to 
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Parliament with the tabling of its Franklin proposal in 1979. He then 
created history by releasing the proposal and its options for public 
comment before passing any deciding legislation.I 9 Lowe's call for a full 
and open debate to precede any final decision, and the eventual passing of 
the Gordon-above-Olga legislation that would avoid flooding the lower 
reaches of the Franklin River incurred the wrath of retired Premier 
Reece. As a member of the newly formed Association of Consumers of 
Electricity, Reece lobbied the Parliamentary Labor Party to heed the HEC 
Commissioner's warning that 'any scheme that didn't flood the Franklin 
would have to be seen as irresponsible' (Lowe 1981:169-79; Tighe 
1992:125). 
The next eighteen months saw a remarkably effective backlash against 
Premier Lowe by hydro-industrial proponents for his attempts to reform 
the hegemonic powers of the HEC. It began with the Legislative 
Council's 13 to 4 rejection of Lowe's alternative Olga scheme and threat 
of blocking supply over the issue, and spread to within the ranks of the 
Labor party, with Harry Holgate twice challenging and finally deposing 
Lowe 12 to 9 as party leader (Lowe 1981:178). Lowe resigned from Labor's 
State Branch, and joined Democrat Norm Sanders on the cross benches, 
to be followed by Labor colleague Mary Willey. All three independents 
supported the Liberals' no confidence motion in Labor's 'handling of the 
power scheme' and brought the Government down. The 1982 state 
election resurrected hydro-industrial 'business-as-usual', with the HEC's 
19 Lowe broke the unwritten law of Tasmanian politics by requesting optional schemes 
from the HEC, in 1971 for its Pedder plans whilst he was a member of the Opposition, and 
in 1979 for its Franklin plans when he was Labor Premier. From the HEC's reply to the 
first request, Lowe states that 'it was obvious no interference would be tolerated in the 
scheduled development program'. The second request cost his premiership (Lowe 1984). 
Of his attempt to independently assess the HEC's plans for the Franklin before being 
deposed, Lowe later explained that 'Where was sufficient bias and distortion in 
information provided by the HEC that I realised I did need a separate, objective and 
competent group to advise me on the complexity of energy policy matters, not only power 
development but conservation strategies and all other related matters' (Lowe 1981:167). 
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original bill for the Gordon-below-Franklin dam reintroduced into the 
House of Assembly by the Gray Liberal Government. 20 By this time, the 
systematic campaigning efforts of conservationists had reached the 
parliamentary arena, and were matched by their increasingly effective 
media tactics outside it. But these efforts came to nought when the Lower 
House passed the Legislative Council's proposed Gordon-below-Franklin 
legislation 29 to 2, opposed only by Lowe and Sanders, the independents 
returned by the June election (Bates 1983:4). Despite intensifying public 
pressure to save the Franldin, Labor 'went to water' and executed a back 
flip away from an 'historic first' achievement of the Lowe Government. 21 
Although the alternative Olga scheme was rejected by conservationists 
for flooding the upper reaches of the Franklin and wreaking havoc in the 
South West, it had not been the preferred option of the HEC either. 
However, for the first time ever, it had been an option determined 
independently by State Parliament in the interests of natural area 
conservation (Lowe 1981:178). 
4.3.3 The Role of the State - decisive federal intervention 
The Pedder dispute had seen conservationists as the lone critics of hydro-
industrialisation, battling the entrenched political supporters of the HEC. 
However, in the Franklin dispute, the Lowe Government had attempted 
the role of impartial mediator, seeking consensus between the opposing 
forces for the conservation, and the exploitation, of the South West. This 
provoked the HEC, initially into producing the sort of material by which 
it had swamped the 1967 Legislative Council Inquiry into Lake Pedder's 
20 The legislation passed to flood the Franklin was the 1982 Gordon River Hydro-
Electric Power Development Stage II Act. 
21 The reasons for the backflip included the perception of Lowe's consensual political 
style as weak and inappropriately leading the party away from its pragmatist roots. 
Fronting for the HEC, the Hydro Employees Action Team, symbolised Labor's spurned 
constituency, attracting a network encompassing unions powerful enough to threaten the 
pre-selection of PLP members, causing their defection throughout 1981 away from the 
alternative Olga scheme to support for flooding the Franklin (Lowe 1981:177). 
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inundation. The HEC's report accompanying its recommended Gordon-
below-Franklin legislation was described by conservationists as 'a multi-
volume glossy publication several feet thick', capable of 'bamboozling' 
any politician, overestimating future power needs, and skating over the 
options to the Franldin dam (Southwell 1983:49). 22 When it became clear 
to the HEC that Lowe's Energy Directorate was intent on public comment, 
and a review of optional schemes, HEC Commissioner Ashton was 
provoked to declare that 'Ulf the Parliament tries to work through 
popular decisions, we're doomed in this state and doomed everywhere' 
(Bates 1983:16). In introducing his alternative legislation several months 
later, Lowe replied that ?The HEC is an engineering organization', 'not a 
socio-economic planning body. Previous governments may have been 
satisfied with a cursory perusal of its recommendations, followed by an 
automatic stamp of approval. This is not my style' (Southwell 1983:51). 
The Franklin dispute revealed the HEC as the 'state within the state' in 
Tasmania, its powers unequalled by any public authority in Australia. As 
early as the 1950s, Premier Bethune had recognised that Parliament had 
abrogated its proper power to the HEC (Thompson 1981:18-25). In May 
1981, just months before being deposed by his own party, Lowe convinced 
his Cabinet to proclaim the Wild Rivers National Park and forward its 
nomination for World Heritage listing to the Federal Liberal 
Government. From that moment on, Lowe's every effort at state level to 
resolve the issue was thwarted, including his attempt to hold a state 
referendum that allowed a 'no dams' option. 23 The Federal Liberal 
Government played a critical role in saving the Franklin by sending 
22 Lowe made the HEC reprint the 'elaborate nine-volume presentation' in a newspaper 
style format for public release. It was 'the first time in the state's history that 
information concerning such a major scheme had been available so openly' (Lowe 1984:105). 
23 Lowe had promised a 'no dams' option on the referendum paper, but was outvoted by 
the Parliamentary Labor Party, and directed to change his position. Nevertheless, 44% of 
all voters wrote 'no dams' across their ballot papers (Southwell 1983:53). 
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Lowe's nomination for registration under the 1972 International 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage. 
The South West was proclaimed World Heritage by the World Heritage 
Committee in December 1982, on the grounds of 'natural and cultural 
values' (Southwell 1983:57). By then, a federal election was in the wind, 
'no dams' was appearing on ballot papers in by-elections around the 
country, 8,000 letters of protest had reached the Federal Government and 
conservationists had blockaded work on the Franklin. 24 The Liberal 
Prime Minister offered $500 million compensation to Tasmania for 
abandoning the dam and building a thermal power station, but was 
rebuffed by Premier Gray (Tighe 1992:166). 25 The Federal Labor Party 
undertook to save the Franklin if elected, and after its win in March 1983, 
(in which the National South West Coalition of conservationists was 
critical to securing marginal seats), Prime Minister Hawke passed the 
World Heritage and Properties Conservation Act that enabled the High 
Court in July 1983 to confirm his right to intervene to save the Franklin 
(Southwell 1983:61). 
4.3.4 The Aftermath of Dispute 
The Franklin victory was won in the High Court on the seven grounds 
argued by the Commonwealth against the Tasmanian Government. 
Four of these related to the world heritage significance of the region, with 
one of the most significant grounds being, (as conservationists had long 
argued in Tasmania), that the Commonwealth has the power to legislate 
24 1,400 protesters were arrested in the two and a half month blockade - the 'most 
sustained campaign of civil disobedience in Australian history' - attracting national and 
international attention (Southwell 1983:59; Bates 1983:12-14). 
25 This proved a costly error of judgement as Gray eventually had to settle for the 
$276.5 million in compensation offered by the Federal Labor Government after it won its 
right in the High Court to intervene to protect the South West World Heritage area. 
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on areas of distinctive Australian heritage, and that the 
Commonwealth's 1983 World Heritage Properties Conservation .Act is 
therefore valid. The Commonwealth also proved in the High Court its 
right to acquire World Heritage areas 'on just terms', and to pass special 
laws to protect aboriginal sites (Southwell 1983:64).26 Although the HEC's 
massive report on its Gordon-below-Franklin scheme claimed that there 
were no areas of archaeological significance to be flooded, excursions by 
archaeologists and speleologists established the astonishing find of caves 
indicating habitation between 15,000 and 20,000 years old, in the 
southernmost ice-age settlement known on earth (Southwell 1983:56). 
This find bolstered Lowe's nomination of the South West as World 
Heritage, and provided the Commonwealth with even greater grounds 
for intervention. Despite himself being a casualty of the Franklin 
dispute, ex-Premier Lowe then had proved the value of his fledgling 
attempts to establish due process for the evaluation of the intrinsic value 
of natural areas in Tasmania. 
The great gain of the Franklin episode for conservationists was in the 
achievement of their immediate objective of saving the river. However, 
the dispute had also seen the quadrupling of the Tasmanian Wilderness 
Society's nation wide membership to 8,500 members, making it more 
subscribed and active than either state political party (Bates 1983:8). A 
'green' foothold had also been gained in State Parliament with the 
resignation of Lower House Democrat Norm Sanders in 1983, in what 
was to prove his successful bid to run for the Federal Senate. Wilderness 
Society Director, Dr Bob Brown, who had stood as an independent at the 
previous state election, contested the recount after Sanders' resignation, 
26 The other grounds of the Commonwealth's submission were: that the Commonwealth's 
World Heritage Act is not aimed at Tasmania, nor does it impair the State's 
constitutional functions; that the Hydro-Electric Commission is a trading corporation 
subject to Commonwealth regulation; and that the External Affairs power extends to all 
genuine international treaties entered into by Australia (Southwell 1983:64). 
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captured his preferences, and so assumed a seat in State Parliament. Dr 
Brown then followed ten years of grass roots activism that had helped 
build the state's conservation movement, with ten years of political 
activism, that was to consolidate green politics at the parliamentary level 
in Tasmania 27 . 
In the euphoria of the Franklin victory, however, it was not immediately 
apparent that for these gains, and in particular for the political exposure 
of the HEC and its backers, bi-partisan conservative forces would redouble 
their efforts to constrain the conservation movement. Later disputes, 
particularly over forestry, would subsequently bear out the vitriol felt at 
state level by the Liberal and Labor Parties against the conservationists. 
For its part, the Labor Party was destined for years in the political 
wilderness after the Franklin dispute, relegated to the sidelines in state 
development debates, as no more than 'a feeble opposition clawing 
vainly for a foothold in the headlines', leaving an oppositional policy 
vacuum that was eventually to be filled by the Tasmanian greens (Green 
1981:51; Pybus & Flanagan 1990:18). 
27 P. A. Walker notes that Tilt is not a widely known fact that Sanders had stood on an 
Australian Democrat ticket and that Bob Brown had run as an independent. [It is alleged 
that] before Sanders resigned, he had ascertained whether Brown intended to contest the 
recount of distributed preferences to find the next candidate to be elected. Sanders wanted 
to ensure that Brown would not contest, so that Sanders' votes would flow to the next 
Australian Democrat on the ticket. 
[It is alleged] that Brown had initially said that he would not contest [the recount] so 
Sanders resigned. Brown [then] "changed his mind" ... capturing Sanders' preferences and 
his seat before the next Democrat [who had been on the ticket]. For this, some Australian 
Democrats in Tasmania have never forgiven Brown' (Walker P. A. 1994, personal 
communication). 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any other candidate would have matched Bob Brown 
in any way. His vigour, vision and dedication have propelled green concern in Tasmania 
into a viable political movement that eventually captured the balance of state political 
power, as we shall see. 
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4.4 The Electrona Dispute - development 'at-any-cost' 
4.4.1 The Policy Context - the hydro-industrial legacy 
Burton argues that the Franklin victory was followed in Tasmania by a 
period of polarisation and backlash against the environment movement 
(Burton 1987:21). The tension was palpable between conservationists who 
had demonstrated their preparedness to intervene in state development 
policy, and the bureaucrats and multinationals 28 who were determined to 
constrain them (Thompson 1982:14). After the dispute, Liberal Premier 
Gray was determined to show his backers that unlike the Labor Party, his 
Government was capable of taking on conservationists and winning. The 
paradoxically destructive effect of Lowe's consensus style was not lost on 
Premier Gray, whose own style in contrast was described by journalists as 
uncompromising, tough, aggressive, and indeed 'Reeconian' - modelled 
that is, upon ex-Labor Premier Reece (Sunday Tasmanian 20 December 
1985; Advocate 27 August 1985; Stokes 1986:3). Gray was equally keen, in a 
bid to consolidate his newly won political power, to snatch from Labor its 
traditional role that Hay (1986:21) describes as 'industrial standard-bearer' 
in Tasmania. In April 1984, shortly before announcing plans for both the 
Henty-Anthony hydro-electric scheme in Tasmania's West, and mining 
exploration in South West protected areas, Gray shifted his economic 
focus to the attraction of multi-million dollar development projects to 
the State (Crowley 1989:52; Bates 1983:4, 5; Tighe 1992:166). 
In 1984, the first of Gray's 'multi-million dollar' projects was announced 
as the $50 million, eighteen storey, international hotel for the historic low 
rise waterfront of Hobart's Sullivan's Cove area. At the same time, a $34 
million silicon smelter was foreshadowed at the site of a failed carbide 
28 Thompson (1982:11) notes that foreign companies have been the major beneficiaries of 
hydro-power. To these the HEC has provided infrastructure, he claims, to the value of 
$1,700 million rent free. The prices paid by industry for HEC power remain confidential. 
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works adjacent to the Electrona village and the town of Snug on North 
West Bay, in Southern Tasmania [Liberal Party Press Release 16.4.85; P. A. 
Walker pers. corn. (1994); Chapman et al 1986;126; see locality map 4.31. 
Both projects sparked bitter opposition with the local community joined 
by the Tasmanian Conservation Trust in opposing the hotel, and the 
North West Bay residents joined by the Wilderness Society 29 in opposing 
the smelter. The legacy of a community still divided over the Franklin 
dispute heightened the antagonism that both projects generated. Liberal 
Premier Gray played on this by invoking the symbolic rhetoric of smelter 
opponents as 'greenies', and 'anti-anythingers' in a bid to shape public 
belief that concern for community and the environment is 'anti-
development', and 'anti-Tasmanian' (Mercury Editorial 21 April 1986). 
On the other hand, the proponents of development were lauded as 'good 
corporate citizens'. The community polarisation this labelling inspired 
was used by the Premier to legitimate his own steamrolling confrontation 
of project opposition. To the evasion, denial, secrecy and exclusion tactics 
characteristic of the Pedder and Franklin disputes, Gray added fast track 
legislation that approved both the international hotel and the smelter, 
dismisse public rights of appeal, as well as overriding all other legislative 
and approval processes in what the local press called 'one of the worst 
public relations jobs ever seen in Tasmania' (Mercury 28 August 1985).30 
If its rural-residential characteristics distinguish the Electrona dispute 
from traditional Tasmanian resource conflicts, its ecopolitical significance 
remains, as we shall see, in exposing the inadequacy of hydro-industrially 
driven regional development, and the ability of the state to misrepresent 
29 After the Franklin victory, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, with major branches 
now operating in each state, changed its name to the Wilderness Society. 
30 The relevant legislation is the 1985 International Hotel Development Act, and the 
1986 Silicon Development Act. An October 1985 poll of 30 Hobart identities, incidentally 
found the International Hotel on its completion to be 'one of the most hated buildings in 
Hobart (Sunday Tasmanian 25 October 1985). 
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and suppress such exposure. Massive injections of state funding to the 
carbide works from the late 1970s had left the Lowe Government in 1981 
with a failed operation, lost employment prospects and a depressed 
regional community that had historically relied upon a large industrial 
employer. 
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Aggregate public losses from the carbide works exceeded $14.5 million, 
and contributed to the growing lack of confidence in the ability of Labor to 
govern Tasmania. The carbide works was described as symbolic of all that 
was wrong with the state economy - its shrinking industrial base, its 
dependency upon external forces, the non-local control of its industry, 
and the inability of state governments to halt its economic decline 
(Advocate 10 July 1985). To the Federal Callaghan Inquiry into industry 
structure and employment in the state, this predicament was a distinctly 
'Tasmanian problem', its only cure in the diversification of the state's 
industrial base away from exploitative, subsidised major industry, and 
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are , 
toward small and medium scale operations (Callaghan 1977:100-106). The 
troubled history of the carbide works should have been sufficient 
warning against the domination of a small regional community by a sole 
export industry dependent upon government subsidy. However, along 
with environmental and public health concerns, economic arguments 
such as these put by smelter opponents came to represent neglected 
debate in the Electrona dispute, ignored by a Government intent upon 
development 'at-any-cost', ruled beyond the terms of reference of the 
Environmental Protection Appeal Board, and eventually squashed by fast 
track legislative provisions (Crowley 1989:48-50). 
4.4.2 The Electrona Dispute - up & down with subsidised industry 
On his election in 1982, Premier Gray had declared the Electrona carbide 
venture by the previous Government the state's worst corporate disaster. 
Two years later, he announced that his Electrona 'revival' would recoup 
up to $4 million of lost state funding, 'making phoenix rise' from the 
ashes of his opponent's carbide works blunder (TPD, House of Assembly, 
April 1984). Gray's 1984 announcement was briefly that negotiations had 
begun with joint venturers concerning the feasibility of converting the 
old carbide works into a silicon smelting operation. A $770,000 feasibility 
study by the venturers was subsequently announced without elaboration 
by the Government (Advocate 3 January 1985). On the 16th of July 1985, 
Tasmanian Silicon Smelters (formed by joint venturers Pioneer Concrete, 
and the French firm Pechiney - later renamed Pioneer Silicon Smelters 
Pty. Ltd.), applied for a licence to operate a silicon smelter at Electrona, by 
which time environmentalists and local resident groups had begun 
expressing concern over the proposa131 (Crowley 1989:47; Mercury 29.10.85; 
31 In July 1984, the Wilderness Society claimed that the joint venturers were being 
offered cut price electricity (Advocate 18 July 1984). The first resident fears were 
expressed by the Howden Progress Association in mid 1985, when it claimed that the areas 
affected would cover the North West Bay rural-residential settlements of Electrona, 
Margate, Howden, Oyster Cove, Sandfly and Snug (Mercury Sr Examiner 13 May 1985). 
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12.4.84; Advocate 9.7.85). 326 objections to the licence application were 
received by the Department of the Environment by the due date of 
August 16 1985, to be dismissed by the Premier as 'anti-Tasmanian', with 
the Wilderness Society accused by the Minister for the Environment of 
'orchestrating a campaign designed to slow development of vital industry 
for the area' (Mercury 21.8.85; Examiner 21.8.85). 
On August 25, the local Kingborough Council voted 5-3 to rezone the 
carbide industry site from general to light industry, in a clear indication to 
the Premier to 'peddle his proposal elsewhere' (Examiner 1.9.85). 
Residents advocated light 'enterprise industries' for North West Bay, 
claiming that the region's complex topography acted as a natural 
amphitheatre, and was therefore unsuitable for any silicon plant, even 
one meeting the most modern technical standards (Examiner 24.9.85). 
The Wilderness Society argued that Tasmanians would bear the 
enormous cost of government subsidy to the project, estimated in terms 
of power alone to be worth nearly $14 million over ten years, to achieve a 
mere 70 direct jobs for the region (Burton 1983 & 1985). However the 
joint venturers issued a writ against Council on September 14 1985, and a 
letter threatening to sue for breach of contract, thwarting the rezoning, 
gagging debate, and making a farce, Bob Brown claimed, of Tasmania's 
1973 Environment Protection Act, (instituted after Pedder), and the first 
major industrial project to be reviewed under it 32 (Advocate 17.9.85). 
32 This legislation was dubbed the 'toothless tiger' by Democrat Norm Sanders, who 
criticised the Tasmanian shield on its cover as symbolising the state's exploitation ethic. 
Despite the preamble in the Act mentioning the Government's policy requirement for an 
environmental impact statement to be carried out 'before a decision is made to proceed 
with any future development which is likely to have an impact on the environment of the 
State', there is no actual legislative mention of this policy. 
The HEC, for instance, has never been required to file environmental impact statement 
(Bell & Sanders 1980:81-87). 
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Although hydro-industrialisation was no longer overt policy at the time 
of the Electrona conflict, its hallmarks were recognisable, particularly in 
the narrowness of economic debate by industry proponents, and in the 
option for the region that eventually prevailed. The willingness of the 
State Government to disregard established policy processes in order to 
achieve its development objectives, as it had in usurping the role of the 
Scenery Preservation Board, and disregarding the national park status of 
both Lake Pedder and the South West, was also a feature of the silicon 
smelter dispute. Since the mid-1970s, the North West Bay region had 
been the subject of several strategic planning and natural area evaluation 
studies funded by the local Kingborough Council. The significant 
characteristics of the region include its aesthetic semi-rural appeal that is 
not expected to suffer development, nor urbanising influences until well 
into the next century, despite its location on the fringe of the Hobart 
metropolitan area. The region was also found to warrant inclusion on 
the National Estate for the scenic value of its strongly defined, and 
topographically complex, natural features - its shoreline, beaches, unique 
mud flats, amphitheatre of rugged, bush covered hills, and the narrow 
alluvial plains that border its waterways (Kingborough 1976:100). Council 
additionally found that noise emission and amplification across North 
West Bay, as well as water quality control, proximity to residential areas, 
and compliance with environmental regulations had each been problems 
with the siting and operations of the carbide works. 
After the collapse of the works, Council then signalled its intentions for 
the future of the region by its first rezone of the Electrona industrial site 
away from heavy industry and towards a more regionally appropriate mix 
of tourism, water based activities and general industrial development 33 
33 The rezone took effect in December 1983 when the 'Industry 113 Heavy' zone was 
redefined into four areas: Cottage Industry, Marine Zone, Port Zone, and General Industry. 
General Industry was restricted in size by the rezone to an area approximately one quarter 
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(Kingborough 1981; TCAE 1975). The Council attempted a further rezone 
from general to light industry, as mentioned above, as a clear indication 
of its desire not to have heavy industry revived at the old carbide site. 
Notwithstanding Council's views, and the specific concerns of residents 
about the health hazards of a silicon smelter situated without a buffer 
zone in the Electrona township, Premier Gray stressed the vital 
importance of the smelter for Tasmania, and warned that it would be 
disappointing if the issue were to become a 'political football' (Mercury 10 
July 1985). A dispute had been brewing for at least twelve months before 
this remark over the proposal, and the air of inevitability surrounding its 
approval by the State Government. Both the Wilderness Society and Dr 
Bob Brown, who asked questions of the Premier in Parliament, could 
extract no details of the operation. On this basis, smelter opponents asked 
both for an extension to the period of public objection to the smelter 
licence application, and an environmental impact statement to be 
prepared and made available for public comment. The Government 
responded by refusing to extend the licence objection period, by urging 
smelter opponents to lodge their objections in the absence of an impact 
statement, and by introducing a $250 fee for the right to appeal against the 
issuing of environmental licences (Mercury 15; 20 & 23 August). 
In July 1985, the joint venturers met the smelter objectors, indicating that 
they were intending to prepare an environmental impact statement, 
restricted in scope, however, to air, noise and water pollution. Shortly 
after this, local objectors formed the North West Bay Development 
Association to represent local concerns, and achieve a broadening of the 
environmental impact statement's terms of reference (Examiner 2 6 
of the prior heavy industrial zone, and included the land on which the Electrona factory 
is sited, the Electrona housing estate to the north, the entry road (Pothana road) and the 
residences lining this road (Stephens 1985:90). 
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August 1985; Mercury 12 September 1985). 34 By mid-August 1985, it was 
obvious that the Government would be facing a major campaign of 
opposition by the residents of North West Bay to the smelter, and that it 
would be backed by the resources of the tenacious Wilderness Society. 35 
As the level of government closest to the people, the Council was already 
responding to anti-smelter pressure, although there were a minority of 
pro-smelter advocates within its ranks. The Government countered this 
by backing the formation of a pro-smelter group, the Kingborough North 
West Bay Progress Association, in late August. 
The Labor Party slammed this tactic as 'an exercise in the use of rent-a-
crowd' by a government indulging in 'transparent political trickery', and 
claimed that the inaugural meeting of the group was not only held by 
invitation only, but stacked with Government supporters and backers of 
the smelter project (ALP Press Release 26 August 1985). In the final weeks 
of August, the Electrona debate erupted into just the full-blown, heated 
controversy that Premier Gray had been endeavouring to avoid, and that 
would persist well into 1986. After the Council vote to rezone to exclude 
the smelter option, and the joint venturers' legal threats, the Federal 
Government was flooded with over two hundred requests for a federal 
environmental impact statement, and the Premier was himself warned 
by the developers that other projects were 'hanging' on the smelter's 
approval, and that the venturers may be entitled to compensation should 
the smelter not proceed (Mercury 11 October 1985; Examiner 13 October 
1985). 
34A submission to the joint venturers from residents saw the inclusion in the statement of 
truck movements, solid wastes and dust, with some consideration to sociological effects, 
land and property values and aesthetic impact (Mercury 28 August & 12 September 1985). 
35 Besides subsidised power, the Wilderness Society's main grounds of concern were the 
economic aspects of the proposal, i.e. infrastructure subsidies, overt and covert government 
financial backing, and the insignificant number of direct jobs to be generated, as well as the 
environmental impact of silica quarrying, which alone could have thwarted the proposal 
(Burton 1983 & 1985). 
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In October 1985, the release by the joint venturers of a favourable 
environmental impact statement was taken by the Premier as a mandate 
to pursue the silicon smelter (Mercury 29 October 1985). Nevertheless 
residents found the document flawed and inadequate, with insufficient 
evidence to support the conclusions presented in each of the areas of: 
dust dispersion; noise emissions; ground level concentrations of dust and 
sulphur dioxide; traffic movements; socio-economic impacts; visual and 
aesthetic impacts; and water pollution - in fact in every aspect of the 
statement. Dr. Gerry Bates, advocate for the appellants in the appeal 
hearing contesting the granting of a licence to operate the smelter, 
claimed that the impact statement was riddled with mistakes and 
anomalies that were identified by the appellants but overlooked or 
ignored by the Department of the Environment (Environment Protection 
Appeal Board 1986:3, 111). 
The Environment Protection Appeal Board heard evidence against the 
issuing of the smelter licence for 28 days over eight weeks in the state's 
longest running environmental appeal that produced a record 3,220 pages 
of evidence. On the pretext that the smelter project might be lost to the 
State by the appeal process delays, the Premier introduced a 'blanket' fast-
track Development Control Bill, with provisions to control opposition to 
the smelter and to any other of its future projects. The Bill drew criticism 
from the conservative Tasmania Bar Council, which reacted with 'shock, 
horror and outrage' over its potential to take away civil rights (Mercury 
19 April 86). The Legislative Council threw out the Bill, retaining only 
development controls specific to the smelter. The Silicon Development 
Act was passed by the Lower House following all night debate on 30 April 
1986 (Bates 1986:190). Royal Assent was granted three weeks later, after 
the Environment Protection Appeal Board's (1986b) 13 May finding that 
the smelter licence was valid. 
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4.4.3 The Role of the State - federal non-intervention 
Gray's uncompromising handling of the Electrona dispute betrayed a bi-
partisan political instinct, following the Franklin dispute, that constraint 
of environmental demands was requisite to retaining political power. 
The $34 million Electrona smelter proposal, so swiftly following Gray's 
1982 election, functioned as an implicit promise to reassert big business as 
the industrial priority in Tasmania. The Gray Government was prepared 
to see development at Electrona 'at-any-cost'. In practice, this saw it ride 
rough shod over local planning, environmental and community health 
concerns. The Labor Party protested, in a peripheral way, about fairness 
and equity in the smelter's approval and licence appeal process, without 
raising issues of environmental, economic, or social significance 36 (ALP 
Press Release 28 August 1985; Advocate 31 October 1985). Labor's criticism 
of the silicon smelter proposal would have been perceived as siding with 
environmentalists, who were believed to have destroyed the Party over 
the Franklin issue, and would have further alienated Labor from its own 
working class political constituency (Crowley 1989:52). 
Smelter objectors were treated as outsiders just as conservationists had 
always been in policy terms in Tasmania. The refusal by the Premier and 
joint venturers to provide public detail of the silicon smelter proposal 
was also justified in the usual terms, that is - that the need for secrecy 
was on the basis of maintaining corporate competitiveness (Mercury 9 
July 1985). The Silicon Development Act confirmed corporate privilege 
by ensuring that 'a person who is guilty of a serious breach of the law 
under the Environment Protection Act by way of polluting is not liable to 
even half the penalty to which a person who maybe standing in front of 
the gates of the silicon smelter would be subject' (TPD, House of 
36 It was however, largely due to Labor Party efforts that, by the end of August 1985, 
perceptions of the State Government's mishandling of the smelter issue were rife, not only 
in public, but significantly in the editorial columns of the conservative Tasmanian press. 
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Assembly, 30 April 1986:1,625-1697). There was no chance that the Federal 
Government would respond to smelter opponents' entreaties to 
intervene in the dispute. 37 Gray had threatened a high court challenge to 
federal intervention on both the smelter and the upcoming woodchip 
export licence renewals (Liberal Party Press Release 29 August 1986). The 
federal government accepted Gray's assurance on the environmental 
legitimacy of the smelter project, suggesting that the only grounds for its 
intervention would be if there was an adverse finding by the proponent's 
environmental impact statement (Mercury 31.8.86). It had been urged to 
take this position by the Tasmanian Labor Party, whose display of bi-
partisan development politics provoked comment about the widening 
rift between Labor and environmentalists (Examiner 30 August 1986). 
4.4.4 The Aftermath of Dispute 
The successful reopening of the old carbide plant may well have proved a 
feather in the cap of the Gray government at the 1986 state elections had it 
not been for the escalation of conflict over the proposal, and Gray's heavy 
handed response. The 1986 state elections were more significant for the 
election of Dr. Gerry Bates as an independent in the House of Assembly 
ushering in a new era of green parliamentary politics. Dr. Bates joined 
Dr. Bob Brown in broadening the conservation agenda by complementing 
wilderness concerns with issues of environmental health and safety, state 
pollution, recycling, container legislation, public participation and appeal 
rights (Roberts 1988:8). Industrial development policy, meanwhile, had 
slipped from the HEC's hegemonic institutional control predominantly 
back into the political arena with Gray as sovereign leader. However, as 
the first of Premier Gray's 'multi-million dollar' subsidised industries, 
37 There were two potential mechanisms for intervention, firstly in ordering a federal 
environmental impact statement into the proposed silica-quartz quarry in the South West 
conservation area that was to supply the smelter, or secondly, by ordering one when 
Federal Cabinet was considering Foreign Investment Review Board approval for the 
export based project. 
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the Electrona silicon smelter could not have proved more disastrous, not 
only for the manner in which it was approved, but for the controversy 
that plagued its performance before its collapse and closure in mid-1991. 
The flaws in the policy approach of 'backlash' against environmentalism, 
manifest as the practice of development 'at-any-cost' by the Liberals, could 
not have been more apparent than in this final outcome of the dispute. 
In its brief operations from July 1987 to August 1991, the arguments of the 
smelter's opponents were proven, confirming the undemocratic nature 
of fast-track development legislation and its exemptions; the 
inappropriate siting of heavy industry in the rural-residential setting of 
Electrona; and the dangers of state subsidisation of externally controlled 
export based industries. The Silicon Development Act prevented 
residents from objecting to the smelter operator's variation of the plant's 
original design, by which its licence had been issued and subsequently 
upheld by the Environment Protection Appeal Board. Smelter opponents 
had protested that the proponent's impact analysis had not considered the 
complex topography of the North West Bay area, which tends to promote 
noise reverberation, and to circulate and recirculate rather than disperse 
air pollutants. During its operations, residents reported vast quantities of 
silica dust issuing as they had feared from the plant's chimneys, and at 
times from the refurbished building itself. They reported disturbing 
'roaring', 'rushing', 'thumpity-thumping', 'buzzing' and 'tonal whirring' 
sounds that were 'half felt-half heard' (TPD House of Assembly 22 Sept 
1987:3, 034; 3 May 1988:1, 354-5). Without recourse to appeal, residents 
suffered the smelter operations until mid 1991, when it closed, having 
lost $22 million in just four years. 38 
38 In August 1987 the Government removed public right of appeal against the annual 
renewing of industry licences. Green parliamentarians were subsequently also refused 
details of loans, subsidies and financial incentives to the controversial smelter operations 
after its collapse. 
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4.5 The Wesley Vale Dispute- 'licence to pollute' 
4.5.1 The Policy Context - the industrial imperative 
There was no doubt, in the Pedder and Franklin disputes, that ecocentric 
values were being asserted by the opponents of hydro-industrialisation 
against the utilitarian values of development proponents. The Electrona 
dispute, although not a battle for the preservation of wilderness, was very 
much a battle over the ecocentric, intrinsic value of an aesthetic, natural 
environment threatened by industrial development. Nevertheless, the 
North West Bay residents and environmentalists had learnt from the 
Franklin experience to pitch a range of arguments against the smelter on 
aesthetic, planning, economic, health and environmental grounds, none 
of which made any impact upon state nor federal politicians. The Wesley 
Vale dispute was inspired by remarkably similar concerns, however over 
a proposal thirty times the size of the smelter, and with the potential to 
devastate prime agricultural land in Tasmania's conservative northern 
heartland (see locality map 4.4). If the Electrona dispute had drawn 
together a disparate group of residents and 'greenies' into an alliance of 
so-called 'anti-Tasmanians', Wesley Vale added primary producers, the 
scientific community and conservative northern land owners, to form a 
broad coalition of concern that defeated the pulp mill proposal, toppled 
the Gray Government, and prompted the return of a record number of 
green independents to State Parliament. 
In terms of industrial policy, Wesley Vale was Electrona 'writ large', with 
all its failings as a development panacea. Just as the Pedder and Franklin 
disputes had exposed the hegemonic, development powers of the Hydro-
Electric Commission, so Electrona and Wesley Vale saw the confronting 
and calling to account of major corporate consumers of hydro-power and 
state resources. The rights of major industry to pollute and consume 
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Tasmania's natural resources with minimal returns to the state, has been 
a privilege upheld by successive state governments in a 'cult of hydro-
development' that has lasted almost a century (Sandercock 1983:13). The 
outcome of this policy, Burton (1986:19) argues, has been the corporate 
domination of Tasmania by a number of resource exploiting industries 
that dictate the terms of their privilege to a 'subservient state'. 39 Whilst 
industry attraction is routine state practice, the sole reliance upon hydro-
policy as an industrial imperative has certainly distinguished Tasmania 
from other Australian states. By selling large subsidised blocks of power 
to very few industries, hydro-industrialisation has also created enormous 
limitations upon the state's future industrial options (Ramsay 1972:6; 
Thompson 1981:146). The flaws in this strategy are legendary following 
the alternate economic debate and project evaluation by conservationists 
during the Franklin dispute. Nevertheless the threat to corporate 
privilege in the Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes saw the pulp mill 
joint venturers respond with resistance, evasion, job and investment 
blackmail, collusion, secrecy, information denial, and pressure for 
legislative protection from public protest and accountability. 
The proposal by joint venturers, North Broken Hill Holdings Ltd. and 
Canadian based Noranda Forest Inc., to build the world's largest bleached 
kraft pulpmill, was not only exactly the type of industry that the strategy 
of hydro-industrialisation was designed to attract, but one of a massive 
scale, beyond the wildest dreams of its political backers. Without the 
dedicated campaigning of the coalition of opponents, upon grounds of 
the pulp mill's likely environmental, health and community impacts, 
the proposal would have received state and federal approval. However, 
39 Even as he battled bureaucratic development forces to save the Franklin, Australian 
Democrat politician Norm Sanders claims to have understood that the HEC was merely 
doing the bidding of its corporate masters to whom Tasmania was expected to give away 
labour, resources and power (Sanders 1981:155). 
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early federal enthusiasm for the pulp mill and its export income earning 
potentialo was tempered, after the strategic lobbying of federal politicians 
by its opponents. McEachern explains that the project had the active 
support not only of the Tasmanian Government, but 'significant parts of 
the Federal Labor Cabinet', the ACTU and the business community. The 
Federal Government, he adds, was split between support of the project 
for its economic advantages, and opposition from those concerned about 
its potential environmental impact (McEachern 1990:63). Rather than 
resolve these differences, the Federal Government gave an undertaking 
that the mill would only proceed subject to the undertaking of proper 
base-line studies, and the enhancing of environmental controls, before 
Foreign Investment Review Board approval could be granted by Cabineto 
(Economou 1992:464). Despite the state government's entreaties and its 
own back down on state environmental controls, this tightening of 
federal requirements saw the pulp mill joint venturers withdraw. The 
project collapsed with many unresolved environmental, economic and 
social issues that may well haunt future state pulp mill and 'down-
stream processing' ventures in Tasmania (USERP 1988). 
Foremost amongst the unresolved issues in the pulp mill debate was the 
question of natural resource exploitation and the depletion of old growth 
native forests. In 1985, the Federal Government refused to intervene in 
the Electrona dispute, but simultaneously it was signalling early approval 
for the renewal of Tasmania's export woodchip licence the following 
40 As Economou notes, the proposal satisfied three major industry federal policy 
objectives: (i) the encouragement of state-of-the-art manufacturing technology in the down 
stream processing of raw materials; (ii) encouragement of industries capable of earning 
export income; and (iii) encouragement of industries capable of displacing importation of 
manufactured good (Economou 1992:464). In terms of Tasmania, McEachern notes that the 
mill seemed an obvious 'value-adding' project for a state short of manufacturing and living 
largely by exports of primary products (McEachem 1990:64). 
41  The call for further base line studies was a response to a Commonwealth Science and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and Department of Primary Industries and 
Fisheries review of the Gray Government's relaxed guidelines (McEachern 1990:64). 
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year. In 1986, a memorandum of understanding between the State and 
Federal Governments delivered an export woodchip volume of 2,889,000 
tonnes to Tasmania in return for its official recognition of 'the need for 
development to be balanced with environmental sensitivity' (Economou 
1990:54). On the strength of its forestry expectations, which in defiance of 
this recognition were to fully exploit Tasmania's timber resources, the 
State proposed a woodchip mill in the Huon region to be supplied by 
southern forests, and commenced harvesting in both the Lemonthyne 
Central Tasmania, and Farmhouse Creek in the state's south, ignoring 
the National Estate listing of both these areas 42 (Wayte 1988:6; Economou 
1990:54). 
Conservationists blockaded the Farmhouse Creek operations prompting 
the ill-fated 1987 Federal Government's Helsham Inquiry into 'National 
Estate Values of the Lemonthyne and Southern Forests'. Following the 
Inquiry's surprise finding of only a fraction of the southern forests as 
worthy of protection, the Federal Government intervened. A Forests 
Accord was struck whereby the State and Federal Governments jointly 
nominated for world heritage listing, (to complement the existing world 
heritage region), an area in excess of Helsham's recommendation. In 
return, the State achieved a 790,000 tonnes per annum increase in the 
1986 woodchip quota, and the closure of one, rather than two, existing 
mills (Economou 1990:55). Environmentalists were incensed, claiming 
that Tasmania's forests were already overcommitted and being logged 
unsustainably, with over 80% exported as woodchips. Even without the 
revised woodchip quota, old growth forests would be exhausted, at 1988 
exploitation rates, by the year 2011. In addition, wasteful practices were 
42 Earlier protection of the Farmhouse Creek region of the southern forests had been 
lost when, immediately after his election, Premier Gray had lifted the moratorium upon 
industry operations imposed in there 1978 with the declaration of the Upper Picton 
Valley as part of the South West Conservation Area. 
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seeing two million tonnes of wood burnt each year on the forest floor. 
Sawlogs, the Helsham Inquiry was told, were being deliberately pulped, 
whilst rough and careless handling was degrading sawlogs to pulpwood 
and woodchip quality43 (Mattingley 1988:6; USERP 1988; Wayte. 1988:6). 
Against this background of conflict, and the green light that the 790,000 
tonnes per annum increased woodchip quota had signalled to the forestry 
industry, the Wesley Vale dispute erupted. 
4.5.2 The Wesley Vale Dispute - corporate politics & the public response 
There had been talk of a multi-million dollar pulpmill at Wesley Vale 
from at least 1987, when Japanese backing of $100 million for such a 
project was rejected by North Broken Hill Holdings Ltd. In March 1988, 
Australian Pulp and Paper Mills released an environmental report about 
the siting of a mill at Wesley Vale, prompting the formation of the 
Concerned Residents against the Pulprnill Siting (CROPS) months before 
any project was confirmed. Spokesperson Christine Milne subsequently 
led a blistering attack against the pulpmill proposal for which she was 
lauded as the 'Boadicea from the Bush' in the local press (Flanagan 
1989:11). In May 1988, North Broken Hill confirmed both a mill proposal, 
and its partnership in the venture with Canadian based Noranda Forest 
Inc., who would invest $500 million in the project and become a major 
customer of the pulp mill's products (Moore 1992). The project would 
create an estimated 200 direct jobs that critics claimed were unlikely to go 
to the unemployed on the North West coast (Murphy 1989:29). An 
announcement of the joint venturers' intention to proceed was delayed 
by royalties negotiations, however a compromise deal saw an agreement 
signed on 17 October 1988 between the Tasmanian Government, North 
Broken Hill and Noranda Inc. (Chapman 1992:50). 
43 In the late 1970s, Tasmania's forestry practices were described as a 'deplorable', 
'obscene', 'biological loss' by a Canadian economist advising the Lowe Government. They 
were, he advised, the world's most wasteful forestry operations (Bell & Sanders 1980:38). 
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The Wesley Vale proposal was for the joint venturers to build the 
world's largest bleached kraft pulpmill, costing $1 billion, on 16 hectares 
of prime farmland at rural Wesley Vale, in north-eastern Tasmania. The 
mill would consume two million tonnes of logs per annum, exacerbating 
unsustainable forestry practices and exerting enormous pressure upon 
National Estate areas such as the Great Western Tiers in the north, the 
Douglas Apsley on the east coast, and the disputed southern forests, as 
well as the unlisted north-eastern rainforests (Wayte 1988:6). It was 
estimated that eventually the pulp mill would consume one sixth of 
Tasmania's standing forests (Murphy 1989:28). The sheer size of the 
pulpmill's operations itself, with its 100 metre stack emitting 16.500 
million litres each day of a variety of toxic gases, raised problems of 
environmental pollution that eventually torpedoed the venture, yet 
eclipsed important, resource based aspects of the debate (Avieson 1989:12). 
The expected returns of $300 million to Australia's terms of trade 
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annually in both taxes and balance of payments credits, led state and 
federal governments to initially welcome the proposal. Return to the 
joint venturers was expected to be $150 million, an 18% yearly pre-tax 
return on their investment, with a $350 million construction windfall 
and $11 million annually in royalties going to Tasmania (Wayte 1988:6; 
Murphy 1989:28). 
The Wesley Vale dispute unfolded over five short, yet intense, months 
from the November 1988 passing of the State Government's Northern 
Pulp Mill (Agreement) Bill, to the Northern Pulp Mill (Doubts Removal) 
Bill in March 1989 (Chapman 1992:50). Concerned possibly by the early 
formation of CROPS, and conscious of the delay caused by Electrona 
opponents, Liberal Premier Gray ruled out appeals of the pulp mill to the 
Environmental Protection Appeals Board, and signalled his intention to 
finalise approval before Christmas 1988. In late November 1988, a week 
after the project had been unveiled, the joint venturers released an 
environmental impact statement, giving objectors four weeks to make 
public comments to be considered in state and federal approval processes. 
The scant information in the impact statement, and the unseemly haste 
with which the pulp mill proponents were moving towards approval of 
a major project, saw both the environmental impact statement and the 
State Liberal Government's fast-track decision making condemned by 
pulp mill opponents and primary industry groups, but particularly by the 
scientific community (Law 1988; USERP 1988). 
In addition to concerns of the pulpmill unsustainably consuming native 
forests, destroying prime agricultural farmland and failing to provide the 
expected jobs 'bonanza', CROPS and the Wilderness Society argued that 
the project would massively consume water resources, pour millions of 
tonnes of toxic effluent daily into Bass Strait, and pollute the atmosphere 
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with tonnes of carbon dioxide daily. 44 The Liberal Government's fast 
tracking of approval under its own environmental guidelines, CROPS 
claimed, blatantly amounted to the awarding of a 'licence to pollute' 
(Milne 1989). The United Scientists for Environmental Responsibility 
and Protection (USERP) 45 found the project proponent's environmental 
impact statement a poor, inadequate document, riddled with serious 
errors, misleading through omission and quite unable to guarantee an 
environmentally safe operation (USERP 1988). The impact statement 
was dismissed by Dr Mary O'Brien, a visiting US pesticides expert, as an 
exercise in the 'elimination of information and science'. Her charge 
against the joint venturers included the withholding of information on 
the effects of the pulpmill's chlorinated compounds or sediments on the 
agricultural and marine environment; the failure to present any known 
alternatives to the chlorinated process; and the further omission of any 
international studies on the environmental impacts of existing chlorine 
based pulp mills. Her summing up of the project was that it would leave 
Tasmania with outdated technology, pollute Bass Strait for decades to 
come, destroy marine life and local produce, and have as yet unknown 
effects on human health (USERP 1988). 
The United Scientists for Environmental Responsibility and Protection 
campaigned relentlessly on the inadequacies, errors, and omissions of the 
pulpmill's environmental impact statement, claiming that to 'fast-track 
this development is not only an insult to democracy, [but] a crime against 
humanity' (Murphy 1989:30). However, comments were also leaked 
44 Pulp mill opponents were particularly concerned over what they claimed would be 
the deadly dioxin emissions from the plant. Dioxin is a by-product of the chemical 
bleaching process, and the most toxic chemical known to science. Because there are no 
known safe levels of dioxin, which causes birth defects and cancer in humans, no dioxin 
emissions are considered acceptable in either the United States or Sweden (Wayte 1988:6). 
45 Murphy (1989:30) explains that 'USERP is a group of 60 expert Tasmanian scientists 
established in June 1988 in response to scientists disenchantment with the Helsham 
Inquiry into the future of Tasmania's forests. Eleven scientists who gave evidence believed 
that their expert opinions had been blatantly over-ruled by political considerations'. 
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from various government quarters that demonstrated similar concerns. 
The State Department of Environment's questions to the joint venturers 
resulted in a 140 page impact statement Addendum (Chapman 1992:50). 
This failed to satisfy USERP, which called for a minimum further twelve 
months study on tidal currents, atmospheric pollution and pollution 
dispersal, as well as an assessment of forest usage. By this stage, the 
climate of public concern over the environmental impact of the mill had 
increased commensurate with the public profile achieved by a diverse 
range of vocal opponents under the umbrella of CROPS. 46 
As the Government attempted to rush the development past these 
difficulties, its own Inland Fisheries Commission leaked a scathing 
critique of the proponents' environmental impact statement, calling its 
consideration of the project's potential impact upon the marine 
environment 'superficial, unsubstantiated, untested and unacceptable' 
(Murphy 1989:31). A leaked report from the State's Tasmanian 
Development Authority found the pulp mill proponent's impact 
statement falling 'short of a soundly based EIS for a project'. Amidst its 
many failings, the TDA report noted that the impact statement fails to 
review alternative pulp technologies, forest uses or forest stocks; and that 
it ignores both the impact of excessive water usage on the Mersey River 
flow, and the potential for toxic sludge waste to leach into ground water 
(Murphy 1989:31). Against contentious public scientific debate fuelled by 
the leaked government critiques, Premier Gray attempted to regain 
control of the public debate with his undertaking that the project would 
46 The unusual alliance of pulp mill opponents included CROPS, the Tasmanian 
Farmers and Graziers Association's local branch, the Tasmanian Abalone Divers 
Association, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Wilderness Society (Wayte 
1988:6). 
In March 1989, 68 Hobart doctors joined the anti-mill campaign by signing an open 
letter of concern over pollution from waste-water discharges, solid wastes and gaseous 
emissions (Mercury 3 March 1989). 
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only proceed on the basis of environmental guidelines that would give 
Tasmania the cleanest pulpmill in the world (Economou 1990:57). 
4.5.3 The Role of the State - federal intervention 
Chapman argues that in early 1989, the pulp mill project 'hung in the 
balance', with Premier Gray talking tough on not having environmental 
terms dictated to his government by the mill proponents (Chapman 
1992:34-35). This volte face, Economou (1990:57) notes, 'owed much to 
the ability of the CROPS campaign on the industrial pollution issue to 
counter regionally-based support for the mill'. Revised environmental 
guidelines were issued by the State on 5th January 1989, and although 
considered still inadequate by USERP, were generally seen as heading in 
the right direction by totally banning dioxin, reducing organo-chlorine 
waste, and requiring tertiary effluent treatment47 (Economou 1990:57). 
The mill proponents then called the government's 'environmental 
bluff, and threatened to withdraw their proposal completely. 
Initially, the State stood firm; however after a month of intense 
negotiations with the mill proponents, State Parliament was recalled on 
27 February, extraordinarily on North Broken Hill Holdings' letterhead, 
to sanction an environmental back down by passing the Northern Pulp 
Mill (Doubts Removal) Bill. This relaxed the original pulp mill 
guidelines, allowing dioxin discharge, twenty four hour gaseous 
emissions, and exemption from environmental regulation throughout 
the plant's commissioning period. The Bill passed into law on 8 March 
1989, and prompted street marches and rallies by the anti-mill lobby, with 
numbers up to 6,000 and with an intensity not seen in public since the 
47 These were issued after advice was received by the State Government on kraft mills 
such as proposed for Wesley Vale from the Swedish Environmental Protection Board 
(Mercury 16 March 1989). 
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days of the Franklin dispute (Mercury 16 March 1989; Chapman 1992:41; 
Kelly 1992:531). 
Despite Prime Minister Hawke initially welcoming the Wesley Vale 
proposal as a blueprint for down-stream processing in Australia, pulp 
mill opponents began their lobbying of federal politicians in early 1988 
with a certain amount of confidence given the damage, for example, that 
pulpmill effluents in Sweden and Canada had caused to local fisheries 
industries. In January 1989, Senator Richardson, Federal Minister for the 
Environment, met with USERP scientists to discuss his concerns over the 
lack of meteorological data and the impact of mill effluent. Subsequently, 
he described Premier Gray's back down as 'government by company', and 
added that all the best advice suggested caution on the project (Age 20 
February 1989; Mercury 16 March 1989). In March 1989, Federal Cabinet 
agreed to withhold Foreign Investment Review Board approval for the 
project pending further scientific reports on aquatic effluent disposal, and 
announced that the pulp mill would only go ahead subject to further 
base-line studies and enhanced environmental controls (Economou 
1992:464; McEachern 1990). On 16th March 1989, the proponents pulled 
out, dropping the pulp mill project completely (Mercury 17 March 1989). 
4.5.4 The Aftermath of Dispute 
Such was the resentment against the Gray Government and the support 
for the environmental cause after the Wesley Vale dispute that, on 13th 
May 1989, the Liberals were toppled from power. The results bore a direct 
relationship to the prominence of environmentalists in the pulp mill 
debate and the extraordinary failure of the State Labor Party to achieve 
any profile throughout the dispute. On the other hand, Christine Milne, 
Lance Armstrong, and Di Hollister joined Dr Bob Brown and Dr Gerry 
Bates as independent green parliamentarians. The Labor Party combined 
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its historically low numbers in the Lower House with the five green 
independents, to form the historic Labor-Green Accord Government. 
The Accord partners agreed to work together to create an innovative, 
open and responsive government, in contrast to Gray's bulldozing tactics. 
The Accord agreement additionally achieved the Douglas Apsley 
National Park gazettal, a halt to the Huon Forests Products proposed 
woodchip mill, the ruling out of a pulp mill at Wesley Vale, the pegging 
of the state export woodchip quota at 2,889,000 tonnes per annum, 
National Estate forest protection, further park gazettal and the effective 
doubling of the existing World Heritage area (Larmour 1990:60-3). 
However, the Accord was to prove a short-lived, bitter experience that 
failed over irreconcilable differences, specifically on the essentially 
contested forestry issue (Hay & Eckersley 1993). Ironically, Ray Groom 
toppled Gray as opposition leader, and took the Liberals back to electoral 
victory in 1992 on the promise of three pulp mills (Moore 1992). 
4.6 Conclusion - Ecopolitical Opportunities & Constraints 
In each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, the 
achievement of environmental demands was constrained, not only by 
traditional development policy, but by bi-partisan political support for the 
unrestrained exploitation of the state's natural resources. Only federal 
intervention, achieved by the campaigning efforts of conservationists in 
the Franklin dispute, and by a broad based coalition of public support in 
the Wesley Vale dispute, managed to thwart state development plans. In 
2.2.2, we saw that ecopolitics disrupts the linear model of the political 
universe by promoting non-material values, and cutting across the left-
right divide of traditional distributional politics. In Tasmania, ecopolitics 
has often left traditional political opponents united in their opposition to 
environment groups, as the Labor and Liberal parties were united on 
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Lake Pedder's inundation, for example. Only Premier Lowe, and his 
reformist supporters in the Labor Party, tried to ideologically distance 
themselves from resource exploitation by embracing conservation to 
preserve at least the lower reaches of the Franldin River. In the Electrona 
and Wesley Vale disputes, however, the Labor Party kept a low profile, 
siding with development forces in a return to bi-partisan politics, but 
opposing Premier Gray's fast-track decision making - even though, 
ironically, the same tactics had been used to flood Pedder by Labor 
Premier, Eric Reece. 
In 2.3.1, we saw that environmentalists face considerable difficulties in 
seeking to influence policy processes, specifically because of the obstacle of 
the growth based paradigm, its political structures and its ideologically 
sustained legitimacy. Premier Lowe's consultation prior to passing 
alternative legislation to the Hydro-Electric Commission's Gordon-
below-Franklin Bill was the sole attempt in any of the four disputes 
considered to consider conservationists as anything other than outsiders 
in the policy process. In the Pedder dispute, conservationists had been 
seen as meddlesome by Premier Reece. After their foray into state politics 
and their enlistment of nation-wide support, they were treated, in the 
subsequent Franklin dispute, as subversives by Liberal Premier Gray. 
Conservation was such an anathema to the Tasmanian development 
ethos, that the fight to save Pedder was also lost partly by the early 
conservationists who themselves hesitated to assert intrinsic wilderness 
values against the hydro-industrial imperative. Their 'last ditch' effort in 
forming the Lake Pedder Action Committee and the United Tasmanian 
Group, came twenty years behind hydro-industrial plans, and at least a 
decade too late to save Lake Pedder (see 4.2.1). 
207 
Power and En vironmenta I Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
The loss of Pedder had taught conservationists to become confident and 
indeed aggressive about flouting state development policy, but also to act 
pre-emptively - anticipating the HEC's own plans, and to treat state 
government assurances with the greatest of suspicion. The sophistication 
of the conservation movement's campaigning skills paid dividends in 
saving the Franklin, but saw the environmental cause vilified by the 
Gray Government as 'anti-Tasmanian' in the subsequent Electrona and 
Wesley Vale disputes. Gray saw constraint of the ecopolitical challenge to 
state development and industry privilege as requisite to the consolidation 
of his political power, and reflected this priority in the legislative 
approval and immunity provisions for both projects. Although Gray 
himself, as Davis (1993:122) observes, had reined in the hegemonic 
powers of the HEC, he was quite willingly held to ransom by the silicon 
smelter and pulp mill proponents. Community outrage at Gray's 
'government by company', and its rejection of development 'at-any-
ecological-cost' was manifest, after concerted campaigning by 
environmentalists, in its return of five green independents, and the 
ousting of the Liberal Government, at the May 1989 state election. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
VALUES, POWER & THE STATE IN TASMANIA 
5.1 Chapter Outline 
In 2.2.1, environmentalism was introduced as paradigmatically opposing 
dominant industrialism, and environmental demands as subversive and 
challenging to prevailing values, policy boundaries and capital interests. 
However, it is argued that paradigmatic analysis is overly simplistic, and, 
in 2.2.2, that environmentalism in fact comprises many difficult shades 
of green. Whilst Porritt (1984:4) describes these shades as the most to least 
opposed to industrialism, Eckersley (1992b:160) argues for an ecopolitical 
characterisation informed by the anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage. In 
3.4.1, we considered environmentalism in shades of 'light' to 'dark' 
green, with the deepest shade of green offering the greatest ecocentric 
challenge to dominant values, and most resistant to mainstream policy 
processes. It has been argued by Hay and Haward (1988:442) that 
environmentalism in Tasmania represents a deep green, ecocentric 
challenge to the wholesale destruction of Tasmania's remnant 
wilderness areas. In Chapter Four, we saw, in each of the Pedder, 
Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, the state development 
paradigm challenged by ecocentric demands that classically oppose 
prevailing values and policy boundaries. In Chapter Five, these disputes 
are reconsidered after Downey (1987:34) to explain the forces that have 
shaped policy - limiting the impact of environmentalists upon decision 
making, and influencing the state in its determination of policy 
outcomes. 
As argued in Chapter Three, analysis of the policy response to ecological 
demands must consider the ideological nature of environmental values 
and conflict, the potential for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy 
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to frustrate the realisation of ecopolitical demands, and the limited 
capacity of the state to distance itself from material goals and capital 
interests. In Chapter Four, we saw that hydro-industrialisation 
functioned, in Hall's (1992:91) and Downey's (1987:32) terms, as a 'policy 
paradigm', defining the limits and the legitimacy of state development 
policy in each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale 
disputes. Chapter Five recognises the need in policy analysis to stand 
back from the detail of such disputes in order to ask what Ham and Hill 
(1984:17) describe as 'some of the bigger questions' about the role of the 
state, and the distribution of power in contemporary society. The four 
disputes will be analysed below initially in terms of the clash between 
dominant and environmental values, then in terms of the power of 
prevailing interests to thwart ecopolitical goals, and finally, in terms of 
the role of the state in privileging industrial demands. This approach 
was determined, in 3.4.5, as a modification of Simeon's (1976:556) 
causality funnel, to examine both paradigmatic value conflict in 
environmental disputes, and power as the capacity in various 
dimensions to achieve a policy outcome. The utility of this approach is 
considered in Chapter Six, the conclusion of this thesis. 
5.2 The Clash of Irreconcilable Values 
5.2.1 Early History Behind Later Conflict 
It had only been a matter of time before attempts to overcome 
Tasmania's economic isolation and vulnerability, discussed in Chapter 
One, clashed with attempts to preserve its natural magnificence. The 
inevitability of conflict has partly been, Hay (1987:4) suggests, that the 
smallness of the island itself 'virtually ensures that any given interest in 
the land will conflict with another'. However, Robson (1985:140) has also 
argued that as early as the 1930s, the ground was being laid for 
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confrontation between the proponents of exploitation and preservation 
in the state. The early history behind recent disputes is crucial to 
understanding contemporary environmental policy formation in 
Tasmania and the irreconcilable clash of values in the Pedder, Franklin, 
Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes. A brief historical survey of trends in 
resource exploitation and preservation since the turn of the century 
reveals a long established pattern of public agitation for natural area 
preservation in Tasmania, as we shall see. This is of interest for 
revealing the pre-history of the conservation movement, and for 
showing that its preservationist forebears were inspired as much by 
anthropocentric utilitarian, as by ecocentric preservationist, concerns.' 
But it also shows that constraint upon natural area preservation matches 
the emergence of hydro-industrialisation, which was championed by the 
Ogilvie Labor Government from the early 1930s as the centrepiece of his 
post-depression program of reconstruction. Successive Labor Premiers 
then expanded the program of hydro-industrialisation and the powers of 
the Hydro-Electric Commission, whilst reservations dwindled until the 
1960s, when the Lake Pedder dispute saw conservation explode politically 
for the first time in Tasmania onto the agenda of public concern. 
Lake (1974) finds three periods of natural area preservation. From 1890 to 
1940, 324,000 ha of reserves were created in a distinctly preservationist 
period (including 64,000 ha for the Cradle Mountain Scenic Reserve and 
Wildlife Sanctuary 2). From 1941 to 1955 a more constrained period 
ensued in which only 28,000 ha was reserved (primarily the Lake Pedder 
reservation, subsequently re-declared National Park). The period from 
1955 to 1967 saw dwindling reservation totalling a mere 9,300 ha, and 
1 Robson discusses 'tum of the century' preservationists, and finds that they were 
inspired not just by Tasmania's spectacular landscape, but by concerns to protect endemic 
fauna, to promote the tourism industry, and the concept of 'healthy educational holidays', 
and to overcome Tasmania's image as a disease ridden penal colony (Robson 1990b:283). 
2 Declared Cradle Mountain-Lake St. Clair National Park in 1922 (Thompson 1981:60). 
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reflected pressure against conservation from the state's expanding 
program of hydro-industrialisation (Lake 1974:435-436). There is a direct 
correlation between each of these periods and the state political 
leadership of the time. In the early preservationist period, state political 
leadership was relatively unstable, the Labor party emerging and holding 
power only briefly in 1909, and again from 1914 to 1916, and the new 
Liberal Party already 'in a state of transition' (Townsley 1976:43). On the 
other hand, preservationist sentiment was strongly championed by the 
organisations3 that emerged and lobbied successfully in these years, for 
example in achieving the declaration, in 1916, of Tasmania's first 
national parks, Freycinet Peninsula on the East Coast, and Mt Field, in 
the South West wilderness (Thompson 1981:60-61). 
Successive Labor Premiers then consolidated their grip on state political 
power, beginning in the 1930s with Ogilvie's reconstruction program of 
'public works, industrial and rural developments, roads, education, 
health services and, above all, hydro-electric expansion' (Townsley 
1976:42-43). The success of this infrastructure program by Ogilvie and 
Cosgrove, his successor, was seen in the drop in unemployment, between 
1933 and 1954, from 13.6 to 1.3 per cent, an achievement that outstripped 
all expectations of post-war recovery (Lowe 1984:14). The beginning of 
this period was marked, in 1932, by the first skirmish between 
conservation and hydro-industrialisation when the newly established 
Hydro-Electric Commission dammed Lake St. Clair in the Cradle 
Mountain National Park, flooding the 'charming' Frankland beaches on 
the shores of the natural central highlands lake to the outcry of local 
bushwalkers. The justification was the 1000 jobs that the dam 
construction would create (Southwell 1983:14; Robson 1990b:429). The 
3 The Tasmanian Tourist Association (founded in 1893), the Tasmanian Field Naturalist 
Club (1904), the National Parks Association (1913), the Southwestern Expeditionary Club 
(1924) and the Hobart Walking Club (1929) (Lake 1974:435-436; Thompson 1981:61). 
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hegemonic powers of the HEC had their genesis in these early years of 
state development, with 1944 legislation giving the HEC autonomy as a 
statutory authority answerable directly to State Parliament. Hydro-
development of the central highlands throughout the 1940s was followed 
by the HEC's preliminary assessment of 'the hydro-electric potential of 
the west and south-west rivers', that was discussed in State Parliament in 
1950. Following power shortages in the early 1950s, this period of 
constrained natural areas reservation concluded with the 1954 Industrial 
Development Act, further expanding the powers of the HEC, including 
its powers of land acquisition (Lowe 1984:8). 
From the late 1950s to 1967, a period of dwindling reservation coincided 
with the transition from Cosgrove, upon his retirement after nineteen 
years as Labor Premier, to the reign of Eric Reece. Reece was to achieve 
political supremacy, in the tradition of State Labor leaders, by vigorously 
pursuing hydro-industrialisation and industrial investment in 
Tasmania, and by offering strong autocratic rule 'in his self styled role as 
political boss' (Lowe 1984; Townsley 1976). Reece's achievements were 
seen by Lowe as his enhanced control, via Cabinet, of the Parliamentary 
Labor Party, and his successful inducement of expansion programs from 
the major bulk consumers of hydro-electric power (Lowe 1984:20). 
Reece's loss of power from 1969 to 1972 fuelled his resolve to thwart the 
efforts of the fledgling conservation movement to save Lake Pedder from 
hydro-inundation. Reece was, in Hay's (1986b:21) terms, a 'purveyor of 
hydro-ideology', who sold 'a vision of industrial greatness underwritten 
by cheap and abundant hydro power' until he retired in 1975. His decades 
of virtually unbroken power were distinguished by his announcement, 
extension4 and inundation of the Lake Pedder National Park. 
4 This was subsumed by the 1968 declaration of the South West National Park. 
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5.2.2 Value Clash From Pedder to Wesley Vale 
In 1967, ecopolitical conflict erupted in Tasmania, as we saw in 4.2.2, with 
the tabling by the Hydro-Electric Commission in State Parliament of its 
plans to flood Lake Pedder. Having exhausted the hydro-potential of all 
but the state's south-western rivers and catchment areas, the technocratic, 
utilitarian practice of hydro-industrialisation directly threatened, for the 
first time, the beauty, amenity and biological diversity of the state's vast 
undeveloped wilderness. In asserting the intrinsic value of Lake Pedder 
against its utilitarian value to the Hydro-Electric Commission and State 
Government, the early Pedder campaigners fell classically into Cotgrove's 
alternative environmental paradigm discussed in 2.2.1. Opposing them 
were predominantly men like Reece, bewildered, as Kiernan says, by the 
growing wave of public feeling for the environment, and for whom the 
notion 'that aesthetic considerations should halt a dam were anathema 
to one who had struggled through the Great Depression' (Kiernan 
1990:30-31). Equally, there were the senior bureaucrats within the HEC 
itself, to whom the valuing of wilderness for 'recreational, aesthetic, 
spiritual or even scientific reasons', Southwell (1983:18) notes, was seen 
as 'frivolous, preposterous or illusory'. Indeed, the HEC's senior 
engineers, who 'had at their disposal the ability to wall off and flood 
entire valleys, divert the age old course of rivers and send them through 
mountains of solid rock', saw the South West as their 'private domain' 
(Southwell 1983:66). 
It is clear that conservationists, as the ideological opponents of resource 
exploitation in the Pedder dispute, 'raided', in Cotgrove's (1982:88) terms, 
their cultural repertoire of beliefs and values to justify their actions and 
to gain support for their cause. But it is less clear, following a review of 
the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes in Chapter 
Four, that paradigmatic analysis in general accurately captures the 
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complexity of environmentalism in Tasmania. 	A range of 
environmental positions can be seen, particularly in the Pedder dispute, 
during which the early conservationists were certainly more politically 
timid than the later Lake Pedder Action Committee. In Porritt's (1984:4- 
5) terms, conservationists who would not oppose state power, but looked 
to common sense to prevail in policy making, were traditionalists afraid 
to oppose industrialism, but hoping to rescue Pedder from its worst 
excesses. Again in Porritt's terms, such conservationists tended not to be 
green. But the campaigners whose activism as the Lake Pedder Action 
Committee led to electoralism as a green political party, on the other 
hand, fit Porritt's radical libertarian environmentalists who do reject 
industrialism, and as such generally seek a 'greener' world order. 5 
Conflict was inevitable in the Pedder dispute between the irreconcilable 
views of wilderness as a utilitarian resource, on the one hand, and as a 
natural paradise, on the other. The aesthetic valuing of wilderness had 
proved to be such an alien concept to state decision makers, that Franklin 
campaigners argued to save the river as much on economic grounds, as 
on grounds of intrinsic worth (in 4.3.1). Lohrey (1990:97) notes that this 
broadened the electoral support for the environmentalists, which it did 
federally, as many voters saw the dam as economically unjustifiable. 
However, it does not account, as Kellow (1989:145) observes, for the 
sweeping to power of the fiercely parochial, pro-dam Gray Liberal 
Government in the 1982 state election. The visual dialogue conveying 
the beauty of a wild river was as much resented by the majority of 
Tasmanians in the Franklin dispute as were the conservationists' 
utilitarian arguments. Smelter opponents bore the brunt of this 
5 The United Tasmania Group (1990:34-6) adopted a 'new ethic' in pursuit of social and 
cultural change, aimed at transforming institutions to broaden decision making, preventing 
human alienation, and creating communities based upon equality, freedom, and peaceful 
evolution living in harmony with Tasmania's natural landscape and its living resources. 
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resentment, as their planning, community health and environmental 
concerns were labelled 'anti-Tasmanian' by Gray in the Electrona dispute. 
The resentment was fuelled by conservationists' calls for native forest 
preservation, a fact that was eclipsed in the Wesley Vale dispute by Gray's 
incompetence in setting environmental guidelines and by his draconian 
approach to decision making. 
5.3 The Power of Prevailing Interests 
5.3.1 Explaining Ideological Constraint 
In Chapter Two, it is argued that the ecopolitical challenge to established 
political order faces the constraining influence of industrialism. In 2.2.1, 
we saw that the ecological paradigm is defined by ideological opposition 
to the dominant perceptions of ecology, polity, nature, knowledge and 
industrial society. In 2.3.1, it is suggested that this opposition remains a 
significant obstacle to the realisation of environmental policy demands. 
In the event of a dispute between opposing value imperatives, such as we 
classically see in Tasmania, Cotgrove (1982) suggests that we could expect 
to see a routine favouring of the dominant ideology (discussed in 2.3.1, fn 
26). Certainly, in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale 
disputes, we have seen a mobilisation of bias toward the imperatives of 
industrial development within the state. Hydro-industrialisation and its 
industrial legacies have imprisoned state development in Tasmania, just 
as Lindblom (1982:333) argues that the market imprisons policy generally 
and frustrates social change. Conflict was fuelled by the state's treatment, 
in the disputes considered, of environmental concern as illegitimate and 
subversive, and by the dominant political view of ecology as an irrational 
distraction from mainstream policy objectives. Only federal intervention 
thwarted state priorities in the Franklin and Wesley Vale conflicts, 
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legitimising in state political parlance, otherwise 'anti-Tasmanian' 
environmental concerns. 
In 2.3.6, the industrial imperative is seen to constrain environmentalism 
by frustrating the legitimation of ecological integrity as a policy concern 
within orthodox politics. In the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley 
Vale disputes, there was a frustration by traditional bi-partisan political 
influences6 within the state of motivating ecocentric concerns, and of the 
economic arguments constructed to justify them. Conservationists in the 
Pedder and Franklin disputes then pitched both sets of arguments at the 
national government, achieving a decisive outcome only in the latter 
case, however, gaining the benefit of experience in the former. As we 
saw in 4.3.1, conservationists learned from the loss of Pedder to argue 
against the Franklin's inundation on economic grounds that were 
strategically interwoven with visual marketing of the river's intrinsic 
worth. The 'world heritage' argument was subsequently championed by 
the federal government, and upheld in the High Court, however the 
economic arguments failed to redirect Tasmania's industrial agenda. 
Franklin campaigners had resumed the United Tasmania Group's 
argument that hydro-development was failing to prove the economic 
panacea that it had been in the post-depression, post-war years. However, 
the federal government's compensation package for the state following 
the Franklin High Court decision affirmed hydro-policy by including $180 
million to dam the Henty-Anthony alpine catchment, to the west of the 
Cradle Mountain Lake St. Clair National Park (Southwell 1983:64). The 
consequences of the failed conservationist bid to redirect the state's 
hydro-industrial agenda in the short term were both the Electrona and 
6 Labor Premier Lowe's failed, reformist attempt to seek a compromise in the Franklin 
dispute discussed in 4.3.2, was a move towards legitimising ecocentric concerns, though 
itself thwarted by the traditional, bi-partisan development lobby. 
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Wesley Vale disputes. In the longer term, persistence in pursuing an 
alternate economic direction for the state, and the bi-partisan political 
resistance it has provoked, has seen the conservation movement spawn a 
green political party that, in 1989, achieved the United Tasmania Group's 
vision of holding the balance of state political power. 
As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter Four, we can identify two 
clear 'development' periods pre and post the 1983 Franklin victory. In 
the Pedder and Franklin disputes, conservationists fought the direct 
impact of hydro-industrialisation on the state's wilderness. In the later 
Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, environmentalists and concerned 
citizens opposed the regional industrial impact of the state's hydro-
development agenda. In the pre-1983 period, the challenge to state 
orthodoxy, and to legitimacy defined in terms of dominant growth based 
values, was clearly ecocentric. In the post -1983 disputes, the challenge to 
development was primarily on amenity grounds and the state's assertion 
of economic over regional concerns. Linking the four disputes was the 
assertion of intrinsic natural values and the importance of place against 
dominant industrial imperatives that invariably provoked routine state 
political constraint. Paradigmatic analysis indicates that ecocentric values 
and environmental imperatives triumphed respectively in the Franklin 
and Wesley Vale disputes after the lessons learned by conservationists 
and environmentalists by the losses in the Pedder and Electrona conflict. 
But it is necessary to look beyond paradigmatic analysis to overt, covert 
and latent policy influences, and the role of the state in determining the 
outcome of conflict, to consider whether the broadening of support for 
environmentalism in the Franklin and Wesley Vale instances equates to 
the legitimation of ecopolitical demands. 
t i 
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5.3.2 Overt, Covert & Latent Policy Influences 
The overt political arena has been the most accessible to the opponents of 
both hydro-industrialisation and the legacies of industrial development. 
As we saw in 3.3.2, however, the limitation of the pluralist policy focus 
upon overt political achievements is that it fails to explain ideological 
exclusion, symbolic decision making and the distortion of contentious 
ecocentric discourse by dominant policy processes. Nevertheless, the 
essentially pluralist accounts of the Lake Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and 
Wesley Vale conflicts in 4.2.2, 4.3.2, 4.4.2 and 4.5.2 each provide valuable, 
initial explanations of what is apparent in the disputes, such as the public 
behaviour of the various stakeholders. From the pluralist perspective, 
the loss of the Pedder and Electrona disputes could be attributed purely to 
timing. Campaigning by conservationists and silicon smelter opponents 
in these disputes was indeed reactive, with the state government well 
ahead of any opposition with its development plans. The tactics of the 
Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp mill opponents were not only more 
proactive, in thwarting state plans before their finalisation, but also more 
determinedly so. However, whilst there is no doubt that the pluralist 
political arena has been the key to the evolution of green political power 
in Tasmania, it is also an arena to which development proponents like to 
keep their opponents confined - entering themselves only as a last resort. 
Conservationists encountered the influence of the covert political arena 
in their early attempts to save Lake Pedder. Political power in the covert 
arena need not, as 3.3.2 notes, be seen to be exercised; indeed inactivity by 
covertly influential stakeholders is often the key to their securing a policy 
outcome. Conservationists dubbed the stakeholders behind hydro-policy 
the 'cabal', claiming that, irrespective of whether the Labor or the Liberal 
Parties held power, the state 'was effectively ruled by a small but 
powerful clique of politicians, union bosses, industrialists and certain 
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press barons with a common interest in protecting the hydro-industrial 
complex' (Southwell 1983:17). Whilst Tasmanian state governments 
have always fronted for the interests of the 'cabal', one of the great 
achievements of conservationists and development opponents has been 
to provoke 'cabal' members into publicly retaliating after being attacked. 
The unmasked political influence of the Hydro-Electric Commission was 
subsequently rendered publicly accountable and eventually reined in, by 
the Gray Government, ending its era as the de facto state developer 
sustained by its 'cabal' protectors. The Electrona and Wesley Vale 
conflicts saw a similar confrontation and calling to account of major 
corporate consumers of hydro-power, exposing, as we saw in the 
conclusion to Chapter Four, 'government by corporation' in the latter 
dispute. However, there is no evidence that the corporate hold over the 
state has been diminished by the Wesley Vale victory, since the 
subsidised pulping of Tasmania's native forests remains a key plank of 
the bi-partisan political agenda. 
As Lukes (1974; in 3.3.3) explains, the pluralist view of the overt political 
arena is one-dimensional, beyond which the two-dimensional view adds 
the second, covert face of power by exploring influences that limit access 
to decision making arenas. Lukes' three-dimensional view, as we have 
seen, considers the means by which the mobilisation of bias may prevent 
the realisation of demands. For our purposes, the one-dimensional view 
reveals what is observable in ecopolitical conflict, the two-dimensional 
view suggests how dominant material interests are sustained, and the 
three-dimensional view explains why bias mobilises against ecopolitical 
demands. Taking three-dimensional analysis further as Gaventa 
(1980:15; in 3.3.5) does, returns this discussion to its preoccupation with 
explaining ideological constraint and the legitimation of industrial 
imperatives in Tasmania. We could then follow Clegg's (1989:16) 
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suggestion of regarding ideological hegemony as discursive practice that 
forecloses the possibility, discussed in 2.3.3, of the realisation of 
ecopolitical goals in a determinate way. To the detail of overt political 
conflict, and covert influence in the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and 
Wesley Vale disputes, three-dimensional analysis adds latent influence, 
whereby hydro-policy is seen as an indirect mechanism of constraint, 
promoting an ideology of popular loyalty, shaped by the media, and 
defended from challenge by the invocation of symbolic rhetoric - such as 
the labelling of environmentalists and the opponents of state projects as 
'greenies' and 'anti-Tasmanians'. 
5.4 The Politics of Underwriting Industry 
5.4.1 From Pedder to the Franklin Dispute - hydro-industrial hegemony 
In Chapter One, we saw that Tasmania's 'hydro-response' to its enduring 
economic problems swiftly developed into an hegemonic ideology, with 
the advocacy and bi-partisan support of pragmatic politics and entrenched 
administrators. Hay observes that in the absence of any political doctrine, 
the 'deep-rooted ideology' of hydro-industrialisation went unchallenged 
for many decades 'as the central unquestionable plank in what passed in 
Tasmania for political thought', rendering 'oddly irrelevant' traditional 
Left/Right divides (Hay 1987:4; discussed in 1.4.3). Hydro-vision was the 
key to thirty-five years of unbroken rule by the Labor Party, from 1934 to 
1969, under its Premiers Ogilvie, Cosgrove and Reece. It was the key to 
Premier Reece's return to power from 1972 to 1975, and to the 1982 
election of the Gray Liberal Government. Hydro-industrialisation was 
hegemonic in the sense that it sustained Labor's hold on state political 
power, until the Franklin dispute, and in the sense that state industrial 
development was controlled by the de facto planning powers of the 
Hydro-Electric Commission. For the decades that the hydro-political 
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formula had remained in place, Labor had been, in Hay's (1986b:21) 
terms, 'electorally unassailable'. It was usurped by Premier Gray in 1982, 
casting Labor into the political wilderness, as the conservation 
movement seized the role of de facto opposition on state industrial 
development. 
The Pedder and Franldin disputes unmasked the politics of underwriting 
industry, revealing the hydro-industrial key to the consolidation of state 
political power. These hydro-industrial conflicts illustrate the limits to 
state action, noted in 2.4.1, whereby ecopolitical demands are constrained 
to the extent of their conflict with established political goals. The early 
conservationists initially turned to the state government in the Pedder 
dispute anxiously hoping for it to respond impartially to their ecological 
demands. However, their scepticism about the state's impartiality was 
heightened, firstly by its failure to perceive intrinsic value in its own 
Lake Pedder National Park, and then by its exclusion of conservationists 
from the decision making process. Following the inundation of Lake 
Pedder, conservationists had virtually no faith left in the ability of the 
state government to fulfil any role other than as an entrepreneur and 
developer of Tasmania's natural resources. Franklin campaigners 
anticipated not only that their efforts would be treated by the state 
government as subversive, but also that they would be resisted and 
constrained by the influence of the greater 'cabal' of hydro-industrial 
proponents discussed in 5.3.2. 
Once the expansionary trend of hydro-industrialisation intruded into the 
South West, the state had shifted its reliance upon economic growth 
more firmly onto the depletion of the state's ecological capital. This 
caused a crisis of legitimation, or a loss of faith by conservationists in the 
actions of the state, that served as the catalyst for the formation of the 
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United Tasmania Group (in 4.2.2). In the terms considered in Chapter 
Two, Tasmanian state governments have proven (in each of the disputes 
considered) unable to act autonomously in responding to ideologically 
challenging ecocentric imperatives. Here it is useful to apply the 'dual 
state' thesis (Blowers 1984:227 & 3.3.4 fn 27) whereby the state 
government can be seen to have assumed the primary role of capital 
accumulator, leaving the federal government to assume the role of 
ecological protector, redistributing the benefits of capital in order to 
preserve wilderness as world heritage. In 2.4.5, it is established that 
whilst economic imperatives routinely thwart the realisation of 
ecocentric demands, an enhanced democratic state is considered by 
various authors to be well suited to checking the influences of 
unrestrained economic growth. The Lake Pedder dispute saw Labor 
Prime Minister Whitlam unwilling to intervene in the environmental 
affairs of his state Labor Party counterpart, Premier Eric Reece. Yet the 
Franklin dispute saw Labor Prime Minister Hawke willing to intervene 
in the affairs of his state Liberal counterpart, Premier Robin Gray. An 
enhanced democratic state may well have ensured that party politics 
played no part in the resolution of these critical environmental disputes. 
5.4.2 From Electrona to Wesley Vale - consolidating political power 
Chapter Four finds that Tasmanian ecopolitics has often seen traditional 
political opponents united in their opposition to environmentalism. 
Hay (1986:21) observes that the transference of the 'role of standard-bearer 
of hydro-ideology' simply shifted from the State Labor to the Liberal Party 
with the 1982 election of the Gray Government. The Liberals had seen 
'hydro-electoral' dividends falling to their political opponents for 
decades, yet had mounted only feeble attacks on hydro-policy or the 
operations of the HEC. Liberal Premier Bethune won office from Eric 
Reece in 1969, pledging no delays to hydro-projects. His short-lived 
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government subsequently failed to pursue alternate energy sources or to 
challenge the autonomy of the HEC in its short period of office/ and the 
Liberal Party subsequently backed hydro-policy strongly throughout the 
Lake Pedder and Franklin crises (Lowe 1984; Bates 1983:14; Tighe 
1992:131). Once conservationists had propelled hydro-development into 
the public spotlight, the critique of state development policy was usurped 
from the party political domain, henceforth to be vilified as a 'green' 
issue of the 'anti-Tasmanian' variety. Just as hydro-industrialisation was 
supported by the State Liberal Opposition during the Pedder and Franklin 
disputes, so the accommodation of industry at Electrona and Wesley Vale 
was supported by the Labor Opposition against opponents of the projects. 
Bi-partisan bonding of political opponents against Tasmania's 'greening' 
deepens Hay's observation of the odd irrelevance of old political divides, 
casting ecopolitics as the new adversary common to traditional state 
political rivals. 
The post-Franklin policy environment was very much one of facilitating 
the establishment of major industries, lending, as we saw in 4.4.1, an air 
of inevitability to the approval of the Electrona silicon smelter. In terms 
of discussion in 3.3.6, the actions of the Gray Liberal Government were 
distinctly corporatist, directly facilitating corporate activity whilst trying 
to neutralise the activities of environmentalists. As mentioned, Premier 
Gray modelled himself upon Labor Premier Eric Reece retaining, in Hay's 
(1986:22) terms, the technocratic, anti-democratic execution of industrial 
policy that had sustained the era of hydro-industrial political power. His 
period in power lasted from 1982 to 1989. In terms of ecopolitical issues, 
Gray rode to power on the back of 'pro-dam' sentiment, with the early 
7 Until the late 1960s, the Liberal Opposition had openly criticised, as indeed had ALP 
backbenchers, incessantly rising power prices, bulk deals secretly awarded to big business 
relocating in Tasmania, the government's failure to pursue alternate power sources, and 
the ethics of HEC advertising to promote public electricity consumption (Lowe 1984:19-23). 
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years of his government then dominated by planning conflicts and the 
Electrona silicon smelter dispute. His electoral mandate was renewed at 
the 1986 state election, despite his heavy handed tactics of securing 
legislative approval in the smelter dispute. The early years of Gray's 
second term were dominated by forestry protest and the Helsham 
Inquiry, and the final years by Wesley Vale, over which he resoundingly 
lost government. 8 
Although cheated by the Franklin victory of the routine hydro-industrial 
vehicle to consolidating his newly-won political power, Gray emphasised 
the industrial side of the hydro-industrial equation, extending to industry 
and prospective industry traditional state privileges, the details of which, 
in time honoured Tasmanian political practice, remained confidentia1. 8 
Whilst development policy slipped from the autonomous control of the 
Hydro-Electric Commission, falling to some extent into the hands of the 
newly formed Tasmanian Development Authority, basically it returned 
to the political arena with Premier Gray as sovereign leader (in 4.4.4). 
The politics of underwriting industry had long been a covert exercise in 
Tasmania, facilitated by cheap hydro-power and operating with implicit 
bi-partisan political support. In the post-Franklin political era, Gray 
pursued the 'development-at-any-cost' route to consolidating his 
political power, confirming corporate privilege, in the best 'hydro-
tradition', with his efforts to accommodate industry at Electrona and 
Wesley Vale. 
5.5 Conclusion - Power & Policy Analysis in Tasmania 
8 Detailed in 4.4.1 e.r 4.5.1, the policy contexts of the Electrona and Wesley Vale 
disputes. 
9 Hydro-industrialisation did not cease with federal intervention backed by the High 
Court decision to save the Franklin. Just after the decision, Premier Gray announced that 
the Henty-Anthony and King River hydro schemes, initially planned as post Franklin 
schemes, were to be brought on line immediately, and suggested that Parliamentary 
approval may be circumvented if necessary to minimise delay (Bates 1983:16; see 4.4.1). 
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Chapter Five has discussed ideological, political and institutional forces 
that have shaped policy and limited the efficacy of environmental 
demands in the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes in 
Tasmania. Chapter Four considered these in terms of the policy context 
from which they arose, the details of the disputes, the role of the state and 
federal governments in conflict resolution, and the aftermath of dispute. 
Chapter Five places these considerations within their broader ideological, 
political and institutional contexts, achieving the pragmatic holism that 
Walker (1992:14; see 3.2.1) advocates in environmental policy analysis, 
and identifying the constraining influence of the hydro-industrial 'policy 
paradigm' upon environmental decisions in Tasmania. It finds the 
demands of conservationists in the Pedder and Franklin disputes, and of 
development opponents and environmentalists in the Electrona and 
Wesley Vale disputes, linked by the assertion of intrinsic ecocentric value 
against exploitative state hydro-industrial and industrial imperatives. It 
establishes the political influence of prevailing interests in routinely 
excluding ecopolitical opponents of state projects from the policy process, 
and in thwarting the legitimisation of ecocentric concerns and values. It 
concludes that the Tasmanian hydro-industrial tradition of underwriting 
industry ultimately prevailed in the state, to secure bi-partisan political 
support for each of the four development projects in dispute. 
Ironically, the ideological, political and institutional constraints upon the 
realisation of environmental demands also explain the evolution and 
electoral success of Tasmania's green political movement. As Flanagan 
explains, the Liberal and Labor parties have scrambled to power on a 
common development doctrine - their common efforts being to thwart 
'the green alternative of a future based upon environmental protection 
and an end to resource depletion' (Flanagan 1990:198). As we have seen 
in the disputes studied, the electoral impact of this has been to see Dr Bob 
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Brown take a seat in State Parliament during the Franklin dispute, Dr 
Gerry Bates gain a seat after representing the residents in the Electrona 
smelter dispute, and Christine Milne, Di Hollister and Lance Armstrong 
gain seats after campaigning against the Wesley Vale pulp mill. 10 
Constraint upon ecopolitical values in these disputes has directly resulted 
in a greening of the state parliamentary arena that is testimony to the 
persistence of bi-partisan political resistance to environmental demands. 
Chapter Five has shown, in the disputes studied, both the extraordinary 
resistance by dominant political interests in Tasmania to environmental 
demands, and the extraordinary determination of environmentalists to 
achieve their goals despite constraint. Ecopolitical demands contradicted 
traditional hydro-industrial and industrial objectives in the disputes, and 
provoked the ire of powerful development interests championed by 
successive state leaders. The Lake Pedder and Electrona outcomes were 
forerunner losses for conservationists and development opponents to 
their victories in halting both the Franklin dam and the Wesley Vale 
pulp mill. Whilst the Pedder and Electrona outcomes reveal the ability 
of industrial interests to evoke bi-partisan political support in resisting 
the ecocentric challenge, the Franklin and Wesley Vale victories 
demonstrate that strategic, activist campaigning can overcome the 
limited efficacy of environmental demands within the state policy arena. 
In conclusion, by examining the background to these disputes, Chapter 
Five confirms the ideological character of the environmental challenge 
in Tasmania, the potential for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy 
to frustrate the realisation of ecopolitical demands, and the role the state 
has assumed of affirming and accommodating industrial development. 
10 Dr Brown replaced Democrat Dr Norm Sanders (when Sanders stood down in his 
successful bid for the Federal Senate) - see fn 27 in 4.3.4. Peg Putt (another active 
campaigner during the Wesley Vale dispute against the Huon pulp mill, and subsequent 
Director of the Tasmanian Conservation Trust) recently replaced a retiring Dr Brown, 
having also been his 'running mate' (see Ch. One fn 3, & Ch. Four discussion). 
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CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Chapter Outline 
The conclusions of this thesis are considered in three sections: the efficacy 
of environmental demands; the value of a broad contextual approach to 
environmental policy analysis; and reflections upon the future 'greening' 
of Tasmania. Chapter Six returns to the argument of this thesis that the 
realisation of ecopolitical values, interests and demands is inevitably 
constrained by material interests (in Chapter One). The Tasmanian policy 
environment, as we have seen, has affirmed the goals of industrial 
development when faced with ecopolitical challenge. The Tasmanian 
studies confirm the ideologically constraining influence of the dominant 
industrial paradigm upon the realisation of ecopolitical demands 
discussed in Chapter Two. Successive Premiers have employed a range of 
measures to thwart the legitimation of environmental values, and 
exclude their ecocentric opponents from the policy process. From the 
Pedder to the Wesley Vale disputes, constraint of ecopolitical demands 
was considered requisite to the retention and consolidation of state 
political power in Tasmania. Only appeal beyond the state by 
development opponents achieved sufficient legitimation of ecocentric 
concerns to halt the Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp mill by 
triggering federal intervention. 
Chapter Six also discusses the utility of the framework of analysis adopted 
to consider the efficacy of environmental demands in Tasmania, before 
concluding with a review of the entrenched antipathy between 'greenies' 
and 'growthists' in Tasmania (Kirkpatrick 1986:312). As noted in Chapter 
Three, the analytic approach adopted is concerned to establish the ability 
of environmentalists to achieve their demands in circumstances of policy 
constraint. The outcomes of the disputes must then be discussed in their 
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broader context, i.e. with the understanding that state action and response 
to ecopolitical demands in the disputes studied was prescribed by hydro-
industrial and industrial imperatives. The framework required is one 
that explains forces that limit and forces that extend the range of policy 
alternatives. These forces are determined to be the nature of the values 
in conflict, the power of prevailing interests, and the capacity of the state 
to act as an impartial mediator in the event of environmental dispute. 
6.2 The Efficacy of Environmental Demands 
The argument of this thesis that environmental demands are subject to 
the routine constraint of prevailing values relies upon the conception of 
these demands as ideologically contentious, not as single issues struggling 
in a pluralistic way for attention in the policy arena. Chapter Two finds 
that rather than 'jostling' as single issues, environmental demands 
reflect a range of 'light' to 'dark' green concerns, with the deepest green 
offering the greatest challenge to dominant values, most routinely 
resisted by the state. This hierarchy of concerns then defines the 
ideological territory between the paradigmatically opposing dominant 
material and alternate environmental worldviews described by Cotgrove 
(1982:27; in 2.2.1). The case for environmentalism as single issue politics 
is dismissed in Chapter Two for its failure to appreciate the ecological 
worldview as an ideological reference point in all manner of light to dark 
green ecopolitical disputes. As Satterfield (1983:138) explains, 
environmentalism is preoccupied with historical, existential, 
destinational and ethical concerns that an ideology will inevitably seek to 
address (in 2.2.3). The case for environmentalism as single issue politics 
is flawed, Hay (1993:8) argues, for failing to observe environmentalism as 
'a competitor not with other issues, but with the other great ideological 
systems' (in 2.2.4 fn 18). 
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The persistence of ecological concerns and the evolution of the politics of 
ecology into contemporary green political movements, if the Tasmanian 
experience is to serve as any guide, may have more to do with constraints 
upon the realisation of environmental demands than their incorporation 
into mainstream policy processes. As Porritt (1984:4-5) explains, radical 
libertarian environmentalists, or, in Eckersley's (1992b:159) terms, deep 
green ecocentric emancipists, reject industrialism, bureaucracy, hierarchy 
and technological fixes to environmental crises (discussed in 2.2.2 & 2.2.3). 
The powerful interests that sustain industrial, bureaucratic, hierarchical 
and technological dominance then present a significant obstacle to the 
realisation of radical libertarian, or deep green, emancipatory, demands. 
In these terms, this thesis argues that the struggle for the realisation of 
environmental goals of the deep green variety is not a pluralistic jostling 
as some may claim, but a struggle for legitimisation that seeks to revise 
power relations between prevailing economic and contending ecocentric 
concerns. Chapter Two proposes a critique of environmentalism that 
pursues, in Cotgrove and Duff's terms, the dominant paradigm's ability 
to systematically repress the articulation of the ecocentric viewpoint 
(Cotgrove & Duff 1980:345). 
As the Tasmanian studies clearly show, environmentalists may achieve 
key victories without these necessarily legitimising their core concerns, 
which in itself illustrates repression of the alternate ecological paradigm. 
The process of achieving legitimacy, as Solesbury (1976:388; in 2.2.6) 
claims, involves the generalisation of an issue 'beyond a particular 
instance'. If the issue attracts political support through association with 
wider values sufficient to prompt a policy response, it may be seen as 
legitimised. The gaining of legitimacy then stimulates the evolution of 
new values. As we saw in Chapter Four, ecopolitical conflict in Tasmania 
has not prompted the legitimisation of environmental concerns within 
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the state. Instead it has prompted a plethora of anti-democratic 
legislative, policy exclusion and rhetorical tactics constraining 
conservationists, environmentalists and, in general, all opponents of 
state sponsored development projects. The practice of ecopolitics in 
Tasmania cannot, this thesis therefore concludes, be understood without 
appreciating the hegemonic nature of hydro-industrial ideology and its 
legacies in policy practice. The power of industrialism to constrain the 
realisation of environmental goals by mobilising bias against non-market 
interests is well documented by various case studies (in 2.3.2). It is the use 
of such mechanisms that protect market interests, imprison policy and 
vigorously frustrate social change, as hydro-policy has done in Tasmania, 
that Lindblom (1982:333) argues must be identified in policy analysis. 
Chapter Two finds that the capacity of the state to respond to ecological 
demands is dependent upon the extent to which the demands contradict 
economic rationales, undermine capital accumulation, or threaten either 
the viability of the growth economy, or the state's own legitimacy. The 
Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes reveal 
the extent to which state governments themselves may be beholden to 
industrial development proponents within a vulnerable island economy 
(also 5.3.2). Neo-Marxist theory suggests (in 2.4.1) that the state is caught 
in cleft roles of capital accumulation, or the creation of the conditions for 
private profit, and mass legitimacy, or the satisfaction of human need. It 
is argued in Chapter Two that the satisfaction of ecological expectations 
adds a further contradictory demand to the role of the state, namely the 
logic of ecological integrity, with its implied radical distancing of the state 
from capital interests. The emergence of political environmentalism in 
Tasmania with the Pedder campaign added just such a contradiction to 
the role of the state by redefining legitimacy to include the satisfaction of 
ecocentric as well as the satisfaction of anthropocentric needs. An 
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implication of this was that traditional stakeholders in the politics of 
distribution, namely the liberal proponents of capital accumulation and 
the politically opposing labour proponents of capital redistribution, found 
bi-partisan political cause in resisting conservationist demands. 
Chapter Two's discussion traces ecological expectations of the state from 
the early 1970s 'limits-to-growth' demands to the more recent and 
unresolved 'sustainable' growth debate, observing that unrestrained 
economic growth today enjoys precisely the primacy sought for planetary 
survival by ecologists over twenty years ago. Over the same period in 
Tasmania, we have seen resistance initially to the demands of 
conservationists, and subsequently to the environmental, economic, 
community health and local planning objections of any opponents of 
state backed industrial development. This is not to deny, in Solesbury's 
(1976:388) terms above, the 'generalisation' of 'lighter green' 
environmental issues such as water quality, pollution control, recycling 
and landcare, which tend to be the issues least threatening to the state's 
economic development imperatives. But it does suggest that, despite the 
increasing efficacy of environmentalism, and claims of the abating of the 
idea of progress in western democracies (Cotgrove 1976; Berman 1981; 
Satterfield 1983; Paehlke 1985), there is yet to be a paradigmatic shift 
sufficiently away from dominant materialism to embrace 
environmentalism and legitimise its political imperatives. 
6.3 The Value of Broader Analysis 
The policy approach adopted in this thesis has been one that recognises 
ecopolitics as an ideological struggle between value contenders. After 
Simeon (1976) and Downey (1987), it has considered ideological, political 
and institutional constraints upon environmental policy demands. The 
approach has been informed both by ecopolitical theory, in explaining the 
232 
Power and Environmental Policy: 
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale 
i 
l 
1 
1 
political challenge of ecological values, and power analysis, in addressing 
circumstances of policy constraint. This approach views environmental 
policy making not as a value free exercise, but as a process constrained, as 
this thesis argues, by the influence of the dominant industrial 'policy 
paradigm'. It is also an approach well suited to reviewing the nature of 
the ecopolitical challenge, in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and 
Wesley Vale disputes, to the hydro-industrial development tradition. It 
is plainly unhelpful to view these disputes as instances of 'single issue' 
politics, not least, as Chapter Five concludes, because linking them is the 
common assertion of alternate ecocentric values against exploitative state 
hydro-industrial and industrial imperatives. Furthermore, the loss of 
faith by conservationists in the actions of the state, (for its reliance, against 
economic vulnerability upon the depletion of ecological capital), served 
as the catalyst for the emergence of green politics in Tasmania. This was 
not single issue politics in action, subject to the vagaries of the 'issue 
attention cycle', but 'issue persistence' that has seen the conservation 
movement evolve into a sophisticated political and parliamentary force 
in the state. 
The ideological contentiousness of ecopolitical demands has preoccupied 
environmental political theorists, as we saw in Chapter One. This thesis 
argues that it must also be the starting point of inquiry in environmental 
policy analysis if the significance of ecopolitics is to be appreciated. As 
Walker (1992:3) explains, the very practical reason for considering 
environmental problems in their broader context stems from ecological 
complexity itself. Natural ecosystems are sustained by a complexity, bio-
diversity and self-regulation that is vulnerable to human interference. 
Ecocentric concern recognises ecological interconnectedness that prompts 
the consideration of environmental issues in broad, interdisciplinary 
contexts. If environmental policy analysis is concerned with the efficacy 
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of ecopolitical demands, it should identify the manner in which broad 
based ecocentric concern is accommodated or constrained in the policy 
process. As Walker (1992:4) argues, the complexity of ecological concerns 
is beyond many politicians, who simply fit ecology into their routine 
conceptual framework of 'widely accepted theories and world views'. In 
Rodman's (1980:64-65) terms, this is a blatant contradiction of ecological 
notions that amounts to an unquestioning acceptance of the modern 
industrial paradigm. Environmental policy analysis must guard against 
such 'linear, one dimensional' analysis that, Rodman suggests, merely 
reduces the study of environmentalism to policy process and the politics 
of who gets what (Rodman 1980:50). 
Policy analysis must then identify the ideological basis of environmental 
policy demands, the interdependency of the issues at stake, and their 
place within the modern industrial paradigm with its commitment to the 
technological domination of nature (Rodman 1980:50; in 3.2.2). It must 
also consider whether the pluralist study of political activity satisfactorily 
explains policy outcome in circumstances of paradigmatic constraint. As 
the studies of non-decision making by Crenson (1971) and, more recently, 
Hill et al (1989) (in 3.2.3 & 3.2.5) suggest, the object of investigation may 
be, more appropriately, political inactivity. Non-decision making seeks to 
explain covert rather than overt political power, and is concerned with 
decisions that are not taken and why. Nevertheless, in Lukes' (1977) 
terms, as we have seen, studies of overt and covert political power, or 
power in the first and second dimension, are essentially behavioural 
studies. Lukes proposes a radical 'three-dimensional' study of power, 
that is concerned with power in a non-individualistic sense, and that 
seeks to explain the mobilisation of bias toward a policy outcome. In 
Sandbach's (1980:106; in 3.2.4) Marxian terms, mobilisation of bias is 
concerned with objective influence, such as industrial capitalism, that 
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shapes and limits environmental policy choices. Whilst notions of 
influence proposed by the first, second and third dimensions of power are 
methodologically irreconcilable, Blowers (1984) argues that a descriptive 
synthesis of these approaches offers powerful insight into environmental 
policy formation. 
To ideology, interdependency and paradigmatic domination, is added, in 
Chapter Three, the multi-layered tool of power theory that reviews overt, 
covert and latent influences upon environmental policy. Pluralist detail 
of overt political activity is then complemented by covert influence and 
activities of constraint, as well as latent influence such as dominant 
industrialism. After Simeon (1976:550), this approach avoids a too 
narrow focus upon decision making at the cost of failing to appreciate the 
assumptions, values and interests behind policy outcomes. Simeon's 
layering of explanation with his 'causality funnel' is recognition of the 
fact that policy outcomes emerge from a multiplicity of economic, social 
and political forces, that are very often contested, as we saw in 3.3.1. The 
layering of policy explanation should not, however, be mistaken for a 
concession to the deterministic influence of ideology and paradigmatic 
dominance upon decision making. Hydro-industrialisation may have 
constrained environmental policy in a determinist fashion for many 
decades in Tasmania, but that did not preclude conservationist victories 
in the Franklin and Wesley Vale disputes. As Chapter Five concludes, 
ideological, political and institutional forces may have shaped policy and 
constrained environmental demands in the disputes studied, but they 
have also prompted Tasmania's political greening in protest. 
6.4 The Greening of Tasmania? 
Tasmanian environmental politics, particularly the Franklin and Wesley 
Vale disputes, have focused world attention on the revolutionary practice 
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of the new politics of ecology in this small island state. As victories for 
the environment, and inspirations to the state's green movement, the 
outcomes of these dispute have become internationally synonymous 
with the 'greening' of Tasmania. The election of five independent green 
parliamentarians after the Wesley Vale dispute in 1989, and the Labor-
Green Accord these five struck to sustain a minority Labor Government 
in power, seemed, until its collapse, evidence of further greening. Indeed 
Hay argues that Tasmania has the only political system primarily focused 
upon 'issues of environment' in the world, and a green movement more 
visible than anywhere in the world. In turn, Hay observes, Tasmanian 
environmentalists have achieved 'tactical and ideological sophistication 
not matched anywhere else in the world' (Hay 1993:7). Inevitably, the 
green phenomenon has impacted in a multiplicity of positive ways upon 
environment policy formation, predominantly in terms of the adoption 
of lighter green 'ideas' least threatening to established industrial interests. 
But in terms of industrial development and natural resource exploitation 
acute bi-partisan political antipathy towards environmentalists remains 
an obstacle to the legitimation of ecocentric values and demands. Having 
considered each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale 
disputes, there appear to be at least two key explanations for the likely 
persistence of this antipathy. 
Firstly, the collapse of hydro-policy has not prompted diversification of 
Tasmania's narrow industrial structure, leaving the state rudderless in 
terms of economic development. This is partly because action to address 
the flaws in hydro-policy has been tainted 'green' and 'anti-Tasmanian' 
by the bi-partisan political backers of exploitative state development since 
the days of the Pedder dispute. The hydro-industrial notion of corporate 
privilege to Tasmania's largest industries has persisted, therefore, despite 
exacerbating the state's economic vulnerability, with all the problems of 
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external ownership, poor returns to the state, and incessant job shedding 
that were first identified by the green movement over twenty years ago. 
As we saw in Chapter Five, the green movement has persisted for over 
twenty years in advocating an alternate economic direction for the state. 
This paid electoral dividends after the collapse of the Labor-Green Accord. 
Although the 1992 state election returned the Liberals to power, ironically 
on the promise of three pulp mills, it also returned each of the five green 
independents to parliament on their ten point, ten year economic plan 
and jobs blueprint for Tasmania, whilst delivering a crushing defeat to 
Labor whose vote fell to an historical low. The Tasmanian Greens, as the 
independents renamed themselves, appeared not to have suffered from 
the Accord's collapse, but to have usurped Labor, at least in development 
policy terms, as de facto opposition to the Liberal Government' (Moore 
1992; Green Independents 1991; Australian Editorial 3 February 1992, p. 8). 
This leads us to a further explanation for the persistent antipathy towards 
the green movement and environmentalism in Tasmania. 
The electoral eclipse of the State Labor Party, once the natural ruling party 
of Tasmania, can be traced to the politically destabilising effect of the Lake 
Pedder dispute over twenty years ago. Hydro-policy had been the key to 
Labor's extraordinary grip on state political power that was first broken 
over Premier Reece's mishandling of the Pedder issue. The flooding of 
Lake Pedder was an exercise of solidarity achieved by the Labor Premier, 
the Labor Prime Minister, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and 
the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council. However, the dispute had 
also seen Premier Reece briefly cast from office, breaking Labor's thirty 
five year hold on power, and prompting the rise of environmentalism in 
Though each of the five greens was returned at the 1992 election after Accord's 
collapse, it was with a reduced margin that may be considered some sort of electoral 
backlash. In fact, it was an unexpected achievement for all five to be returned, given the 
absence of any catalysing ecopolitical conflict, and the expected drift of votes back to 
mainstream parties after the resolution of the Wesley Vale dispute. 
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Tasmania. After Pedder's flooding, it was not only conservationists that 
sought to challenge the dominance of the hydro-industrial article of faith, 
but also, Hay (1986:20) observes, the younger members of the Labor Party. 
As Lowe (1984:24) also explains, younger members felt disenfranchised 
from the process of government by the superficial role they played at 
party forums in policy setting and review. Hydro-politics had always 
been an exclusive preserve that saw government and the party controlled 
to a large extent by executive power, and the 'centralised influence', Hay 
(1986:21) adds, of a 'small coterie' of party strongmen. For the younger 
members of the party, the subsequent Franklin dispute was as much an 
attempt to regain political control from the Hydro-Electric Commission, 
as it was to vet its hydro-industrial plans for state development. 
Reformist policies caused considerable friction within the party between 
old style trade unionists, who defended hydro-industrialisation as job 
creating, and younger middle class members, who backed the 
conservationist demand for an indefinite moratorium on the provision 
of large blocks of energy to capital intensive industries (Davis 1983:205; 
Davis 1983b:110; Crowley 1989:51). 
The conservative right wing of the Labor Party, having eventually tossed 
Lowe from the Premiership for his consensual handling of the Franklin 
dispute, went on, under Harry Holgate, to lose the 1982 state election to 
Robin Gray, recording its lowest statewide vote - 36.9 per cent - since 1931 
(Bennett 1983:86). The Labor Party was left bitterly divided. Divisions 
inspired by the Pedder and Franklin controversies were so fundamental 
and ideologically irreconcilable that they remained and were largely 
responsible for the party's vacuous stance on state development at 
Electrona and Wesley Vale (Crowley 1989:51). After the fall of the Gray 
Government over the Wesley Vale dispute, Labor again recorded its 
lowest ever vote, whilst the Greens achieved the electoral success of 
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returning five members to the Lower House of Assembly (see fn /). The 
political gains of the Greens had been largely at Labor's expense, Flanagan 
argues. He suggests that it is Labor that must bear the responsibility for 
the emergence of the Greens, having itself forfeited 'the reservoir of ideas 
and idealism which is an essential ingredient in the chemistry of the 
ALP' (Flanagan 1989b:8). The Labor Party in Tasmania remains without a 
profile on either environmental issues or industrial development. It 
resents the Greens for thwarting its 'fanciful' hope, Warden (1990:15) 
argues, of 'reintegrating the breakaway green faction' of its own party. 
For as long as it sides with the Liberals against the green challenges now 
mounted routinely in State Parliament, Labor will remain consigned to a 
political irrelevance that fuels its antipathy to the Greens. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Despite the impressive achievements of over two decades, Tasmania's 
greening has seen antipathy entrenched between dominant materialist 
and alternate ecological interests in the state. Whilst this antipathy 
threatens the efficacy of future environmental demands, it remains a 
fillip both to the state's conservation organisations and to the efforts of 
the parliamentary greens. State politics has been assailed by green issues 
since the 1992 state election, the breadth of which bears testimony to the 
Tasmanian Greens' bid for government in their own right that featured 
in their 1992 election campaign. Meanwhile, hydro-industrialisation and 
the inundation of Lake Pedder, the issues that prompted the emergence 
of political environmentalism in Tasmania over two decades ago, are 
again on the political agenda. The Pedder 2000 campaign, spearheaded by 
Dr Bob Brown and supported by the David Suzuki Foundation and the 
World Conservation Union, aims to see the restoration of Lake Pedder to 
its original state by the year 2000 (LPRC 1994). The campaigners argue that 
the hydro-industrial era has finished, leaving Tasmania saddled with its 
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legacies, an enormous hydro-generated state debt, an oversupply of power 
and a Hydro-Electric Commission that remains blinkered and inflexible. 
There were indications at the recent Energy Council Tasmania forum that 
this view is finally gaining legitimacy twenty years after it was first raised 
by conservationists (Mercury 6 May 1994). It remains to be seen whether 
or not this is so, and whether or not conservationists in the small island 
state of Tasmania, having launched global environmental politics with 
the formation of the world's first green party, will next launch a new era 
of ecological restoration with the 'rediscovery' of Lake Pedder. 
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APPENDICIES 
Year Hydro-Development 
1895 Duck Reach (closed 1955); 
built - Launceston City Council 
1911 Great Lake - (privately built) 
1914 Hydro-Electric Dept established 
1916 Waddamana 
1922 Miena 
1923 Liawenee 
1930 Hydro-Electric Dept becomes 
Hydro-Electric Commission 
1934 Shannon (closed 1934) 
1938 Tarraleah - 90mw 
(extended 1943, 1945 & 1951) 
1951 Butlers Gorge - 12.2mw 
1953 Tugatinah - 125mw 
1955 Trevallyn - 80mw 
1956 Lake Echo - 32.4mw 
1957 Wayatinah - 38mw 
1960 Liapootah - 84 mw 
1962 Catagun a - 48 mw 
Year Hydro - Development 
1964 Poatina - 300 mw 
1966 Tods Corner - 1.6 mw 
1967 Meadowbank -40 mw 
1968 Cluny - 17mw; Repulse - 
28mw; Rowallan - 10.4mw 
1969 Lemonthyme - 51mw; 
Devils Gate - 60mw 
1971 Wilmot - 30mw; Bell Bay 1 
oil fired thermal - 120mw; 
Cethana - 85mw 
1972 Paloona - 28mw 
1973 Fisher - 43mw 
1978 Gordon 1 - 288mw 
(to which Pedder was lost) 
1981 Macintosh - 80mw 
1983 Bastyan - 80mw 
1987 Reece - 240mw 
1992 King River - 143mw 
1994 Hent -Anthon - 83mw 
Appendix 1 - A Century of Hydro-Industrialisation in Tasmania 
(Source: Caples 1994:17) 
Name 	 JParty 	From 	To 	Mths 
Ogilvie A G 	ALP 	22.6.34 	10.6.39 	60 
Gray E D ALP 	11.6.39 	18.12.39 	6 
Cosgrove R 	ALP 	18.12.39 	18.12.47 	96 
Brooker E ALP 	18.12.47 	25.2.48 	2 
Costgrove R 	ALP 	25.2.48 	26.8.58 	126 
Reece E 	ALP 	26.8.58 	26.5.69 	129 
Bethune W A 	Lib 	26.5.69 	3.5.72 	35 
Reece E 	ALP 	3.5.72 	31.3.75 	35 
Neilson W A 	ALP 	31.3.75 	1.12.77 	32 
Lowe D 	ALP 	1.12.77 	11.11.81 	47 
Holgate H ALP 	11.11.81 	26.5.82 	5 
Gray R 	Lib 	26.5.82 	29.6.89 	85 
Field M ALP 	29.6.89 	17.2.92 	32 
Groom R 	Lib 	17.2.92 
Appendix 2 - Tasmanian Premiers - from 1934 to 1994 
(Source: Newman 1985 Sz 1994) 
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